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RESEARCH ARTICLES

Identity Status, Frequency of Substance Use and Psychological Symptoms of Adults: Comparison of In Native Germans and Germans of Turkish Origin

Gülşah YILDIRIM and Hilmiye Nesrin DİLBAZ

Abstract. The first aim of the study is to compare whether there is a difference in the identity status of Germans of Turkish origin compared to native Germans. The second aim of the study was to examine the relationship between identity status and psychological symptoms and frequency of substance use. 159 Germans of Turkish origin and 150 native Germans participated in the study. SCL-90R scale, Expanded Objective Ego Identity Statuses Scale and Substance Use Frequency Scale were used in the study. Pearson chi-square and Fisher's exact test were used to compare discrete variables. Compliance of continuous variables with normal distribution was evaluated by Kolmogorov Smirnov test. Intergroup comparisons of continuous variables were made with Mann Whitney U test. The linear relationship between the variables was evaluated by Spearman correlation test. In the study, the "achievement" identity status score was statistically significantly higher in the native German group, and the "foreclosure" and "diffusion" identity status scores were statistically significantly higher in the German group of Turkish origin. It was concluded that individuals in the achievement identity status in the native German group used substances at least once in their lives. On the other hand, one of the most striking results of this study is that although the foreclosure and diffusion identity status scores of Germans of Turkish origin were higher than the other group, no significant relationship was found with substance use. When the scores of the Germans of Turkish origin and native German groups on the SCL-90 scale were compared, all psychological symptoms except the "Somatisation" symptom were higher in the German group of Turkish origin than in the native German group.

INTRODUCTION

The history of the community of Turkish origin living in Germany has been realised in three stages since 1961. The first generation consists of immigrants who came with the first waves of immigration in 1961 and later, and the second generation consists of Turkish families who came to Germany with the family reunification law that came into force in 1974. Children of Turkish origin born and raised in Germany constitute the third generation (Yurdakul & Çaha, 2018). Since the first generation Turkish immigrants migrated only for economic reasons, they did not have any problems such as communication with the German society, integration, identity or cultural adaptation (Başkurt, 2009). Unlike the first generation, the second generation and beyond compare themselves with the same age group of the country they were born and raised in and perceive the opportunities and possibilities they are deprived of (Çelik, 2008). This change, which started in the second generation, has had various effects on the identity perception of the third generation born and raised in Germany (Kaya & Kentel, 2005). Studies have shown that the rate of adoption of both Turkish identity and German identity has decreased among Germans of Turkish descent in the third and fourth generations (Demirağ & Kakışım, 2018). In addition, different ethnic groups, ethnic minorities and bicultural individuals may experience problems such as low self-esteem, anxiety and depression (Mossakowski 2001; Hovey et al, 2006; Lahti et al, 2003). As a result of many studies conducted in the UK on Caribbean, Polish, Irish, Indian and Pakistani immigrants, it has been revealed that these immigrants have a high rate of schizophrenia diagnosis. Since the low rates of schizophrenia diagnosis in the countries of origin of these immigrants cannot be explained by "immigrants are genetically close to these disorders", it has been determined that this situation is related to the problems experienced during migration, after migration or belonging to a different origin (Acartürk, 2016). Psychological problems and identity crisis are risk factors for individuals of different origins who experience a dilemma between the traditional family structure and the culture in which they live (Derin, 2020).

Individuals who migrate settle in an unfamiliar sociocultural environment from the cultural and social environment they belong to and can continue their generation here (Kaplan & Chacko, 2015). For this reason, individuals who both migrate and are born as belonging to a different origin experience processes of sociocultural continuity, feeling of not belonging and alienation, acclimatisation and

adaptation problems (Tekeli, 2010; Schouler-Ocak, 2015). Phenomena such as migration and belonging to a different origin cause these individuals to feel hopeless, insecure and lonely. Therefore, this situation may cause risky behaviours to occur and may negatively affect individuals' substance use and criminal tendencies (Cömertler & Kar, 2001; Kılıç et al., 2017). The identity confusion that emerges during adolescence in the children of second-generation immigrants, called the "intermediate generation", may have more pathological consequences. It was determined that the use of psychoactive substances increased as a method of getting used to a new culture and escaping from the problems brought by the adaptation process. The most common substances used are alcohol and cannabis (Brooke et al., 1988; Güler & Demircan, 2022). Cases such as migration, ethnic minorities, belonging to different origins can negatively affect mental health and this is stated as a factor that increases the risk of substance use (Jirapramukpitak et al., 2008, Derin, 2020). Individuals of Turkish origin who experience problems such as intergenerational conflict, social marginalisation and adaptation problems in Germany have problems with both their families and the environment they live in. Due to these problems and generational conflict, there are research results showing that Turkish immigrants and their families start to use substances (Richard Friman, 2004; Haasen et al., 2004).

Individuals who migrate interact with the new culture. In the face of this cultural diversity, the individual tries to find his/her place in society (Akdoğan Öztürk & Taş, 2018). In this context, concepts such as dual/multiculturalism, dual/multilingualism, dual/multi-identity are encountered (Candemir Özkan, 2022). It is thought that this study on individuals of different origins, who are evaluated within disadvantaged groups, will contribute to individual and social mental health studies, psychology and psychological counselling.

Social integration, identity status, feeling of belonging, psychological adaptation, substance abuse, etc. of Turks, who constitute the largest immigrant group and foreign Germans in Germany, have recently been among the important political and sociological issues. The aim of the research is to examine whether there is a difference in the identity statuses of Germans of Turkish origin compared to native Germans and the relationship of these identity statuses with psychological symptoms and frequency of substance use. In this direction, the problem statement of the research is defined as follows:

Is there a significant relationship between Identity Status, Substance Use Frequency and Psychological Symptoms of Germans of Turkish Origin and Native Germans Living in Germany?

1. Is there a significant difference between the Identity Statuses of Germans of Turkish origin and native Germans living in Germany?

2. Is there a significant difference between the psychological symptoms of Germans of Turkish origin and native Germans living in Germany?

3. Is there a significant difference between the frequency of substance use of Germans of Turkish origin and native Germans living in Germany?

METHODOLOGY

Participants

In this study, which was conducted among Germans of Turkish origin and native Germans living in Germany, the German sample of Turkish origin consisted of 159 people and the native German sample consisted of 150 people. The mean age of the German sample of Turkish origin was 25,7±4,1 years, while the mean age of the native German sample was 25,4±4,6 years. There was no statistically significant difference between the mean ages of the groups (p=0.512). Although the share of women was higher in the German sample of Turkish origin and the share of men was higher in the other group, the difference was not statistically significant (p=0,058). When analysed according to marital status, the share of married people is higher in the German sample of Turkish origin, whereas the share of single people is higher in the other group and the difference is statistically significant (p<0,001). When analysed according to educational status, the share of university graduates in the Turkish sample and high school graduates in the other group was high and the difference was statistically significant (p=0,005). Details are given in Table-1.

Table-1 Comparison of Groups According to Some Sociodemographic Characteristics

	Germans of Turkish orig (n=159) n (%)	Native Germans (n=150) n (%)	chi-square (χ^2)	p*
Gender				
Female	85 (53,5)	64 (42,7)		
Male	74 (46,5)	86 (57,3)	3,601	0,058
Marital status				
Single	114 (71,7)	136 (90,7)		
Married	42 (26,4)	12 (8,0)	18,556	<0,001
Divorced	3 (1,9)	2 (1,3)		
Educational Status				
Primary school	0 (0,0)	3 (2,0)		
Middle school	16 (10,1)	9 (6,0)		
High school	43 (27,0)	66 (44,0)	16,704	0,005
University	83 (52,2)	54 (36,0)		
Master Degree	17 (10,7)	17 (11,3)		
Doctorate	0 (0,0)	1 (0,7)		

* Pearson chi-square test

* Pearson chi-square test

Measurements

Sociodemographic Form

The form prepared to collect sociodemographic data of the participants included questions on gender, marital status, age and education level.

SCL-90R Scale

The SCL-90R scale, which was developed and finalised by Derogotis et al. (1976), was applied to reveal the psychological symptoms that occur or may occur in the individual and the level of these symptoms. The 5-point Likert-type scale consists of a total of 90 questions, including 9 subtests and 1 additional scale. The scale is scored as Extremely 4, Extremely 3, Moderately 2, Very little 1, Never 0. The general symptom index is obtained by dividing the score obtained from all items by the total number of items. If the score obtained from the subtests of the scale is 1 and below 1, it is accepted that the symptoms are normal, and if it is above 1, it is accepted that the person is prone to the pathology of that subtest and has the characteristics of the psychological symptoms of that subtest. The subtests are Somatisation (Som), Obsessive-Compulsive (Ob-Com), Interpersonal Sensitivity (I-S), Depression (Dep), Anxiety (Anx), Anger and Hostility (Anger-Fall), Phobic Anxiety (PhobAnx), Paranoid Ideation (Pard), Psychoticism (Psych) and additional items (eating and sleep disorders).

Expanded Objective Ego Identity Statuses Scale

The identity statuses scale, which was first created by Adams, Shea and Fitch (1979) to measure the four identity statuses put forward by Marcia in individuals aged 18-30, was later revised by Grotevant and Adams (1984). The scale was expanded and finalised by Bennion and Adams (1986). It is a 64-item, six-point Likert-type scale. Answers range from 1 (completely agree) to 6 (completely disagree). The scale consists of two domains: ideological identity (32 items) and interpersonal identity (32 items). Each item analyses the crises and commitments experienced by individuals. There are 16 items in the scale belonging to four identity statuses defined by Marcia as "moratorium, achievement, diffusion, foreclosure". Of these 16 items, 8 items are in the interpersonal domain and 8 items are in the ideological domain.

The person can score between 16 and 96 points for each identity state. High scores indicate a high level of the characteristics valid for the associated identity state. There is no total score in the scale and there are no reverse scored items. As a result of the validity and reliability study conducted by Oscay (1998), Cronbach's alpha internal consistency coefficients were found to be .75, .84, .57 and .73 for achievement, foreclosure, diffusion and moratorium identity statuses, respectively. Test-retest reliability coefficients were .72, .81, .79, .77 for achievement, foreclosure, diffusion, moratorium identity statuses, respectively.

Substance Use Frequency Scale

The scale includes questions on use in the last 30 days, last 12 months and lifetime use to measure the frequency of alcohol, smoking, cannabis and drugs.

Procedure

Participants were selected on a voluntary basis and were determined by random sampling. The research was announced to Turkish and German individuals through various social media (instagram, facebook, twitter, whatsapp, school club pages, online community-based sites...). Participants who wanted to participate in the study contacted the researchers. The first 172 Germans of Turkish origin and the first 161 native Germans were included in the study. The data of 24 participants who did not complete the scales were not evaluated. In order to answer the questions in the study impartially, the name, surname and address information of the participants were not asked, and the participants were informed with the Informed Consent Form that the answers would be kept confidential. Turkish and German forms of the scales were delivered to the participants via Google form.

Analysis of Data

Statistical analyses were performed with IBM SPSS version 21.0 (IBM Corp. Released 2012. Armonk, NY, USA) package programme. Descriptive statistics were given as mean, standard deviation, frequency and percentage. Pearson chi-square and Fisher's exact test were used to compare discrete variables. Compliance of continuous variables with normal distribution was evaluated by Kolmogorov Smirnov test. Intergroup comparisons of continuous variables were made by Mann Whitney U test. The linear relationship between variables was evaluated by Spearman correlation test.

RESULT

When the sub-dimension scores of the groups belonging to the "Identity Statuses Scale" were compared, a statistically significant difference was found between the groups except for the "Moratorium" sub-dimension score ($p<0.05$). The "achievement" identity status score was statistically significantly higher in the native German group, while the "diffusion" and "foreclosure" identity status scores were statistically significantly higher in the German group of Turkish origin ($p<0.05$). Details are given in Table-2.

Table-2 Comparison of Identity Status Scale Sub-Dimension Scores of Groups

Identity Status Score	Germans of Turkish origin (n=159) Mean±SD	Native Germans (n=150) Mean±SD	z	p*
Achievement	56,3±17,8	65,0±15,0	-4,465	<0,001
Foreclosure	42,7±20,3	32,7±13,1	-4,459	<0,001
Diffusion	47,9±14,1	43,3±13,6	-3,123	0,002
Moratorium	45,9±16,7	45,1±14,0	-0,092	0,926

SD= Standard Deviation * Mann Whitney U test

Table-2 Comparison of Identity Status Scale Sub-Dimension Scores of Groups
SD= Standard Deviation * Mann Whitney U test

When the sub-dimension scores of the identity status scale were compared according to smoking, alcohol, cannabis and drug use in German individuals of Turkish origin, no statistically significant difference was found between the groups ($p>0.05$). Details are given in Table-3.

Table-3 Comparison of Identity Status Scores According to Substance Use in the German Group of Turkish Origin

Table-3 Comparison of Identity Status Scores According to Substance Use in the German Group of Turkish Origin

	Identity Status Score	Never uses Mean±SD	At least 1 per day Mean±SD	z	p*
Smoking		(n=100)	(n=59)		
	Achievement	57,6±14,4	54,0±22,4	-0,282	0,778
	Foreclosure	44,2±19,3	40,2±21,8	-1,821	0,069
	Diffusion	48,2±12,1	47,5±17,1	-0,557	0,578
	Moratorium	47,0±15,7	44,0±18,2	-1,309	0,191
Alcohol		(n=58)	(n=101)		
	Achievement	56,8±16,5	55,9±18,5	-0,070	0,944
	Foreclosure	45,2±18,7	41,3±21,0	-1,739	0,082
	Diffusion	48,3±14,0	47,7±14,3	-0,430	0,667
	Moratorium	44,9±17,1	46,4±16,5	-0,324	0,746
Cannabis		(n=128)	(n=31)		
	Achievement	56,2±17,5	56,3±19,1	-0,030	0,976
	Foreclosure	42,5±19,5	43,3±23,5	-0,280	0,779
	Diffusion	48,1±14,4	47,2±12,9	-0,048	0,962
	Moratorium	45,7±16,4	46,7±18,4	-0,048	0,962
Drugs		(n=151)	(n=8)		
	Achievement	56,0±17,8	60,8±18,6	-0,820	0,412
	Foreclosure	42,0±19,6	54,8±29,2	-1,146	0,252
	Diffusion	47,8±14,1	50,4±14,5	-0,737	0,461
	Moratorium	45,4±16,3	55,3±23,0	-1,119	0,263

SD= Standard Deviation * Mann Whitney U test

When the sub-dimension scores of the identity status scale were compared according to the smoking status of the native German individuals, a statistically significant difference was found only in the "moratorium" identity sub-dimension score. The score of never smokers was statistically significantly higher (p=0,021). No statistically significant difference was found in comparisons between other groups

(p>0.05).

When the sub-dimension scores of the identity status scale were compared according to alcohol consumption status in the native German group, a statistically significant difference was found between the groups in the "achievement" and "foreclosure" identity sub-dimension scores. Both identity scores were higher in those who had used alcohol at least once in their lifetime (p<0.05). No statistically significant difference was found in comparisons between other groups (p>0.05).

When the sub-dimension scores of the identity status scale were compared according to cannabis use in the native German group, a statistically significant difference was found between the groups only in the "achievement" identity sub-dimension score. The mean score was higher in those who had used cannabis at least once in their lifetime (p<0.05). No statistically significant difference was found in comparisons between other groups (p>0.05).

When the sub-dimension scores of the identity status scale were compared according to the status of drug use in the native German individuals, a statistically significant difference was found between the groups only in the "achievement" identity sub-dimension score. The mean score was higher in those who had used drugs at least once in their lifetime (p=0.005). No statistically significant difference was found between the other groups (p>0.05). Details are presented in Table-4.

Table-4 Comparison of Identity Status Scores According to Substance Use in the Native German Group

Table-4 Comparison of Identity Status Scores According to Substance Use in the Native German Group

	Identity Status Score	Never uses Mean±SD	At least 1 per day Mean±SD	z	p*
Smoking		(n=110)	(n=40)		
	Achievement	64,4±14,6	66,7±16,1	-1,152	0,249
	Foreclosure	33,4±13,3	30,6±12,5	-1,197	0,231
	Diffusion	43,6±14,1	42,9±12,4	-0,147	0,883
	Moratorium	46,7±14,4	40,8±12,2	-2,300	0,021
Alcohol		(n=23)	(n=127)		
	Achievement	52,0±20,2	67,3±12,6	-3,428	0,001
	Foreclosure	33,1±12,4	32,6±13,3	-0,564	0,573
	Diffusion	37,7±11,1	44,4±13,8	-2,179	0,029
	Moratorium	40,3±14,8	46,0±13,8	-1,711	0,087
Cannabis		(n=86)	(n=64)		
	Achievement	60,7±15,9	70,8±11,6	-4,062	<0,001
	Foreclosure	33,3±12,3	31,8±14,2	-1,196	0,232
	Diffusion	43,4±13,3	43,4±14,2	-0,310	0,757
	Moratorium	45,1±14,0	45,1±14,2	-0,232	0,817
Drugs		(n=125)	(n=25)		
	Achievement	63,4±15,2	72,7±11,2	-2,820	0,005
	Foreclosure	32,3±12,1	34,4±17,5	-0,101	0,920
	Diffusion	43,1±12,9	45,1±17,2	-0,119	0,906
	Moratorium	44,6±13,2	47,6±17,7	-0,219	0,826

SD= Standard Deviation * Mann Whitney U test

When the averages of the 10 sub-dimensions of the scale and the general symptom score obtained from all questions were compared over the scores obtained from the SCL-90 scale by German individuals of Turkish origin and native German individuals, statistically significant differences were found between the groups in all

comparisons except for the mean "Som" symptom score. Details are given in Table-5.

Table-5 Comparison of SCL-90 Scale Sub-Dimension and General Symptom Score Means of the Groups

SCL Score	Germans of Turkish origin (n=159) Mean±SD	Native Germans (n=150) Mean±SD	z	p*
Som	0,84±0,77	0,68±0,64	-1,739	0,082
Ob-Com	1,04±0,73	0,76±0,68	-3,486	<0,001
I-S	0,94±0,77	0,68±0,68	-3,235	0,001
Dep	1,02±0,85	0,69±0,67	-3,558	<0,001
Anx	0,75±0,70	0,52±0,55	-2,844	0,004
Anger-Fall	0,83±0,79	0,51±0,55	-3,462	0,001
PhobAnx	0,56±0,69	0,36±0,55	-2,802	0,005
Pard	0,91±0,82	0,56±0,64	-4,026	<0,001
Psych	0,63±0,65	0,34±0,43	-4,422	<0,001
Additional items	1,01±0,79	0,67±0,61	-3,763	<0,001
General symptom	0,86±0,67	0,59±0,52	-3,721	<0,001

SD= Standard Deviation * Mann Whitney U test

When the correlations between the "Identity Status" sub-dimension scores and SCL-90 sub-dimension scores of German participants of Turkish origin were analysed, no statistically significant correlation was found between the "achievement identity" sub-dimension score and any SCL-90 sub-dimension score ($p>0.05$). The "foreclosure personality" sub-dimension score was only positively, weakly and statistically significantly correlated with the "Psyc" score ($p<0.05$). ‘’Diffusion personality" sub-dimension score was positively, weakly and statistically

significantly correlated with "Som", "Dep", "Psy" and "Additional Items" sub-dimension scores. On the other hand, the "Moratorium Personality" subscale score was positively, weakly and statistically significantly correlated with all SCL-90 subscale scores ($p<0.05$). Details are presented in Table-6.

When the correlations between the "Identity Status" sub-dimension scores and SCL-90 sub-dimension scores of the local German participants were examined, a statistically significant correlation was found between the "achievement identity" sub-dimension score and the "I-S" and "Dep" sub-dimension scores ($p<0.05$). The "foreclosure personality" subscale score was not statistically significantly correlated with any SCL-90 subscale score ($p>0.05$). "Diffusion personality" subscale score was positively, weakly and statistically significantly correlated with "Som", "Anx" and "Phob-Anx" subscale scores ($p<0.05$). On the other hand, the "moratorium personality" subscale score is positively, weakly or weak-moderately, statistically significantly correlated with all subscale scores of SCL-90 ($p<0.05$). Details are presented in Table-6.

Table-6 Correlation Results of Groups' Identity Status and SCL-90 Sub-Dimension

Scores

Table-6 Correlation Results of Groups' Identity Status and SCL-90 Sub-Dimension Scores

	Germans of Turkish origin				Native Germans			
	Achievement r_s	Foreclosure r_s	Diffusion r_s	Moratorium r_s	Achievement r_s	Foreclosure r_s	Diffusion r_s	Moratorium r_s
Som	-0,092	0,129	**0,172***	**0,209***	0,008	0,004	**0,183***	**0,222***
Ob-Com	0,066	0,055	0,144	**0,195***	0,130	- 0,049	0,091	**0,250***
I-S	-0,012	0,042	0,101	**0,185***	**0,204**	-0,078	0,054	**0,267***
Dep	0,007	0,073	**0,163***	**0,250***	**0,185**	-0,080	0,142	**0,334***
Anx	-0,125	0,093	0,081	**0,161***	0,024	0,043	**0,183**	**0,270***
Anger-Fall	-0,020	0,119	0,148	**0,235***	0,111	0,077	0,140	**0,290***
Phob-Anx	-0,073	0,094	0,107	**0,196***	0,059	0,061	**0,228**	**0,248***
Pard	0,007	0,037	0,091	**0,167***	0,142	0,001	0,061	**0,275***
Psyc	-0,035	**0,165***	**0,203***	**0,250***	0,077	0,037	0,070	**0,269***
Additional items	0,008	0,092	**0,167***	**0,193***	0,158	-0,123	0,141	**0,257***

r_s = Spearman correlation coefficient

DİSCUSSİON AND CONCLUSİON

In the study, the "achievement" identity status score was statistically significantly higher in the native German group, while the "diffusion" and "foreclosure" identity status scores were statistically significantly higher in the German group of Turkish origin. Ayten (2012) conducted a study on Turkish immigrants aged 12-24 living in the UK and concluded that the "diffusion", "foreclosure" and "moratorium" identity status scores of adolescent Turkish immigrants were higher. These results suggest that immigrants or individuals of a different origin experience identity crisis more than individuals in the dominant

society, and that they cannot make complete decisions about profession, belief and political ideology and develop a definite commitment. Individuals with foreclosure identity status adopt the behaviour patterns and values of their family in the process of acquiring a certain identity and define themselves as the person their family wants them to be (Marcia, 1966). Unlike the individualistic and liberal child rearing style in the German family structure, in the traditional Turkish family structure, Turkish families attach more importance to raising individuals who are loyal to the family, cultural values and religious beliefs. Due to this difference between German and Turkish families, it is thought that it may be effective in the higher score of "foreclosure" identity status in the German group of Turkish origin in this study.

Individuals with diffusion identity status cannot determine their own identity and experience uncertainty and confusion about their work and beliefs (Marcia, 1966). These individuals do not communicate much with others, behave distantly and often experience social isolation (Kroger, 2004; Schwartz, 2001). Individuals living in two different cultures may experience problems of belonging and identity (Solgun & Durat, 2017). There is a high risk that individuals of Turkish origin, who are caught between the expectations of their Turkish families and the expectations of the German society, will be trapped between two cultures and therefore cannot establish a healthy communication with the members of both societies. It is thought that this dilemma experienced by Germans of Turkish origin may be effective in the higher score of "diffusion" identity status in the German group of Turkish origin in this study.

Turks, who are called the third generation in European countries, still continue to experience many social, cultural and political problems. These individuals, who try to create their own identity between the culture of their family and the culture they live in, may experience various mental health problems and identity crisis (Demirbaş, 2014). In parallel with this, substance abuse tendency and problem is becoming one of the important problems among Turkish youth living abroad (Johntson et al., 2000). However, in this study, no significant relationship was found between identity status according to smoking, alcohol, cannabis and drug use in German citizens of Turkish origin. On the other hand, when the sub-dimension scores of the identity status scale were compared according to alcohol, cannabis and drug use in the German sample, a significant relationship was found in the achievement identity status. It is not possible to compare the results since there is no study on the substance use of the new generation of Germans of Turkish origin.

However, when the relevant literature is examined, there are studies that emphasise the multicultural identities of the young generation living in Europe, emphasising that this generation is more integrated into the social, political, economic and cultural life of the country they live in and that they form a bridge between Turkey and the European Union and that they have become multicultural subjects who can show the ability to live comfortably anywhere in the world (Kaya, 2015; Yağmur, 2006). From this point of view, it is thought that individuals of Turkish origin who were born and raised in Germany may be more conscious and controlled in situations such as substance use and harmful behaviours than first and second generation immigrants.

It was concluded that individuals in the achievement identity status in the native German group used substances at least once in their lives. On the other hand, one of the most striking results of this study is that although the diffusion and foreclosure identity status scores of Germans of Turkish origin were higher than the other group, no significant relationship was found with substance use. When the literature is examined, it is stated in many studies that the risk of substance use may increase in different ethnic groups, immigrant groups or individuals living in a different culture (Güler & Demircan, 2022). Tamar (1996) stated that reasons such as fear of deportation, dismissal or discrimination due to substance use by the country where they live reduce the risk of substance use. Hertner et al. (2023) analysed substance use in different ethnic groups living in Germany and concluded that the link between migration, refugees and different ethnic groups and substance use is not as directly related as assumed. In this study, Germans of Turkish origin, regardless of their identity status, had a lower rate of substance use than the other groups. It can be thought that both the expectations and opportunities of the country of residence and the structure of the Turkish family relationship reduce the risk of problematic substance use in Germans of Turkish origin.

When the scores obtained from the SCL-90 scale by the German of Turkish origin and native German groups were compared, the German of Turkish origin group had higher psychological symptoms than the native German group, except for the "Som" symptom. Living as an immigrant, refugee, minority or belonging to a different origin leads to significant changes in the psychological health and emotions of the individual, and these individuals often have symptoms such as anxiety and depression (Cicourel, 1982; Warfa et al., 2005; Hovey & Magana, 2002; Bustamante et al., 2018; Yiğittürk Ekiyor, 202; Tuzcu & Bademli, 2014; Kliewer, 1991). Odergaard (1932), in his study examining the phenomenon of migration and psychological

symptoms, concluded that migration triggers psychosis and schizophrenia disorders in genetically predisposed individuals (Virupaksha et al., 2014). In a study examining the psychological symptoms of Turkish women living in Germany, it was found that Turkish women living in Germany for more than 10 years had depressive affective problems (Babaoğlu & Akdeniz, 2013). Tuzcu and Bademli (2014) conducted a study on 125 migrant workers and found that the participants experienced stress, anxiety and depression problems. The result of this study supports the related literature. Germans of Turkish origin still experience mental health problems at a higher rate than the native population. This situation reveals the necessity of conducting more research on different ethnic groups considered as disadvantaged groups, planning preventive mental health studies and various political and social regulations.

In the German group of Turkish origin, no correlation was found between the "achievement" identity status and any SCL-90 sub-dimension score, while a positive correlation was found between the "foreclosure" identity status and the "Psyc" score, between the "foreclosure" identity status and the "Som", "Dep", "Psych" scores, and between the "Moratorium" identity status and all SCL-90 sub-scores. In the native German group, a positive correlation was found between "achievement" identity status and "I-S" and "Dep", between "foreclosure" identity status and "Som", "Anx", "Phob-Anx" scores and between "Moratorium" identity status and all sub-scores of SCL-90.

Individuals living in two different cultures may experience many psychological problems such as post-traumatic stress disorder and dissociative disorder (Lindert et al., 2009: 251; Hansson et al., 2012, Öztürk, 2020). Germans of Turkish origin, who are called the third generation, are in a completely different cultural structure in Germany, but their Turkish families try to keep them within their own cultural values. This situation causes Germans of Turkish origin to experience identity problems (Haksever, 2014). Tuzcu and Bademli (2014) concluded in their study that individuals who have difficulty in adapting to the country they migrated to and who experience identity conflict experience serious stress, depression and anxiety disorders. These results suggest that there is an interaction between identity status and psychological status and mental health. In particular, the correlation of "Moratorium" identity status with all sub-scores of SCL-90 in both groups strengthens this idea. Yurdakul and Çaha (2018) examined the identity perception of third-generation Germans of Turkish origin living in Germany and concluded that they could not fully adopt neither Turkish identity nor German identity. In this study,

it was concluded that the unhealthy identity structure negatively affects the mental health of both the German of Turkish origin and the Native German group, regardless of ethnic origin. There is a need to carry out mental health studies on the determination of the obstacles to a healthy identity structure and solutions, to expand the work of various psychotherapy branches in the field of identity, and to develop culturally sensitive psychological studies.

This study has several limitations. The first limitation is that the results of this study were interpreted by focusing only on ethnic differences. In future studies, there is a need to examine the relationship between ethnic groups and sociodemographic information such as gender, region of residence, and educational status. Secondly, another limitation is that some individuals of Turkish origin had difficulties in both German and Turkish language and had difficulty in solving the scales. Therefore, the correct understanding of the scale items while answering the scales posed a risk. In order to minimise this risk, the contact addresses of the researchers were given so that the individuals could reach the researchers in case they did not understand while answering the scales. Individuals who asked about the items they did not understand in the scales were explained by the researchers in a way that would not affect their answers.

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Using Link Analysis to Understand Persons of Concern in Zimbabwe

Tabaro H. KABANDA, Johane HLATYWAYO and Simbarashe JOMBO

Abstract. This study uses link analysis to examine United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data from 1975 to 2020, to identify patterns in the migration of persons of concern in Zimbabwe. Supplementary charts and tables are created to further investigate the acquired data and trends. Upon examining the data over time, a notable trend is observed. There is a clear upward trend in out degree with each successive year studied in Zimbabwe. The number of Zimbabweans who left as asylum seekers increased in the 1990s and has risen ten times in size at the end of 2020. Between 1975 and 2005, there were no internally displaced persons (IDPs). The high number of IDPs from 2006 to 2020 occurred as a result of different government policies and actions. This study provides a measurable visual to connect with an audience, enables humanitarian specialists to rerun assessments, and analyse concerns of persons of concern.

Keywords: *Persons of concern; GIS; Refugee; Link analysis; Zimbabwe*

Introduction

Following the major land reform in Zimbabwe in 2000, the migration flows have been changing (Takaindisa, 2021). Zimbabwe's migration history deviates from the norm within the Southern African region. Throughout history, nations have been categorised as either recipient or sending countries in relation to migratory populations. Zimbabwe has consistently found itself in a unique dual nature position (Chikanda & Crush, 2016; Dore et al., 2008). Throughout the years, a significant number of Zimbabwean individuals migrated to South Africa for employment purposes. According to Charlson (2020), a significant proportion of the adult population in Zimbabwe, specifically around 25%, may trace their familial connections to individuals who have engaged in employment within South Africa throughout certain periods of their lives. In contrast, Zimbabwe had an influx of labour migrants originating from neighbouring nations such as Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique. According to Tevara and Zinyama (2002), during the 1951 census, the population of foreign Africans in Zimbabwe amounted to 246,000 individuals, with around 40% of them originating from Mozambique. Zimbabwe served as both an origin, a destination, and a transit point. When examining contemporary patterns of

emigration, it is possible to identify significant stages. The phenomenon of emigration flows and cross-border migrations has exhibited a gradual increase, particularly after the year 2000, coinciding with a significant decline in the national economic conditions (Kiwanuka & Monson, 2009). Furthermore, it is worth noting that a significant proportion of migration and cross-border movements predominantly take place inside the Southern African region (Tevara & Zinyama, 2002). In addition, it is worth highlighting the prominent types of migration and cross-border movements that have experienced significant growth since the 1990s. These include irregular migration, informal cross-border trade, migration of highly skilled individuals, and survival migration of individuals facing poverty and destitution (Crush & Tevera, 2003). Accurate data on migration in Zimbabwe is challenging to obtain due to its predominantly informal and undocumented nature. The existing data, which lack complete quantification, trends and circularity, present an overly distorted and understated portrayal of Zimbabwean emigration patterns. Hence, it is imperative to do a comprehensive investigation in this context in order to gain a deeper comprehension of the dynamics associated with their migratory patterns.

In today's rapidly evolving world, where over 100 million people were displaced worldwide in May 2022 alone (Jagtap et al., 2022), accessible, trustworthy, and timely geospatial data are essential. It is crucial to harness the potential of geospatial data to help make informed decisions and take effective action on the ground during a humanitarian disaster. Migration and internal displacement are location-based fields that rely heavily on geospatial data. The migration and dynamic growth of refugees in the European Union (EU) countries were visualised by Calka and Cahan (2016) using GIS to create interactive maps. This mapping method facilitated strategic decisions and provided a resource for the people of refugee-accepting nations. The necessity to visualise the routes of refugees and their final destinations is the basis of this study. Zhang (2015) employed GIS to visualise the distribution of overseas Chinese in Japan and other parts of the world and their provinces of origin in China to analyse the migration process. The findings revealed a higher number of Chinese migrants originating from cities and provinces in the eastern coastal area, such as Beijing, Shanghai and Northeast China. In contrast, fewer migrants came from inland provinces. This study underscored the significance of GIS in conducting spatial-temporal analyses of migration patterns. In a similar vein, Çetinkaya et al. (2016) utilised a GIS-based fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (FAHP) and technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) to

identify suitable locations for refugee camps catering to Syrian refugees in Turkey. The research demonstrated that geospatial methods enable a deeper understanding of alternative suitability patterns and can lead to the adoption of strategies for establishing refugee camps that would not be considered using traditional land suitability analysis methods by planning authorities.

Link analysis is a method in GIS that uses a network of interconnected links and nodes to discover and investigate links that are not readily apparent in the raw data. The following are some common kinds of network: conflict networks that illustrate alliances of connected players (Konig et al., 2017), airline networks that illustrate which airports have connecting flights (Verma et al., 2014), and semantic networks that illustrate topics that are related to each other (Bales & Johnson, 2006). The findings of a link analysis can be visually represented through a link chart or a link map. Centrality metrics can be calculated with the use of link analysis. Some examples of centrality measurements that can be derived by link analysis include degree, betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector. This study aims to employ link analysis to chart the migration of persons of concern from their countries of origin to the countries where they settle. Additionally, supplemental charts and tables will be created to investigate the data and trends that materialise over time in Zimbabwe, a nation in Southern Africa. Using relationships between objects, link analysis can help identify patterns and trends (Tresidder, 2005). The goal is to collect and link information from multiple sources and accurately depict and estimate its relevance to reveal hidden linkages. Many organizations have published maps of persons of concern migration, however, these maps scratch the surface of the problem (Calka & Cahan, 2016). To understand how networks function, it is necessary to perform link analysis and visualise them using link charts. This knowledge makes it possible to take steps to improve, manipulate or disrupt the network. Using a Geographic Information System (GIS), it is possible to add the dimensions of location and time to the depiction of entities and relationships in a link chart.

The study area and methods

2.1 Study area

Zimbabwe, located in the southern region of Africa, is a landlocked country (Figure 1). The country has territorial adjacency with Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique, and South Africa. According to ZIMSTAT (2022), Zimbabwe has a population of 15,178,979 individuals, with males comprising 7,289,558 (48%) and females comprising 7,889,421 (52%). Consequently, the sex ratio in Zimbabwe is 92

males for every 100 females. The total population consisted of 3,818,992 households, with an average of 4 individuals per household. According to ZIMSTAT (2022), the population density in the specified land area of 390757 square kilometres is 39 individuals per square kilometre. Based on a recent evaluation, it can be observed that agricultural expansion is, nevertheless, playing a role in the revival of the economy (Ndlela et al., 2018).



Figure 1: Map of Zimbabwe

2.2 Data

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) database served as the source of the information used in this study. Population estimates of persons of concern are provided quarterly and data are broken down by country of origin. According to UNHCR, affected people and affected populations who have been forcibly removed from their homes are called 'persons of concern' (Idemudia et al., 2020). They include refugees, asylum-seekers, refugee returnees, stateless people, and the internally displaced. The database compiles information from various sources, such as governmental agencies, UNHCR field offices, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), through surveys, censuses, and registrations (AbouZahr et al., 2015). The UNHCR database offers the most significant information available, but it has several drawbacks. The lack of earlier data for some countries is the biggest obstacle to studying persons of concern migration trends, along with different definitions and administrative processes between states. The study will

account for these limitations by performing analyses using complete and more restricted data selections, such as those available for the entire period of interest.

2.3 Methods

According to Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI, 2023), ArcGIS Insights has fundamentally altered spatial analysis. According to Sultan and Hilton (2019), the ArcGIS program is a web-based tool that performs data analytics and can simultaneously work with interactive maps and charts. ArcGIS Insights workbooks were built to investigate, analyse and uncover patterns and specifics within a dataset. Having the data in ArcGIS Insights provides robust analysis that can be shared. The next part provides an overview of a link analysis-based Insights worksheet developed to better understand the persons of concern crisis.

2.3.1 Enabling location

The UNHCR accumulates population statistics in the form of spreadsheets that include refugees, returnees, stateless persons, and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), collectively known as "persons of concern" or "total population of concern." The ArcGIS Insights Workbook uses the countries' shapefile layer boundaries from ArcGIS Living Atlas to geolocate the persons of concern table from UNHCR. To enable the location of the persons of concern table, two fields from the UNHCR table are matched to the countries layer: the field indicating the country of asylum and the field indicating the country of origin.

2.3.2 Creating a link map

The relationships and interconnections within a dataset are the primary focus of a link map. They show how different locations are connected using nodes, lines, or arrows. A new field, Total Population, is added to the persons of concern table. The following equation sums all of the number fields in the spreadsheet to calculate the Total Population of concern:

asylum_seekers+idps_of_concern_to_unhcr+others_of_concern+refugees_under_unhcr_s_mandate+returned_idpss+returned_refugees+stateless_persons

The created link map shows the total number of people of concern who travelled between the different nations, with the nodes denoting the countries of origin and residence. In this case, the directional arrows depict the migratory patterns on the map. Directional relationships between nodes define flow maps. The nodes, which represent the nations of origin and residency, are sized using graduated symbols based on centrality. The degree of centrality of a node reflects its importance within a network. When determining which nodes in a network have the most direct influence on other nodes, a notion known as degree centrality, which is

based on the number of direct connections a node has, can be used. The following equation (ESRI, 2023) is used to compute the degree centrality of node x:

$$degCentrality(x)=deg(x)/(Nodes_{Total}-1)$$

Where:

$Nodes_{Total}$ = Total number of network nodes

$deg(x)$ = The number of nodes connected to node *x*

If the linkages in a network are directed, meaning that information can only flow from one node to another in a specific direction, then the degree centrality can be computed as either the indegree or the outdegree. The in-degree option quantifies the number of nations from which a nation has accommodated asylum seekers and refugees. A country that accommodates individuals from several nations will have a more extensive network. Asylum seekers come from all over the world, and the degree shows which countries are receiving the most of them. The Indegree centrality is computed using the following formula (ESRI, 2023):

$$indegCentrality(x)=indeg(x)/(Nodes_{Total}-1)$$

Where:

$Nodes_{Total}$ = Total number of network nodes

$indeg(x)$ = The number of nodes connected to node *x* with flow directed toward node *x*

The term 'outdegree' describes the total number of connections a nation has with other nations. A country with refugees who leave the country and settle in only one or two other countries would have a smaller symbol than a country with refugees who leave the country and settle in many different countries. The outdegree does not indicate the number of individuals departing a country; rather, it just indicates the number of outgoing linkages the country has. Outdegree centrality is computed with the following formula (ESRI, 2023):

$$outdegCentrality(x)=outdeg(x)/(Nodes_{Total}-1)$$

Where:

$Nodes_{Total}$ = Total number of network nodes

$outdeg(x)$ = The number of nodes connected to node *x* with flow directed away from node *x*

2.3.3 Managing the data

The UNHCR data are displayed in the link map created in the previous phase, making it impossible to identify trends or relationships. Data filtering helps to organise information for better analysis. Instead of reporting on the number of new

persons of concern each year, the UNHCR reports on the total number of individuals of concern for the year. For instance, if a person's status as a persons of concern is first recorded in 2018, they may be recorded as such again in 2019 and 2020 if no changes have occurred. Therefore, avoiding any analysis that combines data from different years is crucial, as doing so will provide inflated figures. In this study, charts are used to supplement the flow map and make your analysis more effective.

Results

3.1 Analysing recent refugee situations

In 2020, Zimbabwe had 23637 total persons of concern, as seen in Table 1. Based on the calculations shown at the bottom of the table, it can be observed that the number of refugees originating from Zimbabwe amounted to more than 8614 individuals. Additionally, the data indicates that there were 14611 individuals classified as asylum-seekers, while no internally displaced persons were reported. The UNHCR data include additional categories of individuals of concern that are not represented in the table. These categories include returned refugees, returned internally displaced persons, stateless persons, and others who are deemed to be of concern. Consequently, the total population figure slightly exceeds the combined count of refugees, asylum-seekers, and internally displaced persons. The majority of available data pertains to those classified as refugees, asylum-seekers, and internally displaced persons, so the data displays those fields.

Table 1: 2020 summary table of total persons of concern

Origin	Residence	Refugees (SUM)	Asylum-seekers (SUM)	IDPs (SUM)	Population (SUM)
Zimbabwe	South Africa	3,954	10,995	0	14,949
	United Kingdom	1,594	467	0	2,061
	United States	756	1,041	0	1,797
	Ireland	597	688	0	1,285
	Canada	629	334	0	963
	Australia	417	213	0	630
	Botswana	20	292	0	592
	Germany	282	254	0	536
	Zimbabwe	0	0	0	132
	Namibia	57	52	0	109
	China	5	90	0	95
	Egypt	43	21	0	64
		Total 8,614	Total 14,611	Total 0	Total 23,637

Both the bubble chart and the flow link map were used to filter and display the countries in which individuals of concern from Zimbabwe were residing during the year 2020. The cartographic representation displays the varying widths of the connections between Zimbabwe and the respective countries of residence, which

serves as an indicator of the volume of individuals of concern who are engaged in migration between these nations. Based on the bubble chart, it can be observed that South Africa had the largest population of individuals of concern, as shown by the highest number of residents. This was followed by the United Kingdom, represented by a green bubble, and the United States, represented by a purple bubble. The flow map uses data extracted from the population field in Table 1, representing it through varying line widths, and establishes connections between the origin and residence locations for different countries. The presentation of the data geographically (Figure 2) provides additional context and information that improves the comprehension of the data.



Figure 2: Bubble chart and the flow map for Zimbabwe in 2020

In addition to providing data on the volume of migrants between nations, the flow map also includes information pertaining to the number of countries from which refugees are entering Zimbabwe, as shown by the centrality of nodes. Figure 3 shows the indegree centraliy of Zimbabwe. The indegree centrality for Zimbabwe in 2020 is 20 (Figure 3). In 2020, South Africa had the highest indegree centrality of any African country, with 59. The indegree centrality measures how many countries a country has accepted persons of concern from.



Figure 3: Indegree centrality for Zimbabwe in 2020

The columns in Figure 4 indicate the countries that have persons of concern residing in Zimbabwe in 2020. The most persons of concern are from Congo DRC (11675) and Mozambique (8172). Figure 4 also shows that Zimbabwe had 23637 persons of concern, as also indicated in Table 1. The blank columns have a very low to no population. Figure 5 shows the number of persons of concern travelling between Zimbabwe and the country of residence in 2020 as the thickness of the links between the two nations. The line to South Africa is the thickest, followed by those to the UK, the USA, and Ireland (as seen in the bubble chart in Figure 2). Around 46% of Zimbabwean refugees had made their way to South Africa.



Figure 4: Column chart of countries that have persons of concern residing in Zimbabwe

Figure 5: Flow map showing outdegree centrality for Zimbabwe in 2020

The occurrence of emigration from Zimbabwe is not a recent development. As an illustration, the process of Zimbabweans relocating to South Africa for employment in the mining sector began in the early 1900s (Zinyama, 1990). Most persons of concern migrated to Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana and the United Kingdom from 1975 to 1990 (Figure 6).

3.2 Comparing changes in movement from 1975 to 2020

3.2.1 Movement from 1975 to 1990



Figure 6: Bubble chart and the flow map for Zimbabwe between 1975 to 1990

During the period 1975 to 1990, 65.6% of the persons of concern were refugees, while no one sought asylum. 486900 individuals out of the total population

under consideration migrated to Mozambique, constituting 63.6% of the population (Table 2). The Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict that occurred in the late 1970s precipitated the enormous refugee crisis (Powell, 2013). Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), a militant socialist organisation that opposed white-minority rule in Rhodesia, began a gradual establishment in Zimbabwean refugee settlements in Mozambique for political and strategic reasons (Powell, 2013). Refugees provided liberation movements with a politically motivated constituency in addition to an excellent source of recruits. The nation acquired formal independence under the name of Zimbabwe on April 18, 1980.

Table 2: Summary table of total persons of concern between 1975 to 1990

Origin	Residence	Refugees SUM	Asylum-seekers SUM	IDPs SUM	Population SUM
Zimbabwe	Mozambique	336,900	0	0	486,900
	Zambia	100,570	0	0	121,110
	Botswana	64,584	0	0	100,374
	Unknown	0	0	0	57,020
	Tanzania	160	0	0	160
	Uganda	120	0	0	120
	Nigeria	110	0	0	110
	Kenya	60	0	0	60
	United Kingd...	15	0	0	15
		Total 502,519	**Total** 0	**Total** 0	**Total** 765,869

Figure 7 shows the bubble chart and flow chart that illustrate the data for Zimbabwe from 1991 to 2005. After a prolonged and contentious struggle for independence, Zimbabwe made significant advances in its economic and social spheres during the 1990s (Crush & Tevera, 2010). During the latter part of the 1990s, the country experienced a rapid deterioration in its social, political, and economic conditions, causing a significant increase in emigration (Hadebe, 2022). The adverse economic conditions, including a declining economy, high inflation and unemployment rates, the deterioration of public services, political repression, and increasing poverty, were significant elements that strongly influenced the decision-making of several Zimbabwean individuals (Besada & Moyo, 2008). The geographical proximity of Zimbabwe to neighbouring countries such as Botswana and South Africa, along with the high demand for Zimbabwean professionals in foreign nations, offered individuals a viable destination for migration (Zinyama & Tevera, 2002).

3.2.2 Movement from 1991 to 2005



Figure 7: Bubble chart and the flow map for Zimbabwe between 1991 to 2005

Overall, there were 66981 persons of concern between 1976 and 2005, 32726 were refugees and 34255 asylum-seekers and no IDPs were reported (Table 3). The number of asylum seekers leaving Zimbabwe increased in the 1990s and has increased sharply since 2006.

Table 3: Summary table of total persons of concern between 1991 to 2005

Origin	Residence	Refugees (SUM)	Asylum-seekers (SUM)	IDPs (SUM)	Population (SUM)
Zimbabwe	South Africa	157	27,241	0	27,398
	United Kingd...	23,250	0	0	23,250
	Canada	5,299	4,176	0	9,475
	United States	1,836	1,630	0	3,466
	Ireland	1,100	172	0	1,272
	Botswana	290	202	0	492
	Germany	151	274	0	425
	New Zealand	308	61	0	369
	Australia	180	140	0	320
	Switzerland	0	92	0	92
		Total 32,726	**Total** 34,255	**Total** 0	**Total** 66,981

3.2.3 Movement from 2006 to 2020



Figure 8: Bubble chart and the flow map for Zimbabwe between 2006 to 2020

Table 4: Summary table of total persons of concern between 2006 to 2020

Origin	Residence	Refugees (SUM)	Asylum-seekers (SUM)	IDPs (SUM)	Population (SUM)
Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe	0	0	442,343	443,381
	South Africa	40,534	378,076	0	418,713
	United Kingd...	139,149	4,877	0	144,026
	Canada	39,381	3,952	0	43,333
	United States	20,089	5,954	0	26,043
	Australia	10,614	1,842	0	12,456
	Botswana	9,720	796	0	11,280
	Ireland	4,973	4,836	0	9,809
	Germany	1,399	1,821	0	3,220
	Namibia	477	922	0	1,399
		Total 270,969	**Total** 405,583	**Total** 442,343	**Total** 1,120,805

The prevalence of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Zimbabwe, as indicated in Table 4, exhibits significant variation, contingent upon the factors contributing to their relocation and the duration of their displacement. Displacement ensued due to various government policies and acts. The primary categories of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Zimbabwe consist of agricultural workers and their dependents who have experienced displacement due to the loss of their employment on farms that were seized and redistributed as part of the fast-track land reform programme (Dziva et al., 2013). Additionally, individuals who have been displaced as a result of forced evictions in urban areas of Zimbabwe constitute another significant group of IDPs (IDMC, 2011). Government initiatives targeting

informal mine workers and politically driven acts of violence resulted in the displacement of several individuals (IDMC, 2011). Internal displacement is also the consequential outcome of global climate change, encompassing both rapid and slow-onset processes. According to Trummer et al. (2023), cyclone Idai had a significant impact in 2019, affecting a population of more than 270000 individuals. The cyclone resulted in the displacement of at least 51000 people while causing the unfortunate loss of over 340 lives and leaving numerous individuals unaccounted for. According to the International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC,

2017), weather-related disasters currently result in the displacement of approximately 21.8 million individuals annually on a global scale.

3.3 Evolution of persons of concern over time

This section compares past and present refugee situations and examines the evolution of persons of concern over time.

Table 5: Summary of the centrality and number of persons of concern in Mozambique for the years 1998 through 2020 in Zimbabwe

IC – Indegree country; OC – Outdegree country; RR – Return refugees; IDP – Internally displaced persons; TP – Total persons; CTP – Country most migrated to

Year	IC	OC	Refugees	RR	Asylum-seekers	IDP	TP	CMM
1998	21	3	40	0	0	0	40	United Kingdom
1999	21	3	40	0	0	0	40	United Kingdom
2000	13	6	109	0	204	0	313	Canada
2001	23	10	257	0	2694	0	2951	Canada
2002	23	16	4024	0	1158	0	5182	United Kingdom
2003	24	17	7155	0	3471	0	10626	United Kingdom
2004	33	19	9557	0	9398	0	18955	South Africa
2005	3	25	11246	0	17330	0	28576	South Africa
2006	3	26	12774	0	1207	0	13981	United Kingdom
2007	13	26	14366	0	34318	0	48684	South Africa
2008	10	31	16825	5	34776	0	51606	South Africa
2009	10	33	22441	19	1394	0	23854	United Kingdom
2010	10	33	24081	180	1001	0	25262	United Kingdom
2011	12	31	25033	19	36685	54278	116055	Zimbabwe
2012	11	32	22082	21	41723	57926	121774	Zimbabwe
2013	13	34	19719	0	41822	60139	121777	Zimbabwe
2014	14	35	22478	55	42419	0	65068	South Africa
2015	16	36	21332	31	57376	0	78874	South Africa
2016	16	33	18141	6	43191	0	61499	South Africa
2017	16	39	17420	38	21760	0	39387	South Africa
2018	16	39	15618	21	17121	0	32870	South Africa
2019	19	39	10045	132	16179	270000	296477	Zimbabwe
2020	20	45	8614	280	14611	0	23637	South Africa

Table 5 shows data from 1998, two years prior to the decision made by the government of Zimbabwe in the year 2000 to seize land without providing adequate compensation (Takaindisa, 2021). This marked a turning point in the country's history. The so-called "rapid land reform initiative" led to the eviction of many commercial farmers and those who worked for them. According to Dore et al. (2008), the unorganised manner in which the program was carried out contributed significantly to a loss in production and continued to destroy the economy, which was already weak due to earlier neglect, corruption, and a hastily conceived Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). The ESAP implemented in Zimbabwe in 1990 aimed to usher in a transformative period of industrialisation characterised by modernisation, competitiveness, and export-oriented growth (Brett & Winter, 2020). After the early success in the first few years, the expected dividends of ESAP did not materialise. In 2002, the total persons for concern was more than 5000 for the first time (Table 5). The collapse of commercial agriculture combined with unfavourable meteorological conditions led to significant food shortages (Andersson, 2007). As a result, approximately half of Zimbabwe's population was forced to seek emergency assistance with their food supply. As a

direct consequence of this, a massive population shift occurred. Between 2000 and 2008, many countries, including Canada, the United Kingdom, and South Africa, saw an increase in the number of people applying for asylum from Zimbabwe (Table 5). Several interrelated events caused the upheaval of people's living arrangements. Operation Murambatsvina, which took place in 2005 (Musoni, 2010), was one of the other factors considered. It was formally presented as a program to rid cities of illegal structures, illegal companies, and criminal activity. In reality, it was used as a tool to punish political opponents and, as a direct consequence, an estimated 700000 people were forced out of their employment or their homes (Musoni, 2010). The vast majority of people displaced from their farms and cities sought refuge in the countries listed in Table 5. During the violent land reform and election in 2008, some people were forced to flee the country. According to Dziva et al. (2013), during the national election in 2008, suspected members of the ruling party were responsible for the deaths of over 200 people affiliated with the opposition party. During the peak of hyperinflation in 2008, the economy experienced significant devastation, resulting in an exacerbation of poverty among its population and compelling a substantial number of Zimbabwean individuals to seek emigration (Kudzai, 2023). On the other hand, according to Makochekanwa (2016), the most extreme monthly inflation rate for Zimbabwe was estimated to be 79.6 billion percent, which is equal to 89.7 sextillion. According to Hadebe (2022), following ZANU-PF's first-ever loss of its parliamentary majority in elections in 2008, and a subsequent political standstill over the contested election results, discussion ensued, leading to the formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU) in 2009, which included ZANU-PF and important opposition groups. Initially, it resulted in a decrease in the number of people seeking asylum (Table 5). Zimbabwe switched to using the United States dollar as its official currency between 2009 and 2013, during which time the country's economy improved to the point that it was growing at a rate of 10% per year (Ncube, 2013). During the years 2014–2017, there was not only considerable inflation, but also significant political violence.

Table 6: Summary table of total persons of concern in 2015

Origin	Residence	Refugees SUM	Asylum-seekers SUM	IDPs SUM	Population SUM
Zimbabwe	South Africa	6,358	55,978	0	62,336
	United Kingd...	9,045	475	0	9,520
	Canada	2,368	42	0	2,410
	United States	1,316	261	0	1,577
	Australia	1,009	129	0	1,138
	Botswana	678	12	0	721
	Ireland	191	251	0	442
	Zimbabwe	0	0	0	135
	Namibia	42	76	0	118
	Germany	46	35	0	81
		Total 21,332	**Total** 57,376	**Total** 0	**Total** 78,874

2015 was the year with the highest outmigration, as shown in Table 5. The largest group of persons of concern who left Zimbabwe were asylum-seekers (57376) and refugees (21322), as shown in Table 6.



Figure 9: Bubble chart and the flow map for Zimbabwe in 2015

According to the flow map in Figure 9, the thickest line points to South Africa. The bubble chart in Figure 8 supplements the flow map and shows that the country of residence with the most persons of concern from Zimbabwe in 2015 was South Africa, with a population of 62336, representing 79% of the total population. In 2017, a new government took power in Zimbabwe, with the aim of bringing optimism to the country's population. However, this government could not eradicate corruption or improve the living conditions of the people, which led to the continued flow of refugees and asylum seekers to neighbouring South Africa.

Table 7: Summary table of total persons of concern in 2019

Origin	Residence	Refugees (SUM)	Asylum-seekers (SUM)	IDPs (SUM)	Population (SUM)
Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe	0	0	270,000	270,121
	South Africa	4,003	12,825	0	16,828
	United Kingd...	2,324	390	0	2,714
	United States	825	867	0	1,692
	Ireland	438	791	0	1,229
	Canada	728	383	0	1,111
	Australia	584	226	0	810
	Botswana	564	42	0	738
	Germany	238	298	0	536
	China	5	107	0	112
		Total 10,045	Total 16,179	Total 270,000	Total 296,477

The largest group of persons of concern was the IDP in 2019, as shown in Table 5. The second largest group was the asylum-seekers (Table 7).



Figure 10: Bubble chart and the flow map for Zimbabwe in 2019

In 2019, cyclones Idai and Kenneth were responsible for the displacement of tens of thousands of households, putting them in need of essential resources such as food and water (Cross, 2019). The thickest line (Figure 10) was the loop back to Zimbabwe, representing mainly IDPs as a result of the two cyclones. The two storms were responsible for significant floods and extensive damage (Trummer et al., 2023). In 2020, the number of people seeking asylum and refugees decreased (Table 5), but the number of refugees returning home increased to its highest level. Many Zimbabweans living in South Africa were forced to return to their home country due to COVID-19, increased immigration controls, and xenophobic violence (Addison, 2023).

Discussion

Upon examining the data over time, notable trends are observed. As indicated in Table 5, the first trend reveals a consistent increase in outdegree. Specifically, there is a clear upward trend in outdegree with each successive year

studied in Zimbabwe. Numerous factors influence migration trends and dynamics in Zimbabwe. These include corruption, economic mismanagement, inadequate economic policies like the ESAP, politics, and the land reform programme. From 1998 to 1999, the economy was exceedingly stable and the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), did not fear losing power because there was no significant opposition. There were very few internally displaced persons (IDPs) and very few seeking asylum in other countries, but there was sufficient evidence that the economy was spiraling downward. Since 2000, there has been a gradual increase in emigration flows and cross-border movements. This upward trend has gained momentum, particularly due to the significant deterioration of the national economic condition.

The steady increase in the outdegree can also be explained by a variety of other factors, such as advances in the methods used to gather data, which have led to the compilation of more detailed information on the countries of origin. The Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency reports that 773246 of the 908913 Zimbabweans in the diaspora live in South Africa, the continent's most industrialised nation (Ndlovu, 2022). Table 3 shows that millions have fled the country due to its more than two-decade economic crisis, which has forced them to seek work elsewhere, particularly in South Africa and the United Kingdom. Bloch (2005) claimed that Zimbabweans' migration patterns and characteristics in the United Kingdom differ from those in South Africa. Cross-border migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa is cyclical, and those involved are mostly uneducated, with women outnumbering men. Zimbabweans who go to the United Kingdom mostly do so on a work permit, either to work as health care professionals or on family reunion routes (Bloch, 2005). The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic prompted developed countries such as the United Kingdom to ease immigration procedures for healthcare professionals seeking employment opportunities abroad (Dzinamira, 2021). Consequently, there was a notable surge in the migration of healthcare workers to South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Australia, with many assuming the roles of caregivers. Most of the Zimbabweans who end up in South Africa are teachers, which represents 61% of the total (IOM, 2018). According to the 2021 human flight and brain drain in Africa, Zimbabwe currently has 7.1 index points, which is higher than the average of 5.25 index points seen around the world (The Global Economy, 2022).

According to Bloch (2005), most Zimbabweans living in exile have high ambitions with regard to return migration and contributing to progress in their home

country. This notion is further reinforced by Nyangulu (2023), who highlights that Zimbabweans abroad play a crucial role in driving the socio-economic development of their home country while simultaneously fulfilling their aspirations and desires through a sustainable partnership. A minority of Zimbabweans who reside in the diaspora (12%) expressed no intention of relocating to Zimbabwe for the foreseeable future (Bloch, 2005). The prevalence of Zimbabwean diaspora organisations is growing in nations including the United Kingdom and South Africa. Nevertheless, these organisations generally fall into two categories: those with a political agenda that aims to bring attention to Zimbabwe or protest the treatment of migrants in their host countries and those that are humanitarian coalitions and networks committed to assisting newly arrived migrants in surviving, settling, and assimilating (Pasura, 2010). Today, the participation of refugees in the economic growth of their home countries takes the form of social networks and monetary remittances to members of their families. In particular, Zimbabwe has a large population living outside the country (Crush et al., 2006). According to Mbiba and Mupfumira (2022), the remittances that 'migrants' bring back to their home countries in the form of money, commodities, information and services are extremely important to people's livelihoods.

Conclusion

This research used ArcGIS Insights to examine the spatial and temporal dynamics of persons of concern movements in Zimbabwe. ArcGIS Insights is a geographic information system (GIS) application that may be used to conduct research, create visually appealing maps and charts, and present the findings to top management. The process recording capabilities of ArcGIS Insights will allow humanitarian experts to rerun analyses, inspire further investigations and analysis into persons of concern, and provide a measurable visual to communicate with the audience. The link analysis method employs a network of nodes and links to identify and examine connections within a dataset. This method has broader applications in fields such as public health and forensics. The technique has the drawback of needing reliable data on the number of persons of concern. Many people leave their countries of origin without formal registration.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Author Contribution

The authors confirm their contribution to the paper as follows: study conception and

design, data collection, analysis, interpretation of results and approval of the final version of the manuscript.

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Availability of data

The data that support the findings of this study are openly available at https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/

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SCAPEGOATING THE 'OTHER': A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF ANTI-IMMIGRANT RHETORIC AND XENOPHOBIA IN SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL MEDIA

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Abstract. This qualitative study examined drivers of anti-immigrant rhetoric in South Africa through social media analysis. Online comments from TikTok videos of opposition leaders' speeches were thematically analysed using a postpositivist approach. Findings revealed xenophobic hostility rooted in isolationist history, post-apartheid frustrations, and perceived threats around resources. Immigration was frequently scapegoated for problems like unemployment. Dashed expectations after the end of apartheid emerged as underpinning anger manifesting as xenophobia. Some leaders exhibited denialism tendencies in dismissing xenophobic violence as mere criminality. The multi-dimensional theoretical framework integrating ethnic competition theory and critical discourse analysis provided insight on complex material and discursive factors propagating xenophobia. The study elucidates relationships between political rhetoric, media discourses and public attitudes. It highlights needs for public education on immigration myths, stronger regulations on hate speech by elites, and social integration initiatives. Most crucially, tackling inequality and unemployment is vital to address xenophobia's roots in dashed hopes post-apartheid. The research contributes contemporary data on social media discourses and anti-immigrant rhetoric in South Africa.

Keywords: *xenophobia, political rhetoric, South Africa, immigration, social*

Background

Xenophobia in South Africa has complex historical roots and contemporary manifestations. The racist policies and structures of the apartheid system cultivated suspicion and hostility towards outsiders, while unfulfilled expectations after the end of apartheid laid fertile ground for scapegoating immigrants for socioeconomic ills (Olofinbiyi, 2022; Yingi et al., 2023). South Africa's decades of isolation under apartheid meant citizens had little experience interacting with foreigners, fuelling

fear of the 'unknown other' (Harris, 2002; Morris, 1998). As the country transitioned to democracy in the 1990s, high hopes for economic prosperity and redistribution of resources were dashed, leaving many struggling with unemployment and inadequate housing and services.

These frustrations boiled over into deadly xenophobic violence as early as 1994, with the 'Buyelekhaya' attacks targeting Mozambican, Zimbabwean and Malawian immigrants (Yingi et al., 2023). Outbreaks of violence specifically targeting African immigrants recurred in 2008, 2015 and 2019 across cities including Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban. Over 200 people have been killed in xenophobic attacks since 1994, with thousands displaced and businesses destroyed (Human Rights Watch, 2020; Yingi et al., 2023). The violence has predominantly erupted in townships and informal settlements, where competition over resources and services is perceived to be most acute.

Underpinning these attacks are complex social and political dynamics. Apartheid's divide and rule tactics cultivated suspicion between groups, while post-apartheid socioeconomic frustrations have created fertile ground for scapegoating immigrants (Minga, 2015; Mubangizi, 2021). Statements by political leaders frequently place blame on immigrants for problems like crime, unemployment, and pressure on services (Akinola, 2017). At times, politicians have directly fueled xenophobic sentiments for political gain (Pierce et al., 2022). Implicit bias within state institutions like the police force further entrenches anti-immigrant attitudes (Dahlberg & Thapar-Björkert, 2023; Harris et al., 2001). Problematic media portrayals that exaggerate immigrant numbers and criminality reinforce xenophobic narratives (Nkala & Masuku, 2023).

Xenophobia thus arises from a complex interplay of historical isolationism, unmet economic expectations, inequality, problematic political rhetoric, and biased institutions. While immigrants may add pressure on service delivery, infrastructure, and jobs, they are not solely responsible for South Africa's challenges. Ultimately, dashed hopes of an inclusive, prosperous post-apartheid society underlie much of the xenophobic scapegoating (Tshaka, 2016; Yingi et al., 2023). Tackling inequality, unemployment and biased institutions is critical, as is reframing political and media rhetoric on immigration. With leadership and structural change, the tide of xenophobic violence may be stemmed.

South Africa has a complex history of migration shaped by its apartheid past

and post-apartheid frustrations. As Morris (1998) explains, decades of isolationist apartheid rule meant citizens had little experience interacting with foreigners, fueling fear and distrust of outsiders. Furthermore, the racist structures and policies of apartheid cultivated suspicion between groups (Minga, 2015). The transition to democracy in 1994 raised hopes for greater equality and prosperity, but many of these expectations went unfulfilled. This disappointment laid the groundwork for scapegoating immigrants for socioeconomic problems (Tshaka, 2016; Yingi et al., 2023).

According to Mubangizi (2021), dashed hopes after the end of apartheid rule created fertile conditions for xenophobic hostility. Immigrants became convenient targets for citizens' anger over lack of progress. South Africa's former isolation meant citizens were prone to perceiving foreigners as threatening (Duncan, 2012). As Tella and Ogunnibi (2014) argue, unmet promises of the post-apartheid era fueled immigrant scapegoating. Outbreaks of anti-immigrant violence have occurred periodically since 1994, with significant episodes in 2008, 2015, and 2019 (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

Underlying these attacks are multifaceted social and political dynamics. As Harris (2002) notes, apartheid's divide and rule tactics bred intergroup suspicion. Furthermore, post-apartheid frustrations over unemployment, inequality, and inadequate services have boiled over into xenophobic violence concentrated in townships and informal settlements (Mubangizi, 2021). Immigrants are often blamed for stealing jobs, dominating businesses, spreading crime, and burdening social services, despite a lack of evidence for these claims (Mbiyozo, 2018).

According to Akinola (2017), statements by political elites frequently place responsibility on immigrants for South Africa's problems, at times intentionally fomenting xenophobia for electoral gain. Implicit bias within state institutions like the police also entrenches anti-immigrant attitudes (Dahlberg & Thapar-Björkert, 2023). Meanwhile, exaggerated and stereotypical media portrayals propagate xenophobic narratives (Nkala & Masuku, 2023). Tackling the roots of xenophobic hostility requires policy reforms to reduce inequality and unemployment, public education campaigns, stronger hate speech regulations, and initiatives to facilitate social integration. With committed leadership, South Africa may overcome this complex challenge.

Theoretical Framework

This study examines anti-immigrant sentiments in South Africa through the

lenses of ethnic competition theory and discourse analysis. Ethnic competition theory argues that actual and perceived competition between ethnic groups breeds intergroup hostility and negative attitudes (Olzak, 1992). As immigrant populations grow, native groups may see threats to economic resources and political power, spurring anti-immigrant rhetoric and exclusionist attitudes (Quillian, 1995). Discourse analysis focuses on how language and representations construct social realities and power dynamics. Political and media discourses shape public attitudes by framing immigrants in particular ways (Van Dijk, 1993). These theoretical lenses are relevant within South Africa's complex history. Under apartheid, institutionalized racism cultivated suspicion of outsiders. Transition to democracy in 1994 led to hopes for an equal and non-racial society. However, unmet hopes after the end of white rule also laid ground for immigrant scapegoating (Tshaka, 2016). Ethnic competition theory suggests economic frustrations and demographic shifts drive anti-immigrantism. Discourse analysis reveals how politicized rhetoric and media representations amplify xenophobia.

At the individual level, education, income, and other socioeconomic factors signify vulnerability to competition over resources and jobs. Discourse analysis examines rhetorical patterns and linguistic techniques in the political speeches and social media comments. Framing immigrants as "flooding" the country or "stealing" jobs reflects threat constructions, as does dehumanizing language (Esses et al., 2013). A multi-dimensional analysis combining structural factors and social constructions is warranted. Group threat theory argues that actual conflicts over resources create negative outgroup attitudes (Blumer, 1958). But symbolic threats shaped by representations are also important, as stereotypes and propaganda can intensify xenophobia even absent genuine conflicts (Stephan et al., 2015). Integrating the material and the discursive provides a more complete understanding. Political rhetoric plays a key role in shaping public attitudes on immigration (Bos et al., 2016). Elites can purposefully foment xenophobia for electoral ends (Krzyżanowski et al., 2018). This study analyses leaders' speeches and resultant social media commentary to unpack this dynamic. The data in this study provides insight into how anti-immigrant tropes manifest linguistically and spread within online spaces, illuminating complex interactions between political rhetoric, media discourses and public attitudes.

Critical discourse analysis sees racist and xenophobic language as reflecting and reproducing wider societal power relations (Wodak & Reisigl, 2015). The political

speeches construct immigrants as a burden stealing South Africans' jobs and resources. This othering discourse propagates historical marginalization of outsiders. Commenters amplify anti-immigrant hostility, demonstrating the rippling impacts of elite rhetoric. Foucault's theories of power/knowledge enrich this critical analysis, revealing circulations of power within discourses and their ideological effects (Hall, 2001). Anti-immigrant rhetoric exerts power by framing immigrants as economic and cultural threats. The audience internalizes and replicates these messages, underscoring their hegemonic influence. Such othering discourses perpetuate the symbolic boundaries and hierarchies of the apartheid era into today's South Africa.

In combination, these theories elucidate complex drivers of anti-immigrant attitudes, from structural conditions to political agency to identity constructions. The study provides empirical insight into these dynamics through content analysis of salient rhetorical data. Discourse analysis allows deconstructing how speeches racially frame immigrants as dangerous outsiders. Ethnic competition theory explains how demographic contexts and economic grievances create fertile ground for such othering narratives to flourish and fuel xenophobic public sentiments. This multifaceted theoretical framework contextualizes the research findings within deeper social forces.

Research Methodology

This study utilized a qualitative approach to examine anti-immigrant sentiments and political rhetoric on social media in response to speeches by three opposition leaders in South Africa. A postpositivist paradigm informed the research, as the aim was to explore people's subjective perspectives and experiences related to a social phenomenon (Creswell, 2017). The goal was to understand the range of attitudes and beliefs towards immigrants and immigration policies expressed by TikTok users in response to the leaders' speeches. Data was generated through online ethnography, specifically by examining user comments in response to three TikTok videos featuring political speeches. The two videos featured speeches by two leaders stating their respective positions on the migration question in South Africa. The videos were part of interviews with political leaders that were shared on social media. It should also be noted that the videos and comments were made within the context of political grandstanding in preparation for the forthcoming elections in South Africa in 2024. Video A showed a leader from an opposition party stating that if elected, they would mass deport immigrants and close businesses that hire them, blaming foreigners for lack of jobs and youth unemployment. This video had over

16,000 likes and 2,600 comments as of October 2023, indicating strong user engagement. The leader in Video A argued, “We will mass deport them, we will close businesses that hires illegal foreigners, we don’t have time, we don’t want them. We want them out of this country because our people don’t have jobs. We have 60 % youth employment, and you tell me you still want to give Zimbabweans jobs. In 2024 something is going to happen… there are going home.” While Video B featured a different opposition leader arguing that deporting immigrants would not solve South Africa's problems. This video had over 47,000 likes and 3,900 comments as of October 2023, also evidencing significant user interaction. The leader in Video B explained, “Foreigners are not the problem. Even if we deport all foreigners, that will not address the problems in South Africa.” Purposive sampling was used to identify these two videos based on their relevance to the research topic (Ritchie et al., 2013). The comments on these videos were extracted using the Extract Comments website and analysed using thematic analysis. Thematic analysis involved identifying, analysing and reporting patterns and themes from the data (Clarke & Braun, 2017). An inductive approach was taken, allowing themes to emerge directly from the data. Various steps were taken to ensure validity and rigor, including member checking, peer debriefing, and providing a detailed account of the data collection and analysis procedures (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The researcher's positionality and potential biases were also addressed through reflexivity. Ethical issues such as informed consent for using online data were considered in accordance with best practices for internet-mediated research (Markham & Buchanan, 2012). The sampling, data generation and analysis methods were appropriately aligned with the qualitative, postpositivist approach of the study. A sample size of around 25 comments per video will be used to reach a point of data saturation. The methods facilitated an in-depth exploration of people's perspectives related to anti-immigrant rhetoric and allowed new understandings to emerge, consistent with the aims of qualitative research. The next section presents the findings from this study.

Emerging themes for the findings

The findings from this study are presented using emerging themes from the data analysis. The themes are anti-immigrant rhetoric, economic competition, scapegoating, dashed expectation, and denialism.

Anti-immigrant rhetoric

The social media comments reflect strong anti-immigrant rhetoric and intolerance. One user commented “Blame everyone but the government” (Thabo,

2023). The TikTok comments further revealed strong anti-immigrant rhetoric, particularly directed at Zimbabweans. Words like "hate", "threats", "angry", and "shouting" characterize how some view the anti-immigrant opposition party leader's stance on immigrants. One commenter accuses him of having "so much hate" while another says his "anger will never get u anywhere bro cool down". Others labelled immigrants as "zama zamas" (luyolo, 2023) and accused them of stealing jobs meant for South Africans (dan, 2023). Overall, the tone from numerous comments reflects hostility and intolerance towards immigrants. This aligns with the view that xenophobia arises from hostility and distrust cultivated under apartheid and frustration over unmet economic expectations post-apartheid (Minga, 2015; Tshaka, 2016). As Mubangizi (2021) notes, dashed hopes after independence created fertile ground for scapegoating immigrants. The anti-immigrant rhetoric in the data reflects these prejudices and economic insecurities.

Economic competition

Many comments accuse immigrants of dominating jobs and economic opportunities. One states, "this people don't employ themselves, shouldn't he be focusing on the people employing them" (lerato, 2023), while another argues "foreigners are the best" (nyaba, 2023) at securing employment. A common perception in the comments is that immigrants compete with South Africans for economic opportunities and resources. As the literature argues, competition in townships and informal settlements over "jobs, businesses, resources and services" fuels anti-immigrant sentiment. Comments blame immigrants for "taking" jobs, with one saying, "They don't employ themselves, shouldn't he be focusing on the people employing them" (Busi, 2023). Another argues that immigrants being willing to accept lower wages drives hiring preferences. Resentment also emerges towards immigrant-owned businesses, like one comment stating "where are the multi-billion-rand businesses" owned by citizens. The data reflects a zero-sum view of the economy, where gains for immigrants mean losses for South Africans. These views resonate with the arguments that link anti-immigrant sentiments with how post-apartheid hopes for inclusive prosperity were unmet, leaving many struggling with joblessness (Yingi et al., 2023). This disappointment bred xenophobic scapegoating of immigrants for economic woes. As Tella and Ogunnibi (2014) explain, foreigners provide a convenient target for citizens' anger over unkept promises. The data illustrates such economic competition grievances.

Scapegoating

Immigrants, especially Zimbabweans, are frequently scapegoated for problems like crime and unemployment. One user accuses Zimbabweans of "running" shops at the expense of South Africans (Mdu, 2023). In multiple comments, immigrants are scapegoated for South Africa's problems. Zimbabweans in particular are blamed for unemployment, with one saying "I'm at home my boss fired me for nothing wrong I did and she hired a foreigner" (Thembi, 2023). Immigrants are also accused of causing crime, with a commenter asking "How are we going to maintain social order" without border controls (Thabo, 2023). These sentiments echo the literature describing immigrants being blamed for "socioeconomic ills" in South Africa. Scapegoating provides an outlet for frustrations over lack of progress since apartheid's end. As revealed above, unmet expectations after apartheid laid ground for scapegoating immigrants (Tshaka, 2016). As the isolation hypothesis suggests, South Africa's former isolationism cultivated fear of outsiders (Duncan, 2012). Scapegoating arose as immigrants were blamed for economic shortcomings (Tella & Ogunnibi, 2014). The blaming of Zimbabweans in the data reflects this defensive, xenophobic scapegoating.

Dashed expectations

Disillusionment over unmet expectations threads through many comments. As the the literature review in the background describes, hopes for inclusive prosperity after apartheid gave way to economic exclusion and inequality. One commenter pointedly states that unemployed youth "are living off of gogos pension" rather than working (Busi, 2023). High expectations of redistribution and empowerment were dashed, fuelling resentment. Multiple comments express disappointment in leaders for not delivering change. As one says, "we have a lot of money being looted by our very own" that should be used for "service delivery." Unfulfilled hopes underpin the desire to scapegoat immigrants and feed into populist anti-immigrant rhetoric. Comments reflect disappointment with the unfulfilled promises of the post-apartheid era. One argues "this guy is doing so much to be voted in power. Show him some love please South Africans" (Legend, 2023), suggesting leaders have not met citizen's needs. As discussed in the background, the transition to democracy raised hopes for economic gains which never materialized for many (Tshaka, 2016; Yingi et al., 2023). Anger over dashed expectations fuelled xenophobic scapegoating. The data exhibits this dissatisfaction with government performance.

Denialism

The data from commenters illustrated the ongoing denialism trend by some politicians on the phenomenon of xenophobia. One commenter outrightly states "Blame everyone but the government" (Loreto, 2023) in response to anti-immigrant rhetoric from an opposition politician. This implies the government deflects responsibility for xenophobia onto immigrants and other targets rather than accepting its own role in fostering prejudiced attitudes. State institutions like the police force, which research shows reflects anti-immigrant biases, are not confronted (Dahlberg & Thapar-Bjorkert, 2023). Another comment asks the politician "What about that foreigner interviewing you????" (Thabile, 2023), a statement that itself denies xenophobia by implying immigrants cannot be loyal, patriotic citizens. Furthermore, multiple commenters express disappointment in the ruling ANC party for corruption, lack of service delivery, and unfulfilled expectations of an equitable post-apartheid society. By scapegoating immigrants, leaders can avoid accountability for policy failures that drive inequality and unemployment. Dashed hopes since apartheid's end also fuel xenophobic denialism, as immigrants become easy targets for citizens' anger over lack of progress. Until the state acknowledges xenophobia's roots and citizens address their own complicity, denialism will enable anti-immigrant violence to continue unchecked. Confronting xenophobia requires honesty and collective responsibility from leaders and citizens alike.

Some political leaders in South Africa have denied the existence of xenophobia, instead dismissing violent attacks on immigrants as merely generalized criminality. This tendency towards denialism was evident in a news headline referenced in the comments stating "C.R vows to stem the tide of xenophobic attack" (Daily News, 2022). By labelling overtly xenophobic assaults as just violent crime unrelated to anti-immigrant prejudices, officials absolve the state and citizens of culpability. Xenophobia is reduced to sporadic criminality rather than a systemic issue rooted in South African society. As scholar Olofinbiyi (2022) explains, the government's refusal to acknowledge xenophobia and its underlying causes enables further hostile attitudes and violence towards immigrants. By denying that xenophobia exists, authorities do nothing to address the historical, political and economic drivers of anti-immigrant sentiment. Citizens are not encouraged to challenge their own prejudices or reflect on how rhetoric from leaders and media fuels hostility. Immigrants remain demonized as the 'other' rather than recognized

as equal human beings deserving of dignity and protection. The next section presents a discussion of the findings in this study.

Discussion of findings

The presentation of findings reveals complex dynamics underpinning anti-immigrant rhetoric and xenophobia in South Africa. A key theme is the strong anti-immigrant sentiments expressed in the TikTok comments, reflecting hostility towards foreigners that aligns with South Africa's isolationist history and post-apartheid frustrations. As the background describes, decades of apartheid cultivating distrust of outsiders combined with unmet expectations after the transition to democracy laid ground for xenophobic scapegoating (Harris, 2002; Tshaka, 2016). The vitriolic, dehumanizing rhetoric in the data demonstrates how thoroughly these prejudices permeate society.

Furthermore, the findings highlight perceptions of economic competition as driving anti-immigrant hostility. Research shows immigrants often take menial jobs shunned by citizens and contribute to economic growth (Sultan, 2019). However, a zero-sum mentality emerges in the comments where gains for immigrants mean losses for South Africans. This worldview overlooks systemic issues around skills shortages and fails to recognize the positive economic contributions of immigrants. As Mbiyozo (2018) explains, xenophobic rhetoric frequently relies on stereotyping African foreigners as 'stealing' jobs and resources. The data exhibits such unsubstantiated beliefs.

In addition, the tendency to scapegoat immigrants for problems like unemployment and crime appears strongly in the findings. Zimbabweans in particular are singled out for blame. As the literature establishes, unfulfilled expectations after apartheid created fertile ground for scapegoating (Tella & Ogunnibi, 2014). Immigrants provide convenient targets for citizens' frustrations. However, research shows immigrants are not responsible for South Africa's socioeconomic challenges. Xenophobic scapegoating deflects from state accountability for policy failures that drive inequality and poverty. The findings demonstrate this defensive scapegoating mentality. Moreover, the data exhibits dashed hopes post-apartheid breeding anti-immigrant hostility. Anger over lack of economic upliftment for the majority manifests in resentment towards immigrants rather than government. populist politicians exploit these frustrations through xenophobic rhetoric, as the denialism findings reveal. By refusing to acknowledge xenophobia, authorities enable prejudice while absolving the state of responsibility.

Despite immigrants making up a small share of South Africa's population, they have become scapegoats for broader economic frustrations. The data unpacked in this study reveal the gulf between the citizens' misperceptions and the reality depicted by the empirical evidence as captured by official statistics. Official statistics indicate approximately 2.4 to 4 million foreign nationals reside in South Africa, comprising around 3-7% of the total population (Institute for Security Studies, 2022; Statistics South Africa, 2022). However, the South African Social Attitudes Survey (2021) found nearly half of South Africans believe immigrant figures are vastly higher, between 17 to 40 million. While actual population data may have some margin of error, typical inaccuracies in national censuses are in the range of 2-5%, far lower than the misperceptions among many citizens. More interesting are the official figures for South Africa's unemployment rate in the first quarter of 2023 was recorded at 32,9 %, and is among the highest in the world. According to the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS), this is an increase of 0,2 of a percentage point compared to the fourth quarter of 2022. Essentially, this reveals a disconnect between reality and public attitudes aligns with patterns noted in the draft paper, where immigrants are rhetorically constructed as threatening outsiders flooding the country and stealing resources. The exaggeration of immigrant figures reflects a moral panic that serves elite political interests but distorts reality. Combating such disinformation and problematization of minority groups is crucial to fostering social cohesion and inclusive national identities.

Overall, the data provides evidence for the complex roots of xenophobia described in the background literature. However, the small sample of social media comments may limit generalizability. More extensive data gathering across platforms could establish more robust, representative findings. Comparative studies of xenophobia within political discourse vs among citizens is another potential avenue. The findings have several practical implications. They highlight the need to counter xenophobic myths around immigration and economics with facts. Civic education dispelling harmful stereotypes could help, alongside public messaging that recognizes immigrants' contributions. Tightening regulations on hate speech may curb dangerous rhetoric from politicians and media. Initiatives that facilitate social integration and contact between citizens and immigrants show promise for reducing prejudice (Levy et al., 2017). Most crucially, tackling inequality, unemployment and corruption is vital to address the roots of dashed expectations and frustrations. With honest confrontation of its past, South Africa may gradually overcome the complex

legacies of isolation and oppression that feed xenophobic hostility.

Conclusion

This study deployed a multifaceted theoretical framework integrating ethnic competition theory and critical discourse analysis to unpack complex drivers of anti-immigrant rhetoric and xenophobia in contemporary South Africa. The qualitative analysis of social media responses to opposition leaders' speeches revealed strong anti-immigrant hostility rooted in isolationist history, unmet expectations post-apartheid, and perceived threats around resources and jobs. Comments exhibited xenophobic scapegoating of foreigners, especially Zimbabweans, for problems like unemployment and criminality. Dashed hopes after the end of apartheid emerged as an undercurrent feeding frustrations that manifest in anti-immigrant rhetoric. The data also evidenced tendencies towards denialism, where politicians dismiss xenophobic violence as mere criminality, absolving the state and citizens of responsibility.

Together, the findings underscore the value of examining xenophobia through intersecting theoretical lenses encompassing material conditions, political rhetoric, media discourses and public attitudes. Ethnic competition theory illuminated how demographic shifts and actual or perceived threats to economic resources can breed intergroup hostility, as evidenced by grievances around immigrants "stealing" jobs. Critical discourse analysis revealed the power of dehumanizing, othering rhetoric from leaders in shaping anti-immigrant prejudices. Techniques like exaggerating immigrant figures and blaming foreigners for South Africa's woes propagate dangerous myths. The data exhibits how such symbolic threats ride alongside, and intensify, realistic conflicts around resources and services.

This synthesis of structural and discursive dimensions provides a more holistic understanding of xenophobia's complex roots. The study makes several scholarly contributions. It adds empirical evidence on social media discourses to the body of literature on xenophobia in South Africa. The data provides contemporary insight into how anti-immigrant rhetoric manifests online, spreading dangerous stereotypes. The findings also elucidate the relationship between populist political speech and public opinions. Opposition leaders' statements had a strong influence in amplifying xenophobic hostility among citizens. This aligns with arguments on elite's moral responsibility to avoid divisive language, though more work could

examine these dynamics. Overall, the multi-dimensional theoretical approach undertaken here could inform future studies seeking to move beyond surface explanations.

On a practical level, the research highlights need for public messaging correcting misperceptions on immigration's economic impacts, stronger hate speech regulations, and integration initiatives. Most critically, tackling inequality, unemployment and corruption would address root causes. With committed leadership and policy reforms, the cyclical eruptions of xenophobic violence may be overcome. South Africa still retains promise to achieve the inclusive, equitable society that its transition symbolized. But fulfilling that promise requires honest confrontation of the past and collective responsibility for change. It necessitates moving beyond scapegoating and forging bonds of solidarity across all who call South Africa home. This study contributes one small step on that long road, working to dismantle prejudices towards building a society where all can thrive, regardless of origins. Therein lies the flickering hope against xenophobia's darkness.

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Violent Conflicts, Forced Migration and Internal Population Displacement in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, 1999-2011

Adesote Samson ADESOLA and Peters AKIN

Abstract. This paper interrogates the nexus between violent conflicts and internal population displacement during the first decade of the birth of the Fourth Republic in Nigeria. It critically examines the challenge of various cases of violent conflicts on internal population displacement during successive administrations of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, late Alhaji Musa Yar'Adua and Dr. Goodluck Jonathan. It argues that this great human tragedy/humanitarian crisis caused by violent conflicts, has not only led to the disruption of human lives and property but also constituted a major threat to national peace and security. The paper contends that the root causes of violent conflicts, which could be ethno-religious, inter-ethnic, political and inter-communal are hinged on a decade of poor governance, underdevelopment of peripheral areas populated by ethnic minorities, mismanagement of identity conflicts, chronic abuse of power resulting in egregious violations of human rights, gross inequality in the sharing of power, national wealth and so on. It concludes that there is need for adequate management of various conflicts, ensuring equitable resource allocation, the practice of true federalism, the promotion of good governance, and national security.

Keywords: *Violence, Population, Displacement, Internal Displacement*

Introduction

Internal population displacement has become an issue of serious concern to many scholars today because of the human tragedy and insecurity associated with it. Besides, the issue that mostly dominates discussions on Internal Population Displacement at global, continental and national level is the conflict-induced displacements caused mainly by ethno-religious, inter-ethnic, political and intra and inter-communal conflicts. With the return to civil rule in 1999, Nigeria has been affected by recurrent internal conflicts and generalised violence which have resulted in the displacement of many innocent people across the six geopolitical zones in the country. A critical analysis of the displacement of many Nigerians between 1999 and 2011 reveals that internal population displacement is caused by various categories of violence which are inter-ethnic, ethno-religious, communal and political. Okpeh (2008) argues that the systematic and overlapping patterns of inequality in the country have been described as "breeding grounds" for conflict.

There is no doubt the fact that Nigeria is a country that makes up of an

extremely complex web of ethnic, linguistic and religious groups. Evidences have shown that series of conflicts in the country have been triggered by disputes over access to land, citizenship and broader questions of ethnic identity, particularly between people considered indigenous to an area and those regarded as settlers. The Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution in 2002 for instance in their strategic conflict assessment reported that the return to democratic governance and the competition for the new political opportunities had led to increased violence in the country. It is against this backdrop that this paper tends to examine the growing challenge of internal population displacement in Nigeria between 1999 and 2011 and its implication on the socio-economic life of the citizenry.

The paper is divided into four sections. The first section is introduction; second section focuses on conceptual clarification; the third section deals with Violence and internal population displacement in Nigeria while the last section is the conclusion.

Conceptual clarification

It is important to consider the meanings of some key concepts and issues because they are inherent in this topic. They include violence, internally displaced persons, internal displacement and forced migration.

Violence: Violence has been viewed from different perspectives by different scholars from distinctive standpoints. Meanwhile, for the purpose of this discourse, we are looking at violence in terms of violation of human rights and social injustice. Thus, this paper critically examines some major types of violence that have greatly led to the displacement of thousands of Nigerians between 1999 and 2011 among which include ethno-religious, inter-ethnic, political and intra and inter communal. Gilula & Daniels (1969) cited in Wikipedia (2010) define violence as 'destructive aggression'. This conceptualization of violence implies the use of physical force to injure persons or property; and this is the core of most definitions of violence. This definition of violence can equally be corroborated with that of W.H.O. The World Health Organization defined violence as the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation (WHO, 2002). These two definitions of violence depict the situation of Nigeria since1999. This is because; major categories of violence which have occurred in the country during the period

of study that have resulted in the massive displacement of innocent lives are "organized", "patterned and deliberate"; and are geared towards the pursuit of the interests and goals of the organizer(s).

Internally Displaced Persons / Internal Displacement: The main description of Internally Displaced Persons is hinged on forced or obliged migration within national boundaries. In this discourse, internal displacement will be used interchangeably with "forced migration", "relocation" or "forced relocation". This is because, they are closely-related. In more specific terms, the description of internally displaced persons is given in paragraph 2 of the Introduction to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement by the United Nations. Thus, the United Nations Guiding Principles on IDP's defines IDP's as: …persons or group of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human – made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border (UNHCR, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 2005). The distinctive feature of internal displacement/IDPs given above is coerced or involuntary movement that takes place within national borders. The reasons for this involuntary movement though may vary, include armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, and natural or human-made disasters. This definition shows that voluntary migration is not captured here. Therefore, we argue here that voluntary migration which involves the search for means of livelihood or economic survival due to occupation displacement/losses can though be qualified as internal displacement, does not fit the description of internally displaced persons to whom the Guiding Principles apply.

Forced Migration: Forced migration or involuntary migration is another key concept in this discourse. Forced migration refers to the coerced movement of a person or persons away from their home or home region. It often connotes violent coercion, and is used interchangeably with the terms "displacement" or forced displacement (Wikipedia, 2011). Someone who has experienced forced migration is a "forced migrant" or "displaced person". Less formally, such a person may be referred to as a refugee, although that term has a specific narrower legal definition (Wikipedia, 2011). The International Organization for Migration defines forced

migration as any person who migrates to "escape persecution, conflict, repression, natural and human-made disasters, ecological degradation, or other situations that endanger their lives, freedom or livelihood." According to NCCS (2006), forced migration consists of smuggling, disaster induced, conflict induced, trafficking and development induced. In this paper, our major focus is the conflict induced which involves political, economic, social/ethnic and cultural. According to Oxford University (2006), conceptualization of forced labour can be done in four major models. These models are legal institutional, social development, security and political economy.

First, legal institutional model of forced migration according to Gibney (1999) is characterized by three distinctive features. They are, an emphasis on demarcating and categorizing different groups of forced migrants such as refugees, de facto refugees, internally displaced persons; a concern with either the legal entitlements for these groups in relation to states and as determined by national and international law or the mandated responsibilities of various international agencies and NGOs to these forced migrants; and a focus on dealing with forced migration as primarily a matter of humanitarian concern for status, international organizations and NGOs. This legal institutional model of forced migration came as an initiation of the United Nations in order to address the growing number of refugees world-wide.

Second, social development model is an alternative approach which tend to establish the root causes of a conflict that invariably leads to the displacement of people (NCCS,2006). Cox (1999) argues that the root causes of a conflict include poor governance, atrocities, discrimination, marginalization and so on. This model emphasized that conflict is a reality and thus exists in a society. It argues that a society that has no norms and values is not a civic society, because, a civic society is a composition of group of people who think and perceive the same thing or idea differently, but live, act and behave together. Cox therefore suggested some social development agenda for addressing post-conflict situation among which are immediate needs of the displaced persons, the community and the society.

Third, security model basically emphasize that the security of human lives should be the major concern of every responsive government during any catastrophe. NCCS (2004) points out some security issues of discussion that need to be addressed because of their negative effects of violation of human rights and the massive displacement of person. Among these security issues are insurgency and militarization of ethnic militias, crisis of governance and security, environmental

security (degradation, flood etc) and so on. The above discussed first three models of forced migration actually depict the Nigerian situation which is the central focus of this paper.

Violence and Internal Population Displacement in Nigeria in the Fourth Republic, 1999-2011

Internal population displacement has become one of the human tragedies confronting the world today. In Nigeria for example, every citizen has recognized it as a critical and major problem which is largely blamed on flood, erosion and conflicts. Of these causes of internal population displacement, the conflict – induced (which could be ethno-religious, inter-ethnic, intra and inter communal and political) appears to be more, and is therefore given prominence in this discourse. These induced conflicts have resulted in large wave of internal displacement of thousands of people.

Historically, Nigeria had witnessed series of violence prior to her political independence in 1960. This violence happened as a result of the introduction of various policies of the British administration, like taxation. Notable examples of such violence or uprising were the 1929 Aba women riot in the East and the 1916 Iseyin-Okeho uprising in the West. The first major ethnic violent that occurred in the post colonial period took place in the Western Region and was between Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Chief Ladoke Akintola in 1962. The rift between them led to a series of crises and clashes which invariably led to the declaration of a State of Emergency (Falola,et al,1990).

The Northern region was the second region that experienced another ethnic violent. This took place in Kaduna, the seat of Government and headquarters of the region. The first major crisis to erupt in Kaduna was as a result of the assassination of Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sarduna of Sokoto in a bloody coup d'etat of January 15, 1966 led by Kaduna Nzeogwu, an Igbo ethnic stock. None of the Igbo leaders was assassinated in that coup which was said to have created resentment and triggered off a backlash against the Igbo by the Northerners, especially the Hausa. The resultant outcome of this growing resentment led to the Nigerian Civil war (1967-1970) in which majority of the Igbo were massacred in the Northern region of the country.

Having examined the brief history of violence in Nigeria, most importantly during the First Republic, it is essential to know how series of violence have continued to persist under different successive administrations since the return to

civil rule up till date in Nigeria. Since the re-emergence of democracy in May 1999, not less than one hundred politically, ethnically and religiously motivated conflicts have occurred in Nigeria. The democratic opening presented by Nigeria's successful transition to civil rule in May 1999 unleashed a host of hitherto repressed or dormant political forces. In fact, the most of these political forces is the dreaded Islamic sect called Boko Haram. The most unfortunate is that aside the fact that the leaders of this dreaded sect are faceless, they have not come out with their demands, but continued with outright criminality and mayhem on the country and innocent lives through bombings.

Post-transition Nigeria has continued to experience the rise of conflicts across the six geo-political zones, borne out of various agitations by a plethora of movements purportedly representing, and seeking to protect, their ethnic, political or religious interests in a country which appears incapable of providing the basic welfare needs of its citizens. Ayodele (2004) has argued that different reasons and circumstances which are the weak character of the Nigerian State and the inability of its equally weak institutions to engender order and security are responsible for these conflicts and violence. Olu-Adeyemi (2008) posits that poverty, military intervention in politics, citizen's apathy to the State, elitist greed and manipulation are major reasons for major conflicts and violence. Adeniji (2003) also points out that land, space and resource availability, Jurisdictional disputes between Monarchs, disregard for cultural symbols and pollution of cultural practices are major causes of violence and conflicts. The first major violence that occurred with the inception of a civilian government in May 1999 took place in the Niger Delta region. The major violence in this region was between the local militias, who emerged during this period as a result of the need to address long years of neglect and deprivation, coupled with the insensitivity of successive governments (military and civilian) and lack of corporate social responsibility from trans-national oil companies operating in the region (Omojeje and Adesote); and the Nigerian security forces.

The major violent incidence that occurred in this region with return to civil rule in 1999 led to the displacement of about 60,000 people during Odi crisis in Bayelsa State (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC Report, 2009 Retrieved from www.internal-displacement.org) The northern region was said to have been second region that witnessed series of violence following the emergence of this administration in 1999 and resulted in the displacement of several people. The type of violence in this region is both inter-ethnic and ethno-religious violence.

While inter-ethnic violence erupted in Taraba and the north-central states of Plateau, Nasarawa, Benue; ethno-religious violence broke out in some northern states of Kaduna, Zamfara, Kano and others. For instance, in Kaduna state, the imposition of sharia law led to a series of uprisings and violent clashes in February 2000 between Christians and Muslims in the city of Kaduna. Many Igbo, who are generally Christian, were killed. For safety reasons, Christians and Muslims moved to areas dominated by people of their own faith, and as thousands fled the far north, religious tensions increased in other areas. In reprisal for the Kaduna violence, Igbo groups in the south killed hundreds of generally Muslim Hausa migrants from the north (HRW, 2003).

Majority of inter-ethnic violence that took place in Taraba, Plateau, Nasarawa and Benue States between 2000 and 2002 centred on the issues of land, boundary and indigenes/settlers. This view corroborated by Dunmoye in his survey of conflicts in Nigeria with particular reference to the Middle Belt Zone that: "a major factor of communal conflicts in the zone is land or boundary disputes. This shows that land is becoming a very scare factor of production either due to population pressure, land alienation or concentration of land in a few hands." (Dunmoye, 2003). Besides, ethno-religious violence broke out in Plateau State, Jos in particular in 2001. In 2001, religious clashes erupted in Jos, the capital of Plateau state, which sits on the dividing line between the largely Muslim north and Christian south. More than 1,000 people were killed and thousands more displaced (Best, 2011; HRW, 2006). Many settled in temporary camps or permanently in neighbouring Bauchi state (Blench, 2003).

In fact, in the four years of the first civilian administration in Nigeria between 1999 and 2003 more than forty incidents of violence nationwide claimed estimated 10,000 lives while many were displaced (Manby Bronwen, 2002). The violence took many forms among which are, inter ethnic conflict, ethno-religious, communal and so on. In an interview with a local newspaper, the Federal Commissioner for Refugees recently estimated that around half a million people had been displaced between 1999 and 2005, when communal clashes peaked (This Day News, 17 April 2008). Also significant is that, between 2003 and 2007, of the second term of the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo, a number of violence which could be inter-ethnic, ethno-religious, political and communal featured across the country. For instance, there was a series of clashes over farmland in Adamawa and Gombe States which led to the displacement of over 20,000 and 3,700 people respectively.

The renewed violence in Plateau State over indigenes/settlers issue led to the declaration of a state of emergency in the state. According to President Obasanjo, justification for the declaration of state of emergency in Plateau State under Governor Joshua Dariye in 2004 was as a result of communal conflict over land and boundary which led to the killing and the displacement of many people (Obasanjo, 2004). He also emphasized that: Violence has reached unprecedented levels and hundreds have been killed with much more wounded or displaced from their homes on account of their ethnic or religious identification. Schooling for children has been disrupted and interrupted; businesses have lost billions of naira and property worth much more destroyed (Obasanjo, 2004). He went further to observe that visitors and investors have fled or are fleeing Plateau State and the neighbouring States have had their economies and social life disrupted and dislocated by the influx of internally displaced persons (Obasanjo, 2004).

By 2005, statistics of the Global IDP project showed that the internally displaced persons numbered 23.7 million, and affected 50 countries. 20 of these were in Africa with 12.1 million IDP's (Sohne, 2006). The most affected countries, according to the statistics, are Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and Uganda. Together with these three countries, the total number of IDPs in Africa amount to 9 million (This day, June 27, 2006). In Nigeria, the number of IDP's, range between 200,000 and 800,000. In the 2005 report of the Norwegian Refugee Council, the total number of IDPs was put at 200,000 (online http://www.idpproject in Nigeria: a hidden crisis, February 2005). Also paramount in this discourse is the administration of Yar'Adua/Jonathan following a successful transition from Chief Olusegun Obasanjo in 2007. The regime which began in 2007 and ended in May 2011 also witnessed various forms of violence that invariably led to the displacement of thousands of people mostly in the northern region; and few numbers of displaced persons in the southern part. The major forms of violence in Nigeria during this period would be analyzed. In November 2008, disputed results in the Plateau State elections led to inter-communal unrest which greatly heated the country. For instance, in Jos, the state capital, several thousand people were reportedly displaced by clashes that were described to have occurred between Christians and Muslims (BBC, 1 December 2008). Later report revealed that the tensions primarily reflected resentment between the indigenous (Christian) minority and settlers from the Hausa-speaking Muslim north (Reuters, 30 November 2008). Meanwhile, the IDPs of both religious groups reportedly found refuge together in makeshift camps around

Jos city, which consists of temporary camps in mosques, churches, army barracks and hospitals (IRIN, 4 December 2008).

At the beginning of December, the Nigerian Red Cross had registered some 14,000 IDPs in 13 camps (ICRC, 4 December 2008). In February 2009, between 4,500 and 5,000 persons were displaced following sectarian violence in the city of Bauchi (IRIN, 25 February 2009; This Day, 28 February 2009). Although the exact cause of the clashes remained unknown, violence flared up after a dispute between two different religious communities. Many people found shelter in schools, army barracks while some fled to neighbouring city like Jos, as violence spread throughout Bauchi and led to more deaths and destruction (Punch, 23 February 2009). Some of residents who fled reported that security agents either did not intervene to prevent the unrest, or were absent from certain areas, thereby contributing to the spread of violence (Punch, 23 February 2009).

Before the declaration of Amnesty for the militants in the Niger Delta region by Alhaji Yar'Adua in August, 2009, there were series of clashes in region between the militants and the security forces which also led to displacement of innocent people. For example, in May 2009, thousands of people were displaced as a result of a fight between government forces and militants of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), which was created through the merger of different armed groups in 2005. The Joint Task Force (JTF), charged with restoring order in the Niger Delta, launched Operation Restore Hope in an effort to uproot militant groups. The JTF launched land and air strikes around the city of Warri in Delta State, and later extended its offensive to neighbouring Rivers State (Reuters, 24 May 2009). The number of casualties among the civilian population due to the conflict was unknown; and the reported IDP figures varied, from 1,000 people sheltering in a school and hospital in the local capital Ogbe Ijoh to 10,000 residents which were believed to have fled to the forest and unable to return home (IRIN, 22 May 2009; BBC, 21 May 2009). Most of the people that were being hosted in the hospital were reportedly women and children, and while the men who were arrested on suspicion that they were militants encouraged other men to remain in hiding in the bush (FoE-Nigeria, 19 June 2009).

In July 2009, clashes between an Islamic group and the Nigerian army, which started in Bauchi and quickly spread to neighbouring states of Borno, Yobe and Kano, led to new displacement. Between 3,500 and 4,000 people reportedly fled the violence across the four states, most of them following heavy fighting in Maiduguri,

the capital city of Borno State (ICRC, 31 July 2009). IDPs found shelter in police and army barracks. By the beginning of August, the Nigerian Red Cross was reporting that most of the IDPs in Maiduguri had returned home, except for around 160 people whose homes had been destroyed during the violence (IRIN, 5 August 2009). One major ethno-religious violence that deserves brief illumination during this administration was caused by the insurgence of a dreaded Islamic sect popularly known as Boko Haram in the northern region. Although the sect had not adequately engaged in attacking and bombing public places and religious buildings like now, evidences show that this sect had carried out a number attacks on police station in Bauchi which also spread to Maiduguri on 26 July 2009 (Punch17, June, 2011). Following the untimely death of President Alhaji Yar'Adua in the early 2010, who hails from the region, and with the emergence of his Vice, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, first as the Acting President and later as the substantive President, the activities of the dreaded Islamic sect became noticeable. The emergence of President Jonathan in the April, 2011 general election marked a shift of power from the North to the South. This development did not go down well with many of political big wigs in the region (North) some of whom publicly promised to make the country ungovernable for the Jonathan administration (Ajayi, 2012). The immediate result of this was a political violence (post-election violence) which broke out in some Northern States of Bauchi, Kaduna, Kano and Kastina and so on. This postelection violence which broke out in this part of the country resulted in the killing of about ten Corps members in Bauchi State (The Punch, Saturday, December, 2011.p.46) who were from the Southern Nigeria of Ondo, Osun, Lagos and so on. Later development that followed this killing was the evacuation of some other corps members from the South who were serving in the State by their different State governors like Dr. Olusegun Mimiko of Ondo State. By the time the crises abated, a new and more dreaded Islamic sect popularly known as Boko Haram began to launch a formidable and frontal attacks on government security agencies, public institutions, worship centres and symbolic monuments as well as assassination of important public figures and many other unfortunate peoples through frequent deployment of bombs and other instruments of mass destruction. In fact, hardly has any day passed without fresh report(s) of the dastardly activities of this group which has virtually brought the country to his knees, security-wise (Ajayi, 2012). The activities of this sect have taken different dimensions and trends. The sect has graduated from cruel drive by attacking beer parlous to bombing of security buildings, public buildings and

Christian institutions (churches) which happened to be the most affected (Abimbola & Adesote,2012).

Due to the nefarious activities of this sect, in late December 2011, following a series of attacks carried out by the sect in which more than 100 people were killed and some 90,000 displaced made President Jonathan to declare a state of emergency in some local governments in some Northern States like Niger, Borno, Bauchi and others (ICG, 2 Jan. 2012; The Economist, 14 and 23 Jan. 2012; Reuters, 9 April 2012). At a certain time, the sect released a threat message that the southerners should vacant the north within 2 weeks. In early January 2012, after Boko Haram had issued a warning to Christians living in the Hausa dominated north to leave or face retribution, Igbo leaders in the south-east called on Igbo families to head for safety in the south and offered a free shuttle bus service (BBC, 15 March 2012). Since then, thousands of people have reportedly moved and families split up to send women and children to safer areas in the south-east, a situation reminiscent of the population movements from northern states provoked by the religious clashes in 2000 (AP, 19 March 2012; BBC, 15 March 2012; Business Day, 18 April 2012; The Economist, 14 and 23 Jan. 2012; VOA, 30 Jan. 2012).

Recent development about the activities of this sect especially with major attacks on churches in the northern states of Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi, Adamawa, Niger and Plateau revealed that it was anti-western values (Christianity inclusive). We therefore conclude that the violence being unleashed on the Nigerian state in general and the Christians in particular by Boko Haram is both political and ethno-religious. Thus, according to Gwamna Dogara Je'adayibe (2008), ethno-religious violence was the major violence that has produced the highest number of IDPs in Nigeria and of which the Boko Haram is currently perpetrating.

Selected Statistical Data of Internally Displaced Persons in Nigeria, 1999-2008

Though there is no accurate statistics of the total number of IDPs caused by various forms of violence, the available information at our disposal enable us to present the table below which shows some of the pattern of violence that has erupted in the country between 1999 and 2008.

Sources: Norwegian Refugee Council, Profile of Internal Displacement in Nigeria, February 2005, online http://www.idpproject in Nigeria: a hidden crisis,

February 2005, online www.idpproject.org. & Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC Report, 2009 Retrieved from www.internaldisplacement.org).

Conclusion

S/N	Year of Occurrence	Type of Violence	Location/State	Number of Displaced Persons
1	1999	Violent clashes	Odi, Bayelsa	60,000
2	2000	Ethno-Religious	Kaduna	63,000+
3	2000	Ethno-Religious	Kano	Thousands
4	2001	Ethno-Religious	Kaduna	Thousands
5	2001	Ethno-Religious	Kano	80,000
6	2001	Ethno-Religious	Plateau	60,000
7	2001	Ethno-Religious	Bauchi	22,000
8	2001	Communal	Ebonyi	1000
9	2002	Inter-Ethnic	Nasarawa	Hundreds
10	2002	Inter-Ethnic	Lagos	5,000
11	2002	Religious	Kaduna	30,000
12	2002	Indigene/Settler	Plateau	Hundreds
13	2002	Indigene/Settler	Benue	Hundreds
14	2002	Political	Taraba	Thousands
15	2003	Political	Warri	12,000
16	2003	Political	Delta	4,000
17	2003	Communal	Adamawa	20,000
18	2003	Communal	Gombe	3,700
19	2004	Indigene/Religious	Plateau	298,000
20	2004	Ethno-Religious	Kano	10,000
21	2004	communal	Adamawa	2,000
22	2004	Political	Port Harcourt	6,000
23	2004	Political	Rivers	10,000
24	2006	Communal/Political	Onitsha	50,000
25	2007	Ethno-Religious	Bauchi	3,000
26	2007	Inter-Ethnic	Sokoto	Hundreds
27	2007	Political	Port Harcourt	Not mentioned
28	2007	Political	Kano	Not mentioned
29	2007	Pre &Post-election	Kogi	1,250
30	2007	Pre & Post-election	Ukwale L.G (Delta)	2000
31	2007	Pre & Post-election	Asakio. LG (Nasarawa)	1,415
32	2008	Land Dispute	Ebonyi	Thousands
33	2008	Violent clashes	Rivers	20,000
34	2008	Electoral	Jos	7,000
35	2008	Communal clashes	Akwa Ibom	Not mentioned

There is no doubt the fact that governments at all levels have been responding positively to the challenges of various forms of violence being unleashed on the Nigerian state in general over the years. It is important to point out here that the gradual return of enduring peace to the Niger Delta region is attributed to the proactive measure taken by Yar'Adua/Jonathan administration through the Amnesty

Programme of which the preceding administrations failed to address. Before the emergence of Yar'Adua administration, due to the repressive measures being unleashed on the people of the region by different successive administrations, militancy and every form of criminality were noticeable there. This development forced Yar'Adua and his Vice, who is from that region to change their tactics by withdrawing stick (this has been the method being adopted by successive governments) and offer carrots in form of Amnesty. The first major step taken by Yar'Adua administration was that, his Vice, Goodluck Jonathan was sent to meet with his people in the creeks and dialogue with them. The outcome of the dialogue made President Yar'Adua to make public announcement that: "I hereby grant amnesty and unconditional pardon to all persons who have directly or indirectly participated in the commission of offences associated with militant activities in the Niger Delta". The president gave the militants 60 days which started from August 6, 2009 to October 4, 2009 (Omojeje and Adesote, 2011). A large number of militants who laid down their arms and ammunitions within the stipulated time were compensated through various training programmes which have resulted in their re-integration and gainful employment.

Today, the activities of militants in the Niger Delta region have reduced due to this approach of which, before the Amnesty Programme, the zone was a dangerous place to live and has driven away, both people from other regions of the country, and foreign investors. It is on this passing note that the current administration needs to take drastic step at addressing the nefarious activities of this dreaded Islamic sect called Boko Haram which is capable of breaking the country. It is high time the Northern leaders and stakeholders in the region put hands on deck to see how this challenge could be addressed through dialoguing/holding talks with the leaders of this sect. This is because they cannot claim ignorance of it. The fact remains that the leaders and members of this group, even though they claim to be faceless people, still live within them in the same areas where these activities are being carried out. The former President Yar'Adua through his Vice and the governors of the Niger Delta region took this step towards addressing the menace of violence in the Niger Delta region.

On a final note, some constitutional issues need to be adequately addressed. This is because one of the causes of various forms of violence in the country like land/boundary issues, citizenship (indigenes/settlers issues) among others can be addressed through constitutional reform. In all, the promotion of good governance

at all levels of governance in the country is very paramount at addressing the problem of various forms of violence which have resulted in the displacement of many innocent lives. Each political leader must live up to their constitutional responsibilities. Corruption must not only be fought, but should also be get rid off in the country. The dividends of democracy in terms of high standard of living, good portable water, constant power supply, abundance food supply, quality education as well as the provision of other infrastructures that can make life worthwhile for every citizenry must be adequately provided.

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Refugee Protection in Romania Before Communism, Under the 1923 and 1938 Constitutions (I)

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Abstract: This paper, the first in a series, endeavors to document Romania's historical commitments to refugee protection over the past century. It delves into the legal and political dimensions of refugee protection, exploring both factual occurrences and societal perceptions, as well as the construction of humanitarian solidarity. Additionally, we reflect on instances of failure in protection and criminal persecutions endured within Romania, targeting individuals assimilated with refugees. These persecutions and crimes were perpetrated by state institutions, political organizations, and individuals alike.
We aim to contextualize the legal and political framework surrounding refugee protection by examining constitutional structures, including:
I. The Constitutions of 1923 (in force from 1923 to 1938) and 1938 (in force from 1938 to 1940).
II. Suspension of the Constitution from September 6, 1940, to August 23, 1944.
III. The reintroduction of the 1923 Constitution and its validity from 1944 to 1947.
IV. Communist Constitutions of 1948, 1952, and 1965, with the 1965 Constitution remaining in force until 1991.
V. The Constitution of 1991, which has been in effect since 1991.
We delineate the legal provisions of these constitutions regarding refugee protection, examine special laws in the field, identify responsible institutions, and scrutinize societal perceptions of refugee protection. Furthermore, we investigate the prevailing culture of humanitarian solidarity, defined as a collective ethos encompassing knowledge, attitudes, and moral conduct towards individuals in distress, irrespective of their circumstances. We contend that this culture of humanitarian solidarity serves as a pivotal enabler for upholding the principle of human dignity in refugee protection and acts as a deterrent against murders, crimes, and persecutions targeting refugees.
This paper specifically focuses on refugee protection during the interwar period, under the democratic Constitution of 1923 (1923-1938) and the autocratic Constitution of 1938 (1938-1940), until January 1941.
The analytical framework comprises:
1. Constitutional, international, and legal instruments for refugee protection in Romania.
2. The reality of protection and instances of serious failures, including estimations of refugee numbers, factual occurrences of protection, societal perceptions of safety, and violations against the obligation to protect civilians.
3. Humanitarian solidarity as a component of public culture

Keywords: *refugee protection, humanitarian solidarity, public culture of humanitarian solidarity.*

Introduction:

This paper examines refugee protection in Romania during the interwar period, spanning from 1919 until Romania entered into World War II on June 22, 1941. This timeframe encompasses the governance under the 1923 Constitution, the enactment of the 1938 Constitution, as well as the suspension of the latter during the National Legionary State (September 6, 1940 – January 29, 1941) and the initial phase of the Antonescu Dictatorship until June 22, 1941, when Romania aligned with the Axis forces to reclaim Bessarabia and Bukovina.

We hypothesize that the absence of public humanitarian solidarity fosters hate, xenophobia, and policies of extreme violence, rendering the most vulnerable individuals automatic victims. This extreme violence, perpetrated by the state, and sanctioned by local groups and individuals, permeated the societal fabric, creating an atmosphere of victimhood.

The central questions addressed in this study are: How did Romania safeguard refugees during the interwar period, and did it cultivate a culture of humanitarian solidarity?

To address these inquiries, we explore and document the legal and political frameworks for refugee protection both in Europe and within Romania. We juxtapose assumed obligations to protect refugees against the stark realities on the ground and assess the presence or absence of a culture of humanitarian solidarity.

The European landscape during this period was marked by instability, with extremist forces gaining traction and preparing for war against democracies, leading to harsh persecutions targeting vulnerable segments of society, including minorities and refugees. Following September 1, 1939, the outbreak of World War II exacerbated the situation, plunging weaker states into disarray and giving rise to widespread crimes and persecution.

Similarly, Romania grappled with internal instability. From 1919 to 1941, the Romanian Kingdom transitioned through various forms of governance, including a democratic regime under the 1923 Constitution (1923-1938), an autocratic regime under the 1938 Constitution (1938-1940), the brief rule of the National Legionary State or Legion Dictatorship (September 5, 1940 - January 29, 1941), and the personal dictatorship of General Ion Antonescu following the suspension of the 1938 Constitution on September 5, 1940. The country also experienced dynastic instability due to the succession of kings, including Ferdinand I (1916-1927), Michael I (1927-1930), Carol II (1930-1940), and Michael I (1945-1947). With four kings in twenty

five years, Romania faced challenges in maintaining international standing and internal coherence.

The context in Romania during the period from 1919 to 1941 was marked by instability and political tumult. The Romanian Kingdom underwent various forms of governance:

a) It functioned as a democratic country under the provisions of the 1923 Constitution (1923-1938).

b) It transitioned into an autocratic regime under the 1938 Constitution from 1938 to 1940.

c) It experienced a period of rule by the National Legionary State or Legion Dictatorship (5 September - 29 January 1941), led by General Ion Antonescu.

d) Following the suspension of the 1938 Constitution on September 5, 1940, the country came under the personal dictatorship of General Ion Antonescu.

Additionally, the Romanian kingdom grappled with dynastic instability, primarily due to the actions of Prince Carol II. His abdication in 1926, subsequent return to the throne in 1930, and his corrupt governance contributed to internal turmoil. Successive kings during this period were Ferdinand I (1916-1927), Michael I (1927-1930), Carol II (1930-1940), and Michael I (1945-1947). With four kings in twenty-five years, Romania's international standing and internal cohesion were significantly challenged.

Moreover, the political landscape was characterized by continuous upheavals and violent conflicts, as well as intricate relationships with various external powers. A multitude of political parties, including significant ones such as the National Peasants' Party (PNȚ) led by Maniu and Mihalache, the Liberal Party (PNL) led by Dinu Bratianu, the Legionary Party (formerly the Iron Guard) led by Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, and the Social Democratic Party (PSD) led by Titel Petrescu, sought to mobilize the country based on their respective ideologies.

Furthermore, the Communist Party, operating illegally since 1924 and supported by Moscow, under the leadership of Anna Pauker, worked to further the interests of the Comintern and undermine the stability of the country. These parties maintained strong ties with ideologically aligned parties in other European nations and with governing parties, such as PNȚ with British Conservatives, PNL with French and other liberal groups, PSD with Social Democratic Parties primarily in Western and Nordic countries, and the Communist Party with Stalin's political party.

In the context of the Great War in Europe, the protection of refugees was in its infancy. Aside from sporadic acts by the Red Cross and the humanitarian principles

advocated by Henry Dunant, refugees often found themselves reliant on the goodwill of neighboring states. Consequently, significant efforts were undertaken to establish protective measures under the League of Nations and the Nansen Offices for refugees.

Similarly, in Romania, refugee protection was in its nascent stages. However, certain experiences within society shed light on the culture of humanitarian solidarity and imparted valuable lessons on who should intervene and on behalf of whom.

The capacity to aid refugees was governed by international norms, ratified treaties, and the provisions of constitutions regarding refugee protection and definitions. Before the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugee Protection, the term "refugees" lacked a precise definition and referred to individuals crossing national borders due to regime changes in their home countries or facing persecution. Specific groups such as White Russians and Armenians were mentioned in international acts, while after 1933, Jews and opponents of the Nazi regime in Germany and Austria were included. During this period, there was no distinction between asylum seekers and refugees, nor between migrants and refugees.

In the interwar period, the term "refugee protection" held symbolic significance in state policies and public culture, entailing limited obligations of the host state to ensure personal security for those seeking refuge. However, the League of Nations documents, particularly the 1933 Refugees Convention, provided a comprehensive framework outlining signatory states' responsibilities towards stateless individuals, asylum seekers, or refugees. This included ensuring non-refoulment, fair asylum procedures, decent living conditions, integration support, and the right to apply for citizenship.

During this time, humanitarian solidarity was primarily associated with Christian values and the charitable mission assumed by societal elites and churches. However, the concept of EU solidarity with refugees encompassed both a moral obligation to support those fleeing persecution and a political response influenced by state regimes and alliances.

For us, the culture of humanitarian solidarity signifies society's collective readiness to assist refugees and denounce their persecution, violence, or crimes, extending beyond just elite groups to encompass broader societal support.

1. The Protection of Refugees in Europe After the Great War

1.1. European Political Context

The general European context during the interwar period was marked by instability, with countries grappling with the aftermath of the Great War, seeking revenge, and facing economic challenges, poverty, inflation, uncertainty, and social upheaval. Radical political parties gained traction, fostering xenophobia that permeated from academic circles to popular media. Fascist groups emerged across Europe, engaging in antisemitic actions and battling with communists. The mainstream parties struggled to manage social unrest, and minorities faced widespread discrimination and persecution. In Germany, particularly after the Nazi seizure of power in 1933, minorities, especially the Jewish population, became targets of hate speech and racial persecution, leading to the enactment of discriminatory laws such as the Nuremberg Laws.

1.2. Available Protection in Europe Amidst Political Turmoil

During the interwar period, international organizations such as the League of Nations and the Red Cross assumed responsibility for refugee protection. The League of Nations, prompted by the Red Cross, initiated international cooperation in protecting refugees, appointing Fridtjof Nansen as the High Commissioner for Refugees in 1921. Nansen introduced several arrangements to define and provide identification documents for refugees, starting with agreements for Russian and Armenian refugees and expanding to include other groups such as Assyrians, Syrians, and Kurds. In the 1930s, new arrangements were established to protect German and Austrian refugees, culminating in agreements signed in Geneva in 1936 and 1938. Additionally, the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees adopted resolutions defining conditions for protecting victims of forced migration from Germany, including Austria. Various international institutions, such as the Nansen International Office for Refugees and the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees Germany, were created under the League of Nations to oversee refugee protection efforts.

A significant milestone in refugee protection, established by the League of Nations, is the Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees, dated 28 October 1933. This convention grants refugees the right to obtain identity and protection outside their country of origin, access humanitarian international aid, and receive assistance and protection as refugees and displaced persons. Unfortunately, only a few countries ratified it.

The document outlines several key provisions for assisting refugees and displaced persons, including commitments by the League of Nations, in conjunction with the Red Cross, too:

1. Evacuate refugees from areas of danger.

2. Admit refugees into signatory states, adhering to the principle of non-refoulment.

3. Provide identification documents, such as the Nansen Passport, to refugees in need.

4. Offer emergency assistance unconditionally, including registration, establishment of refugee camps, special attention to minors and disabled persons, and meeting immediate basic needs.

5. Manage refugees' concrete situations and facilitate their integration into the host community, including access to employment, affordable housing, social assistance, and healthcare.

6. Provide pathways to refugee status and, ultimately, naturalization.

7. Facilitate resettlement, transit, and voluntary repatriation.

8. Ensure special protection for victims.

This convention laid the groundwork for the 1951 Convention on Refugees Protection.

Figure no.1. Refugees Protection Pattern in the 1933 League of Nations Convention on Refugees



Figure no.2. 1933 Refugees Protection Pattern Underling REFUGEES INSERTION IN ADOPTIVE COMMUNITY



In our interpretation, all international documents address the insertion of a refugee into an adoptive community, rather than integration. This approach, with its non-reflexive nature, has implications for the foundation and efforts of the adoptive community, as well as respect for the refugees' choices. Insertion is not a definitive or compulsory process; instead, it is a temporary option for the refugee and an effort by the adoptive country to provide temporary relief to victims of war or other highly threatening conditions. Insertion is changeable, allowing the refugee to choose another adoptive community or return to their country of origin, as indicated by the logic of resettlement, transit, and voluntary repatriation.

The 1933 Convention addressed nearly all categories of persons in distress and movement due to war or political reasons, along with their practical and immediate basic needs. While the convention named international institutions such as the Red Cross and Nansen Offices as responsible, the primary protection was supposed to come from the receiving state. However, there were fundamental steps that states needed to take. Firstly, they needed to determine how many refugees to accept. When the refugee crisis reached critical proportions, most states refused to increase their national quotas for refugee acceptance. The failure of the Evian Conference in 1938 exemplifies this, as states refused to increase their acceptance quotas for Jews fleeing persecution in Germany, despite the relatively modest proposed quota of 17,000 Jews per state. The principle of non-refoulment was

another crucial step, yet in 1938, it was only applied to one obvious victim in desperate need of refuge: Jews. Some partial solutions were found, with support from Jewish organizations, such as individual crossings of German borders and sending children to the UK for protection. However, these solutions were limited and left the majority of Jews in the Reich and other invaded territories vulnerable to the Holocaust. For other ethnicities, such as Germans and Austrians, agreements made by the League of Nations in 1936, 1938, and 1939 provided partial solutions.

Refugee protection in Romania after the Great War, particularly under the 1923 Constitution.

2.1 Refugee protection in Romania under the 1923 Constitution was guided by international norms established during the interwar period. These norms were effective in Romania, aligning with the democratic principles of the country's first constitution.

The Constitution of 1923, promulgated by King Ferdinand through the Royal Decree of 27 March 1923, enshrined individual rights, including those of citizens and non-citizens, such as refugees. Despite certain limitations, such as the lack of separation between the Church and State and significant executive powers vested in the King, it upheld democratic values and rights for all individuals residing within Romania's borders. This constitution remained in force from 1923 to 1938.

Refugee protection was explicitly granted under the 1923 Constitution. Article 7 addressed the rights and conditions of naturalization for refugees, while Article 9 stipulated that all foreigners living on Romanian soil were entitled to the protection provided by law for persons and property.

Although no specific law regarding refugee protection was identified in the Romanian Kingdom from 1919 to 1938, provisions within two collateral laws created legal conditions to safeguard refugees. The Law on Romanian Nationality (citizenship) of 1924 and the Law of 1939 allowed foreigners to obtain rights similar to those of Romanian citizens.

The Law on Migration, enacted on April 20, 1925, established conditions for Romanian state protection of immigrants, including refugees, thereby providing a legal framework for their support and integration.

Under the regime of the Kingdom of Romania governed by the 1923 Constitution, a commitment to democratic principles led to the signing and ratification of international agreements aimed at protecting refugees. Notably, Romania signed the 1933 Convention, demonstrating its dedication to refugee rights. Additionally, in 1930, a Nansen Office for Refugees was established at the

initiative of Nicolae Titulescu, which played a significant role in awarding the Nansen Certificate among other functions.

2.2. On the Reality of Refugee Protection in Romania, 1923-1938

Number of refugees protected: Reports indicate that approximately 10,000 Armenian refugees arrived in Constanța in 1923, with the Union of Armenians of Romania (UAR) advocating for their legal status and Romanian citizenship. Many vessels carrying refugees arrived in Constanța during this period, including one with 189 orphans who were later housed in Strunga near Iași until 1926. It is difficult to estimate the total number of Armenian refugees who entered Romania illegally. Despite the temporary nature of their refuge in Romania, many refugees found shelter and were eventually naturalized as Romanian citizens.

Facts in protecting refugees in Romania, 1923-1938: Oral histories and museum records indicate that the Romanian Kingdom provided protection to Armenian refugees, particularly in the 1930s. The first vessels arrived in Constanța in 1923, carrying around 10,000 refugees, mostly en route to France. An Armenian benefactor, Armeng Manissalian, supported the refugees financially and established an orphanage in Strunga. Although the Brătianu government did not provide direct support, the efforts of individuals like Manissalian ensured the well-being of the refugees. The Armenian Orphanages Album from 1923, preserved in the Constanța Armenian Museum, serves as a testament to this protection, highlighting the pathways to integration and citizenship afforded to refugees.

Perceptions of refugee life: While political leaders and community figures expressed gratitude for the protection afforded to refugees, common refugees often faced challenges and abuses that overshadowed any sense of protection. Many refugees, including Harry Tavitian's uncle Sarkis, experienced internment and loss of identity documents, highlighting the precarious nature of their status. Sarkis's ordeal, documented by Tavitian, reflects the harsh realities faced by refugees, despite legal protections and efforts to integrate into Romanian society.

2.3. Does the provided protection fit with the requirements of humanitarian solidarity?

The protection offered to refugees in Romania during this period was inadequate and fell short of the standards expected for humanitarian solidarity. While the state did open its borders to Armenian refugees, the structural support and assistance necessary for their well-being were largely provided by ethnic Armenian communities and individual benefactors. The assistance was primarily based on ethnicity, and while Christianity offered some protection against religious

xenophobia, it was not sufficient to ensure comprehensive support for all refugees.

Humanitarian solidarity demands more than just the opening of borders. It requires the provision of legal identity, emergency support for survival and transit, assistance with integration into society, and pathways to naturalization and equal rights. However, the support provided to refugees in Romania did not fully meet these criteria, leaving many refugees vulnerable and without adequate assistance.

3. Refugees' Protection in the Kingdom of Romania (1938-1940)

3.1. European political context around 1938 and its significance for refugee protection.

The political context in Europe around 1938 was marked by growing tensions and the rise of fascist regimes, particularly in Germany. The appeasement policies pursued by traditional democracies like France and the United Kingdom contributed to the expansionist ambitions of Nazi Germany and the erosion of treaties established after World War I. This led to the annexation of Austria and the division of Czechoslovakia, among other aggressive actions.

The signing of the secret Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact in 1939 further destabilized the region, with the Soviet Union gaining influence over Romanian territories. Romania, feeling insecure about its future, sought alliances and assurances of support from France and the UK. However, when the outbreak of World War II occurred in September 1939, it became clear that these assurances were not sufficient to protect Romania.

Facing increasing threats from both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, Romania decided to remain neutral. However, after the invasion of Poland by both Germany and the USSR, Romania found itself in a position to admit refugees fleeing the conflict. This decision, made by the Crown Council, was in line with a culture of humanitarian solidarity cultivated by the League of Nations, despite not being a signatory to the 1933 Convention on Refugee Statute.

The decision to admit refugees from Poland was significant, as it demonstrated Romania's willingness to provide humanitarian assistance in the face of regional turmoil. However, it also incurred the anger of Hitler and the Soviet Union, highlighting the complex geopolitical dynamics at play during this period.

The Kingdom of Romania Constitution of 1938, also known as the Carol II Constitution, was an authoritarian document that significantly expanded the powers of King Carol II. Unlike a constitution resulting from democratic processes such as debates in a Constituent Assembly or negotiations between political parties, this constitution was hastily engineered by Carol II to consolidate his authority. Produced

in just 10 days and approved through verbal votes with an overwhelming majority, it codified emergency powers and established royal supremacy over Parliament and the judiciary.

One of the notable aspects of the 1938 Constitution was its suppression of political parties and associations. Article 26 effectively eliminated the existence of political parties by denying the right to create legal entities without specific legislation. Instead, Parliament was restructured to represent professional associations, with half of the Senate being directly appointed by the King and the other half being heavily influenced by him

Despite its undemocratic nature, the 1938 Constitution did not explicitly abolish the right to asylum. Article 27 provided foreigners already in Romania with state protection for themselves and their assets, while Article 11 allowed for the naturalization of foreigners, which could potentially include refugees. This constitutional framework, however flawed, did not prevent Romania from opening its borders to refugees from Poland during the tumultuous period of World War II.

Overall, the 1938 Constitution of Romania exemplified the autocratic tendencies of King Carol II's rule, but it did not explicitly foreclose the possibility of providing refuge to those in need.

3.2 Reality of Refugees' Protection in the Interval 1938-1939

The number of refugees from Poland to Romania during 1939 remains uncertain. Polish civilians, government officials, and members of the armed forces, who had disarmed at the borders, entered Romania. Masses of Polish refugees received permission to transit through Romania as they made their way to France and later London. The type of protection provided was temporary, as these individuals were considered people in transit. This situation fostered a culture among governmental elites to uphold the solidarity commitments made when regional countries signed an alliance in case of a communist attack. However, the general public had limited contact with the refugees.

The exact number of Polish refugees who transited through Romania during this time is unclear. Without archival investigations, particularly in police archives, estimates vary. Some popular sources suggest around 50,000 refugees, while others indicate up to 100,000. In most cases, their protection was temporary and aimed to facilitate their passage through Romania as part of a retreat corridor. This protection was primarily managed by state institutions and rarely involved the general public.

3.3 Does the Provided Protection for the Refugees of Poland Fit with the

Requirements of Humanitarian Solidarity?

The protection offered by the Romanian Kingdom for Polish refugees fostered emotional solidarity within the country. Although this solidarity was short-term, it nurtured public empathy. This atmosphere left no room for hostility toward refugees in Romania. The transit of refugees did not require contributions or sacrifices from the local population. However, there was an element of public pride in assisting, reflected in sentiments of "We did it!"

As mentioned earlier, this protection was short-lived, as the majority of refugees were passing through Romania and had limited contact with the native population, primarily in cities like Bucharest. There were few opportunities for mutual learning about humanitarian solidarity. Additionally, Romanians themselves faced threats during this period, with new refugees arriving in subsequent months, including those from lost territories.

In summary, while the protection offered to Polish refugees in Romania during this period may not fully meet the criteria of humanitarian solidarity, it represented an important political gesture of solidarity during wartime.

4. First Waves of Refugees in Amputated Romania: Romanian Citizens from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina

4.1 The Political Context in Neutral Romania: Victims of USSR Aggression and Preparations to Host Brother Refugees

Romania's status of neutrality did not shield it from the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, which led to the dismemberment of Romania and the Communist invasion. Conditions became unbearable as the Communists disregarded civilians, disregarded those in need, and failed to provide reasonable conditions for retreat or alternative options. The terms of the pact, progressively harshened, amounted to an abominable diktat of the time.

On June 26, 1940, the Soviet Union issued an ultimatum to Romania, demanding the restitution of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. This ultimatum[1], justified by the USSR's perceived right, also included the annexation of Herza County. The Romanian government's proposal for negotiations was met with another ultimatum just two days later. Romania was ordered to evacuate its army and

[1] The text of the document with the first Romanian Government response, plus the new ultimatum (USSR response) with the other Romanian response are available in Bucur, Bogdan, (2019*): Sociologia proastei guvernări în România interbelică (The Sociology of Bad Government in the Interwar Romania)*, București, Editura Rao, pp.230-235.

administration from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina within 36 hours, with no mention of the affected population or their citizenship status. This concession, orchestrated under the government of Gheorghe Tătărescu and King Carol II's patronage, was not met with resistance.

Subsequently, a Crown Council meeting decided not to fight against the USSR, recognizing the futility of opposing an overwhelmingly superior force[2]. This decision was later subject to debate within Romania. Nevertheless, Romania's territorial losses continued with the cession of Northern Transylvania to Hungary on August 30, 1940, and the cession of the Cadrilater to Bulgaria on September 1, 1940. Both agreements[3] contained provisions for refugees' protection in Article 3.

In the following months, Romania's domestic political situation deteriorated further. The loss of territory fueled resentment against King Carol II's regime, especially as his government shifted towards a Nazi-friendly orientation. The pressure for Carol II's abdication intensified, with figures like Iuliu Maniu and Dinu Brătianu spearheading efforts to facilitate the transition to a new government. Despite initial promises[4], General Ion Antonescu accepted the role of Prime Minister and formed a government sympathetic to the Axis powers. Mass demonstrations against Carol II's regime erupted, culminating in his forced abdication in favor of his son, King Michael, on September 5, 1941. Carol II had previously suspended the 1938 Constitution[5], and Romania entered a period of political transition without a new constitutional framework in place.

4.2 Reality of Refugee Protection in Amputated Romania: First Wave of Refugees, Refugees from Bessarabia, and Bucovina

The evacuation left the state unprepared to protect its people seeking to escape from dire circumstances. With the loss of Bessarabia and Bukovina, waves of refugees poured into Romania from the former Romanian territories during the four days when the borders were not yet closed. These individuals legally sought refuge between June 28 and July 4, 1940. Subsequently, many Moldavians attempted to

[2] See Djuvara, Neagu, (2013): *O scurtă istorie ilustrată a românilor (Romanians Short History with Ilustration)*, București, editura Humanitas, pp 325 and 326.

[3] The texts are available in Bucur, Bogdan, (2019*)*: pp.230-235.

[4] Ion Antonescu firmly promised to Maniu, that he would not accept a mandate of Prime Minister. (See Pavel, Dan (2023): pp. 120-121.)

[5] *Kingdom of Romania (1940): Legea 510/ 1940 pentru suspendarea Constituției din 27 Februarie 1948 (Law no. 510/1940 for the suspension of the Constitution of February 27, 1938.)* Text published in the *Official Gazette*, Part I no. 205 of September 5, 1940. In force since 05 September 1940 available at https://lege5.ro/ legea-nr-510-1940-pentru-suspendarea-constitutiei-din-27-februarie-1938

flee illegally after losing their Romanian citizenship due to the new border alignment, desperately seeking safety from Soviet Bassarabia.

The people from Bassarabia constituted the first waves of Romanian ethnic refugees heading to the country. As evacuees, they fell into a special category, deserving of humanitarian solidarity from both the government and society at large. Unfortunately, this solidarity was lacking, especially after Romania retreated from the League of Nations on July 13, 1940.

Simultaneously, increasing numbers of illegal refugees arrived, fleeing Communist terror and persecution against ethnic Romanians. In the chaotic moments following the Soviet occupation, many Romanian soldiers and civilians were detained, disarmed, or arrested by Soviet forces. The communist authorities began mass arrests, targeting civil servants and former deputies of the Country Council, among others.

The escape from the territories for those who became non-Romanian overnight presented a formidable challenge for both the refugees and the Romanian Government, led at the time by George Tătărescu. While the government informed the population of the situation, it was ill-prepared to provide transportation or guidance on resettlement. Consequently, refugees were left to fend for themselves in many cases, with priority given to political entities, administration officials, and the military.

The evacuation process was chaotic and lacked a legal framework for providing means of evacuation and personal security for civilians. Political entities, administration, and military personnel were prioritized due to the foreseeable risk of persecution and mistreatment. The ensuing persecution under Soviet occupation was relentless, with arrests, deportations, and executions becoming commonplace.

While some support was provided to citizens of major cities, rural populations faced greater challenges in escaping during the legally permissible evacuation window. Many attempted to cross the borders illegally, with varying degrees of success. Soviet authorities responded with terrorist measures, including strengthened border patrols and the deportation of families with relatives in Romania to forced labor camps.

Numerous attempts to flee to Romania resulted in tragedy, with individuals being killed, wounded, or captured by Soviet patrols. Those who managed to reach Romania often faced retaliatory actions against their families left behind. Despite the risks, these desperate attempts to seek refuge underscored the perilous conditions

and the determination of those fleeing persecution.

The Romanian authorities conducted investigations and published various data regarding the circumstances of the withdrawal at least three times: immediately during the withdrawal, after the reoccupation of the provinces in 1941, and on Antonescu's order in 1944 as part of the efforts to prepare documentation for the Conference of Peace. They estimated the number of refugees from Bessarabia and Bukovina to be around 200,000. However, due to the prevalence of illegal border crossings, the accuracy of this figure is uncertain. According to official documents, only a small portion of the population of Bessarabia and Bukovina reacted positively to the Soviet annexation, with the majority expressing pro-Romanian sentiments. Many attempted to seek refuge, and about 200,000 citizens managed to legally do so in Romania, spurred by the urgency of the ultimatum response.

The number of refugees who entered illegally is unaccounted for in the total of 200,000. These individuals, whether alerted or simply confined within the new borders, likely numbered around 200,000 as well. The atrocities committed following the establishment of the Soviet administration suggest that many sought to escape the Communist regime.

Regarding effective protection measures, no legal preparations were identified to host, integrate, or support the refugees. The government was caught off guard[6] and took necessary actions to protect the refugees within three months, with measures becoming effective by the end of September 1940. The Secretary of State for the Colonization of the evacuated population was tasked with implementing these measures, which included providing small allowances, access to some social services (largely provided by NGOs), and facilitating employment opportunities. Refugees perceived this protection as a form of hope for mercy from the authorities, though some individuals, such as a high-ranking officer and a teacher named Mihail Covaliu, sought state support directly.

The memories of evacuated individuals paint a complex picture of refugee life, with many expressing dissatisfaction with their circumstances despite

[6] Constantin Băjenaru, , (2020): *Aspecte privind Refugiații Basarabeni în Județul Făgăraș până la intrarea României în Război (21 Iunie 1941) (On the Refugees from Bassarabia in the Făgăraș County until the Romania Entering into the War (July 21, 1941)* available at the https://humanities.studiamsu.md/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/23.-p.153-160-3.pdf

acknowledging the necessity of refuge. Hostility towards refugees was common[7], and feelings of unhappiness prevailed, even in the absence of immediate danger. Instead of nurturing solidarity, these sentiments fueled individualistic efforts for survival.

An anecdote about a young refugee family from Cernăuți illustrates the challenges faced upon arrival in Romania. Despite seeking refuge in their mother-in-law's house in Bucharest, the family faced hostility and was unwelcome. The daughter-in-law, who arrived with no possessions, was particularly targeted, with resentment growing due to her lack of assets. She often reminisced about their home in Cernăuți, emphasizing its address to her daughter as a symbol of their lost life before displacement.

During the evacuation, in places and some stations where refugees gathered in desperate fights for space on trains or wagons, anti-Romanian and pro-Soviet incidents occurred. These groups of young fanatics attacked, stripped, beat, and even killed priests, intellectuals, Romanian soldiers separated from their units, or simple civilians. The actions of these groups highlighted the failure of the Romanian administration to protect its people. Some military and civil documents from that period blamed the Jews of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina for this deplorable retreat, though Jewish documents proved the persecution of the Jewish population. Upon arriving in Romania, Romanian citizens of the Jewish minority found themselves in a particularly hostile atmosphere fueled by fascist elements, fascist political leaders, some intellectuals, and the press. There were cases of Romanian soldiers who, after crossing the Prut River, indulged in violent actions against innocent Jews.

Despite the executive's impotence in integrating them into new areas of the country, waves of refugees continued to arrive, along with the need to ensure order in the evacuation process. Enraged by xenophobia, some groups, including those related to the army, committed crimes against Romanian citizens of Jewish ethnicity. Jews uncovered cases of people being pushed out of trains, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, exacerbating protection challenges. The prevalence of a culture of humanitarian solidarity mattered significantly in those circumstances.

4.3. Does the provided protection for brother refugees, speakers of the same language, fit with the requirements of humanitarian solidarity?

[7] Ravici Niura (f.a): *Family deportation from Cernăuți to Debrecen in* Schieber, Siegfried, edt: *Generații, Generații ...Viata și Martirul Evreilor din Campulung Bucovian (The life and the Martyrdom of the Jews from Campulung -Bukovina),* f.a. pp. 675-676.

The chances to protect refugees and develop humanitarian solidarity toward brother refugees were ruined from the beginning by some groups in the army and administration failing to adopt legal and moral conduct toward the victims. Specifically, the murders, crimes, persecutions, and abuses against minorities—documented by Jews—poisoned the atmosphere in the country for a long time, undermining efforts to provide effective protection and promote solidarity among refugees.

5. Next Waves of Refugees in Amputated Romania: Romanian Citizens from Northern Transylvania and Cadrilater

5.1. Protection of Northern Transylvania Refugees in the Early Wartime Period in the Kingdom of Romania after August 30, 1940: Options for Romania

Unlike the victims of the Ultimatum[8] (refugees from former Romanian territories incorporated into the USSR), refugees from Northern Transylvania were afforded a form of legal protection. The Vienna Diktat, although terrifying, contained provisions for refugee protection. Romanians who chose to leave were given a six-month window to do so. In the Vienna Arbitrage/Vienna Diktat document, Articles 2, 3, and 4 outlined measures to protect individuals who lost their citizenship. Instead of retaining their citizenship, affected individuals were automatically granted citizenship of the new state. The text mandated that the decision to stay or leave be left to individual choice—hence referred to as "options"—and provided a six-month interval for those affected by the Diktat to make their decision. Furthermore, it allowed for the regulation of business affairs and asset transfers. Once a decision was made, the new state was required to facilitate transportation for those opting to leave (Articles 3 and 4). The entire text of the Diktat is available in facsimile form in a book authored by Bogdan Bucur[9].

In Romania, the text was disseminated via the press, and the public was informed about refugee protection measures: "All Romanian subjects established in the territory to be ceded by Romania on this day acquire Hungarian nationality

[8] In the Soviet *Ultimatum*… were no provisions for the civilians. No possibility to opt for citizenship or other (for Romanian or Soviet citizenship); no reasonable interval of time to organize their refugees; no for protecting their assets; no or to legally return as foreign citizens back to the home villages or cities. Neither the minimal provision to ensure the public order in the refuge was in the text. (The atrocities that occurred were partly determined by the missing concerns for civilians in the text.)

[9] See Bogdan Bucur, (1919*):* pp.250-252.

without any further formalities. They will be authorized to opt for Romanian nationality within six months. Those who exercise this right will depart Hungarian territory within an additional period of one year and will be received by Romania. They will be allowed to take their movable property without hindrance, liquidate their immovable property until their departure, and take the proceeds with them. If liquidation is unsuccessful, these individuals will be compensated by Hungary. Hungary will address all matters related to the resettlement of those opting to leave in a generous and accommodating manner." (Excerpt from the text published in "Universul," September 1, 1940 edition).

5.2. Reality of Refugee Protection for Brothers from Northern Transylvania and Conditions of Options for No Refuge

The number of refugees from Northern Transylvania after August 30, 1940, was significant, with estimates reaching around 500,000 individuals seeking shelter primarily in the south of Transylvania. According to official reports from the Commission for Refugees of Northern Transylvania, between December 1, 1940, and December 1, 1943, the total number of refugees from this region was 218,919. A comparable number, approximately 250,000 individuals, were not at home at the time of the Diktat.

Did the Romanian authorities adequately protect the refugee population from Northern Transylvania? Comprehensive studies on this topic are lacking, but family memories recount frightening situations where individuals received little to no assistance from the Romanian state. For instance, my great-grandmother, severely injured in her yard in Feleac, Cluj, did not receive assistance from the Romanian state. When transferred across the new border to Cluj for medical care, she faced incredible difficulties gaining access to a hospital under Hungarian administration. Thus, it appears that individuals were largely left to fend for themselves in these conditions.

Regarding education, some former students from Cluj-Napoca who sought refuge in Timișoara were able to continue their studies and graduate, but the effort required was immense, and specific support from the state or civil society is not well-documented. Literature mentions isolated cases of support provided to refugees, but a comprehensive overview is lacking.

One notable form of support came from the King Michael Foundation, which supported the House of Transylvanian Refugees Avram Iancu, located in the Village

Museum in Bucharest. Additionally, refugees in Bucharest organized themselves into the Association of Refugees from Northern Transylvania and engaged in public communication efforts, including gatherings at the Museum of the Village[10], public conferences, and publications aimed at maintaining hope and trust in their future.

In terms of state involvement, there were some instances of support noted in the Coposu diary, particularly for jurists from Northern Transylvania who found employment[11] in Bucharest upon arrival. However, this support seems to have been more selective and caste-based rather than part of a systematic intervention to ensure the "Big 4s" (labor, housing and food, education, and healthcare) for all refugees.

In conclusion, it can be said that apart from their admission into Romania, the brothers-refugees were largely left to fend for themselves.

Romanians and Jews who remained in Northern Transylvania after August 30, 1940, faced significant challenges. Despite provisions in the text to avoid harming civilians of other ethnicities, widespread murders, crimes, persecutions, and abuses occurred, often instigated by local fanatics or civil organizations. Of particular concern were the atrocities committed against Jews, many of which occurred under the influence of the Nuremberg Laws, which were adopted early[12] and comprehensively in Hungary, then allied with Germany.

Romanians who remained in Horthy's Hungary were effectively refugees in their own homes, subjected to deprivation of their rights and major offenses. They were denied access to education[13], excluded from civil service positions, and often conscripted for labor or military service. Educational institutions such as the University of Cluj opted to relocate to Sibiu, while high schools like Emanuil Gojdu in Oradea moved to Timișoara.

The ARDEAN (Association of Refugees, Expulsions, and Displaced Persons from Northern Transylvania) detailed numerous atrocities and violations of the

[10] See Gabriel Țepelea, (1995): *Lupta Refugiaților Transilvăneni impotriva Diktatului de la Vienna (The Refugees of Transylvania Fight, against the Vienna Diktat)*, available at https://biblioteca-digitala.ro/reviste/ACTA-MUSEI-NAPOCENSIS/32-II-Acta-Mvsei-Napocensis-Istorie-1995_042.pdf.

[11] Dan Pavel, (2023): p. 134.

[12] Horthyst Hungary adopted the *Nuremberg law* between 1938 -1941, excluding Jews from many professions, schools, from participation of the economic and social life. The laws forbade the intermarriages between Jews and non-Jews, barred the Jews for be employed in administration. See more on https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/hungary-before-the-german-occupation.

[13] The University of Cluj – Ferdinand I University - and Cluj University of Medicine opted for a refuge at Sibiu; the Cluj University of Agriculture refugeed at Timișoara. The Oradea high-school Emanuil Gojdu at Timișoara etc. The students enrolled there must refuge or end their studies.

Vienna Arbitrage/Diktat, including thousands of murders, tortures, arrests, and expulsions, as well as tens of thousands subjected to forced labor or internment[14]. Although the text of the Arbitrage/Diktat allowed for appeals in cases of breaches, its provisions were not consistently implemented in good faith, leading to widespread suffering among Romanian civilians.

Under pressure from leaders like Iuliu Maniu, the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mihai Antonescu, invoked Article 7 of the Arbitrage/Diktat to call for intervention from Germany and Italy[15]. A commission led by Henke and Ruggieri confirmed mutual breaches of the legal framework[16], with both Romanian and Hungarian citizens suffering persecution and economic damages in each other's territories[17]. Despite protests from the Romanian government, the situation remained dire for many civilians affected by the territorial changes.

Despite the adoption of the Nuremberg Laws in Hungary, Horthy assured Hungarian Jews that he would personally protect them, leading many to believe him. However, the atrocities against Jews occurred after Horthy's removal from power in March 1944 and the German occupation of Hungary. In the early 1940s, Hungarian Jews faced persecution and recruitment into labor units, with some individual support from Romanians in certain cases[18].

The perceptions of Northern Transylvania refugees regarding their protection in Romania during the final days of Carol II's dictatorship and the subsequent National Legionary State are not well-documented in official state records. However, individual testimonies paint a troubling picture. In many cases, refugees relied on relatives, colleagues' families, or acquaintances for protection rather than state institutions. Additionally, the social climate did not support their integration into society.

Some individuals choose to cross borders back to their hometowns for various reasons. For example, Dumitru Roșca and Teodor Tătaru, students at the

[14] Mircea Popa and Doina, (2006): *Open letter to the Romanian Member Chamber of Deputies, Viorel Arion on the behalf of the ARDEAN (Association of the Refugees, Expulses, and Displaced Persons from the Northern Transylvania*, available at https://www.cdep.ro/proiecte/2007/100/80/4/ax184.pdf.

[15] A commission of the two powers (Nazi Germany and Fasciste Italy) governs visited the territories where the Vienna Dictate was imposed. Their conclusions: there were abuses in both of the parts. According to Pavel, Dan (2023): *Iuliu Maniu în Jurnalul lui Corneliu Coposu* ..., p. 197.

[16] See Coposu, Corneliu, (2014): *File dintr-un jurnal interzis 1936-1947, ...(Pages from a forbiden diary 1936-1947 ...)*, București, Editura Vremea.

[17] See Roșca, Dumitru, (2016)... p. 86. and pp. 82-83.

[18] See Roșca, Dumitru, (2016)... p. 86. and pp. 82-83.

Adventist Seminar in Stupini, decided to return home[19] to the North of Ardeal and faced challenges crossing the border illegally. Similarly, Iosif Negrean[20], a shopkeeper from Carei, experienced multiple movements across borders due to political changes and personal circumstances, illustrating the complexities faced by refugees.

Persecutions against those who maintained hope, such as members of the Pro Transylvania association, led to negative perceptions of the National Legionary State's willingness to protect refugees. The deportation of Jews and Roma people to Transnistria, which began in October 1941, further exacerbated these negative perceptions. Although these events occurred after Carol II's abdication, they were influenced by his policies and foreign relations.

5.3 On the Humanitarian solidarity in the Refuge situation

During the period of the 1938 Constitution, there was little space for the construction of humanitarian solidarity concerning refugee situations, either as beneficiaries or benefactors, at a societal level. While individual acts of solidarity existed, they were often rare and isolated. Some instances of solidarity were motivated by Christian teachings, as seen in the memories of Dumitru Roșca, an Adventist.

In one notable example, a group of Adventists provided protection for a group of Jews who had escaped deportation, offering them food and shelter in a secure location where the Adventists prayed[21]. However, these instances of solidarity were exceptions rather than the norm.

Overall, the wartime atmosphere was marked by atrocities committed by one group against another, with refugees mainly being victims rather than recipients of widespread humanitarian aid or protection.

Conclusion on the Refugees Protection in the Kingdom of Romania 1923-1940.

The period of refugee protection in the Kingdom of Romania from 1923 to 1940 reveals several deficiencies in the country's approach to handling refugee crises. Unlike states that were signatories to the League of Nations 1933 Convention on Refugees' Protection, Romania often lacked a comprehensive legal framework for

[19] See Roșca, Dumitru, (2016)... p. 86. and pp. 82-84.

[20] See Mărieș, Horia, (2014): *Români refugiați, expulzați sau rămași în Ardealul de Nord după Diktatul de la Vienna* (*Romanians refuged expulsed or remained in the Northern Transylvania after Vienna - Diktat*), *available at* https://www.buletindecarei.ro/2014/09/ romani-refugiati-expulzati-sau-ramasi-in-ardealul-de-nord-dupa-diktatul-de-la-viena.

[21] Roșca, Dumtru, (2016), p. 96.

addressing refugee situations. Instead, measures were often taken reactively rather than proactively.

The implementation of refugee protection norms was inconsistent, and the Romanian state was ill-prepared to handle the influx of refugees during World War II. Generally, refugee protection efforts relied heavily on the initiatives of international organizations like the Red Cross and League of Nations, as well as private initiatives such as the Orphanage of Strunga funded by individuals like Armeng Manissalian.

The arrival of refugees from former Romanian territories exposed deficiencies in Romania's political, institutional, social, and cultural systems regarding refugee protection. One significant deficiency was the absence of a culture of humanitarian solidarity and the lack of efforts to cultivate such a culture at the societal level.

Factors contributing to this deficiency may include the influence of the Far-Right government, the prevailing atmosphere in Europe characterized by the ideology and implementation of the Nuremberg Laws, a lack of tradition of solidarity among Romanians without discrimination, and insufficient examples of solidarity from Romanian elites.

For researchers in political science, sociology of public culture, and political communication, this period presents an opportunity to examine why efforts to construct a culture of humanitarian solidarity were lacking, while xenophobia against others was allowed to proliferate. It raises questions about the societal values, political ideologies, and historical contexts that shaped Romania's approach to refugee protection during this time.

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FOCUS: 'DE-MIGRANTICIZE' MIGRATION

Approaching Migration and (In)mobility Analysis Through Rhizomatic Thinking, Feminist Epistemes and the Embodied Experience of Migration

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Abstract. International migration analysis frequently addresses mobility phenomena through state-centric macrolevel descriptions. This "top down" approach is helpful to portray general patterns and highlight structural issues that contribute to mobility, but often omits "the figure of the migrant". Feminist phenomenology demonstrates the importance of articulating "the body" as social constructions of expressions of biopolitical relations that structure ontological positioning in the world. Heeding to the plea to de-migranticize migration analysis, I argue that it is imperative to redress international migration analysis "through the body" by reframing migrancy through feminist phenomenology and reflexivity. Through rhizomatic thinking, illustrated with narratives on the Mexico-United States borderlands, I propose a re-conceptualization of migrancy that *embodies positionality* argued through feminist narratives as imperative to the center of migration and (in)mobility research.

Keywords. *de-migranticization, embodiment, feminist phenomenology, heterophenomenology, migrancy, ontopological, reflexivity, rhizomatic thinking*

Introduction

Despite the widely accepted argument to abandon methodological nationalism in international migration analysis (Wimmer and Schiller 2003), much of the analysis that prime migration policies around the world still *speak through* the Nation-State (Bommes and Thränhardt 2012; Dahinden 2016). By maintaining discourses that do not "descend" from the lenses of the Nation-State and its legal body, narratives *hover* above the "migrant body" with the effect of *naturalizing* approaches to analyses, that reproduces hegemonic world-system views of migration and mobility. These analyses tend to portray the "national" state of mobility "because the modes of presenting problems and questions are politically

constituted by the nation states"[1]. The conceptual distance of the Nation-State from the migrant, centers migration and mobility phenomena around the structure of migration and mobility regimes through narratives that sway away from the experience of migration, from the body of the migrant, and from the *figure of the migrant* (Nail 2015). This "tyranny of the national" approach[2] frequently dismisses issues of agency in favor of structure, and is prone to what Alex Sager has called "descriptive and explanatory inadequacy" (Sager 2014). It is also a testament to the perseverance of methodological frameworks that have, as Sager (2014) argues, become *naturalized* in migration research. Discourses that keep a "safe distance" from the migrant body are non-reflexive stances that are often moving within the boundaries of what Michael Shapiro (1997: 16) calls "moral geography", that is, "a set of silent ethical assertions that preorganized explicit ethicopolitical discourses".

Significant efforts at the end of last century were made to decenter state-centrism from international migration discourse, notably by working through analytical frameworks such as transnationalism and its theoretical tributaries (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007). Nevertheless, as Pessar and Mahler (2003) suggest, it still falters in addressing substantive aspects of the intersectional constitution of the "migrant body" such as gender and ethnicity, among others aspects highlighted by feminist epistemologies and methodologies, that structure the phenomenological positioning of "being-in-the-world" (Schües 2018). In a similar tone to the call to "open up social sciences" in late 20th century (Wallerstein et al. 1996), a growing number of migration research scholars have increasingly called for a greater appraisal of reflexivity in migration research in order to "tilt the frame"[3] of prevailing discourse (Shinozaki 2021)[4].

Pushing through the "reflexive turn" in migration studies (Shinozaki 2021)[5], a recent prominent voice in this discussion has been Janine Dahinden's "plea" to *de-migranticize* migration research. Attending to the historical foundation of migration research, pioneered in mid-XIX notably through two distinct approaches: the census-based, "from above" works of geographer Ernst G. Ravenstein and the magnus opus

[1] Bommes and Thränhardt (2012: 202).
[2] See Donna R. Gabaccia (1999: 1123) discussion on the need to "reject the tyranny of the national by seeking alternative concepts and alternative scales for writing history above, below, within, or outside individual nation".
[3] See Steinberg (1998).
[4] See Schües (2018).
[5] See Maccarini, A. M. and Prandini, R. (2009) for an in-depth discussion on reflexivity.

research “from below” on polish migration by William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, Janine Dahinden echoes a growing grumble to revest staple categories of migration research analysis -such as “migration”, “culture” and “society”- through critical semiotic denotations and connotations that seek to decouple a historical dragging of *dominated* concepts. She proposes breaking out of the self-producing “migration container” to redress migration analysis through reflexive positionality and sensitivity. To this end, the Swiss researcher pushes for a *de-migranticization* of migration research, to replenish migration research with new epistemic and methodological considerations across disciplines. To de-naturalize migration research implies, as feminist researchers have argued for many decades, “thinking through the body”.

Feminist phenomenology and thinking through the body

The extended interest in mobility during the second half of last century is symptomatic of a renewed interest and analytical approach to the configurations of glocal politics, accelerated by advances in transportation and communication systems that frame migration under the socio-political contexts of umbrella concepts such as the “global village” (McLuhan 1964), “global ecumene” (Hannerz 1996), alongside “transnationalism” -arguably one of the most representative descriptors of migration relations and configuration of late twentieth century- giving rise to concepts such as “transnational migrant circuits” (Rouse 1991), “transnational community” (Goldring 1996), “transnational social space” (Faist 2000), all of which reframe certain aspects of migration within the transnational migrancy expressions of “transmigrants” (Basch et al. 1994). These umbrella concepts are powerful containers of meaning and substance that enrich migration and mobility realities that seek to re-engage with “the body” of the migrant by addressing further the ontological impact of migration on social and individual realities through the lenses of intersectional, gender-studies and critical feminist approaches (Leinonen 2021). This redressing makes important headway in addressing the explicit impact and role of intersectional complexities of the *embodiment* of migration that fundamentally structure migration patterns, forms, shapes and interpretations. Nevertheless, despite critical engagement with conceptual configurations of migration and (in)mobility patterns that shape the experiences and forms of phenomena, categorizing experience has still proven a difficult task.

It is precisely the intersectional complexity of experiences of migration -*its*

phenomenological properties[6]- that has eluded its encapsulation in a semantic articulation that can, effectively, denote key aspects of experiencing the experience of migration (Coole and Frost 2010). One way to engage with the experience of migration, and bring the analytical value of experience to migration and mobility studies, is to take key from feminist phenomenology and think "through the body". Phenomenological consideration from feminist critical thought is crucial to rethink, de-naturalize and de-migranticize migration research. Linda Fisher (2000a: 15) echoes this stance by stating that "the intertwining of feminist and phenomenological ideas has rich possibilities for a wide variety of fields and discussions, offering the potential of a suggestive, salutary, and radical analysis for future inquiry".

Within a discussion on the politics of technological subjugation in gender, Haraway (1997) alludes to the attachment necessary to situate the body as an embodied body, and does so -in part- through a creative usage of the theoretical consideration of *prosthesis*[7]. By seeking a political and epistemological positioning of the body as "always a complex, contradictory, structuring, and structured body" as opposed to "the view from above, from nowhere, from simplicity" she is calling for an increase in the complexity of the subject, and ultimately placing the notions of gendered bodies as an intersecting social fact. Ultimately, Haraway is expressing the *ontopological* property of migrancy. An ontopology, argues Jacques Derrida (1994: 103) is the axiomatics linking indissociably the ontological value of present-being [*on*] to its *situation*, to the stable and presentable determination of a locality, the *topos* of territory, native soil, city, body in general.

Then, the experience of migration is a *situated experience within the experience of migration* mediated, precisely, due to its social construction and characteristics, determined by its *ontopological character*. To think of migrancy as ontopologically constituted is to make the body *visible* (Merleau-Ponty, 2002). Guillaumin (1995) highlights how expressions and perceptions of gender, ethnicity, and class become *social facts*[8] as they impose by its ontopologically constitution

[6] See Coole and Frost (2010).

[7] In Donna Haraway's discussion on the politics of technological subjugation in gender, she alludes to the attachment necessary to situate the body as an embodied body, and does so -in part- through a creative usage of the theoretical consideration of prosthesis. To this, she concludes that, "prosthesis is semiosis, the making of meanings and bodies, not for transcendence but for power-charged communication" (Haraway, 1997: 293).

[8] A *social fact*, argues Durkheim, are representations and actions that are culturally transmitted and engaged with and conformed by them.

through world-system positionality and systemic organization on the politics of the body (Fisher 2014). The body becomes another form of the *body politic* (Gatens 1997). The experience of migration becomes part of the body, as an embodied social fact, that simultaneously shapes and is shaped by the ontopological positioning of the *figure of the migrant*. The dialectical constitution of the forms of experience places the Other as Self within the body of experience (de Beauvoir, 1956) and so, experience, then, becomes an embodied aspect of the Self.

Approaching migration and (in)mobility studies through feminist phenomenological perspectives, incites the explicit acknowledgment of structural patriarchal heteronormative biopolitical practices that *define* substantial conditions, configurations, and considerations that shape social realities. Addressing this discourse of the overarching moral and biopolitical structures of migration can better position how structuring factors -such as economic position and disposition, cultural affinity, religious creeds, ethnic membership, social perception, and political motivation, among others- shape the fundamental possibilities of agency and experience of migration. By engaging in reflexivity, discourses can move beyond dominated categories of analysis that serve as primers for regulation, liberation and alteration of pathways of (in)mobility and incorporate the" senses of the body" to address the fundamental ontological constitution of reality that emanates from the social construction and perception of the body[9]. As Edward Said (1994: xiii) put forth, "nations themselves are narrations".

By moving between the spaces that structure and articulate the "body of the migrant", it becomes possible to not only highlight the practices that constrict and facilitate mobility but also highlight systems of values, moral and identity politics -*biopolitics*- that filter through the multiple levels of "the body" of the migrant. Addressing what Sam Binkley (2018) has fashioned as the "biopolitical metaphor"[10] to migration phenomena, is a recognition of the historical situatedness of structural experiences that embody the means and modes of experiences and being in reality. In the words of Claire Blencowe (2012: 1), biopolitics should be understood as a

[9] See "Embodied metaphors: nerves as lived experience" on the social positioning of the senses, in this case, the nerve (*nervios*), by Setha Low (1994).

[10] Building upon the discussions raised through Foucault's assessment of the embodiment and *in corporealization* of power (bio-power), Sam Binkley (2018: 2) fashions the "biopolitical metaphor" as an embodied aspect of biopower to address and demonstrate how biopower touches not just upon the body's present and future actions, but acts upon the very basis of those actions in the body's felt past, in the accumulated residue of repeated and habitualized actions that shapes embodiment demonstrate how.

historically specific formulation of experience and embodiment – a formulation or 'framing' that constitutes life as an immanent ground of meaning, truth games, ethics and political reason.

It becomes imperative, then, to head to the sustained cry to readdress the complexities of the social construction of the body, as Pessar and Mahler (2013) argue, and "bring gender" into migration and mobility studies, as well as de-naturalizing ethnicity (Dahinden 2016; Leinonen 2021). One way to "embody" the intersectional makeup of the migrant in analytical considerations of (in)mobility, is to recapture the essence of *migrancy*.

Embodying migrancy

Migrancy has frequently been reduced to convey something akin to the movement of migration as a lexical verb, commonly fashioned as a *naturalized* aspect of addressing facets of migration and mobility. This naturalized notion of migrancy, however, fails to attend to the necessary complexity embedded -and embodied- in migrancy. Taking Dahinden's "plea" to de-migranticize migration analysis seriously, a turn to Ian Chambers' (1994) seminal work on migrancy can recenter migrancy "through the body". By capturing the transformative agency of theoretical analysis and formulation in the post-1968 "revolutionary" moment (Wallerstein 1989), taking notice of critical deconstructionist, post-structuralist and feminist epistemes surrounding the narratives of social construction of reality, Chambers insists that terminology in migration and mobility studies are missing *something*, as "there is clearly also something else occurring here". By shifting the focus of migration discourse, narrative and forms of "seeing" migration phenomena from the "top" to "down" -from voices from "above" to voices from "below"- Chambers is bringing the difference of migration experience to the forefront of migrancy - the essence of the movement and mobility- of *the experience of the experience* of migration. It is precisely "the third view" applied to gather the entanglements of embodied migrancy that suggests a heterophenomenological approach.

Moreover, than the constitution of the phenomenological expressions of "being a body", to see another "body in motion" requires a double hermeneutic approach that recognizes the positionality of interpretation embedded in the observation of the observed. It is here that Daniel Dennett's heterophenomenological approach can be useful. Building off phenomenological theorization, Dennet (1991) recognizes that an observation of an observation

requires reflexive positionality, much in tune with the feminist position of "situated knowledges" as purported of a "feminist objectivity" (Haraway 1988). This explicit recognition is "the third view" serves as an epistemic mechanism to recognize embodied positionality within the object observed and its constitutive aspect on the lenses of the observer. Thus, heterophenomenology implies adopting an intentional stance in which one observes a subject invested with agency, beliefs, and rationality, and interprets his or her actions and the events that traverse the subject as socially positioned in a social field that refers to and composes individual (as well as social) biographical narratives.

Assuming a heterophenomenological stance allows us to treat narratives as stories that make sense of the world, and to take subjects "seriously"[11]. Considering the ontopological position and heterophenomenological condition of narrating migration and (in)mobility phenomena is a recognition of dialectics of identity as common denominators in the process of "seeing and describing" (social) reality (Kohl and McCutcheon 2014). The explicit recognition of differentiation -the differences in "structural other-ness" that shape identity politics (Braidotti 2006) - allows migration discourse to highlight the heterogeneity of the plights of migrants and pry away from normalization and naturalization discourses that "hover" above the migration field. By recognizing the socio-political configuration in historical-situatedness of migration populations through the *embodied body*, as Merleau-Ponty might suggest[12], migrancy inescapably addresses the issues of situatedness in social reality that speaks "through the body", by bringing to the forefront of narrative consideration, articulating and presentation, the implications and politics of gender, ethnicity, status -*as a minimum*. Given this, I propose understanding migrancy, with and through its reflexive and positionality properties, as the "*the (unfinished) social product of the social process of the experience of migration, heterophenomenologically expressed and ontopologically situated.*"

Through this de-migranticization, migrancy no longer lends to be a creative synonym to the movement of migration, but can correctly revert the "marginalization" of migration reflexivity[13] by addressing the embedded and embodied complexities of, as Thomas Nail has argued, "the figure of the migrant". By indulging in the process of migration itself, Thomas Nail centers on the

[11] See chapter 4. "A Method for Phenomenology" in Dennet (1991).
[12] See Seamon (2018) for further discussion.
[13] See Dahinden (2016).

communality of risk in all forms and degrees of migration. By placing mobility within the gains and losses of the *senses* of place, Nail is effectively retributing the "movement" of migration, through the "experience" of migration as part of the *regime of social motion*. By focusing the regimes of social motion of migrants "from below", Nail asserts the possibility of registering the "minor history" of migration forms, shapes, and patterns that challenges the push to generalize, homogenize and distil differentiation in narratives that describe the migrant as a non-agentic member of the story being told and described. The "figure of the migrant" is, in essence, *the embodiment of migrancy*. As Russel Ferguson (1990: 10) stated over three decades ago, "no longer can whiteness, maleness or heterosexuality be taken as the ubiquitous paradigm, simultaneously center and boundary". Narratives are political[14]. The body is political[15]. *What we say, matter. How we say it, matters*.

De-migrantizicing migrancy makes attainable the social dimensions of the "figure of the migrant". Adding an embodied migrancy approach to migration, mobility and transnational analysis aids in breaching the gap between the different scalar levels of analysis and adds a necessary dimension to understanding migration and (in)mobility by recognizing agency, situatedness, and intersectional composition and positionality that shape the means, modes and forms of engaging with "the body" of the "figure of the migrant". Narratives that engage with embodied migrancy address the underlying issues that structure the "bodies" of migrants, by acknowledging how regimes of identity politics facilitate some forms of mobilities while hindering others (Leinonen 2021)[16]. Adding to this framework, is the disruptive penetration of new facets of Information and Communications Technology that have reshaped the modes of "being" in the world in. The growing access to the digital sphere adds new layers of complexity that are necessary to address when considering the shapes of experiences of migrancy[17]. Embodied migrancy at the beginning of the second decade of 21st century find itself at the cusp of being, simultaneously "a body without organs" while being a "body with organs"[18].

[14] See de Fina (2017).
[15] See Synnott (1993).
[16] Notably by making visible how racially-motivated and gender-exclusive structures of mobility are imperative in conditioning the forms of (in)mobilities and the experiences of the experiences of (in)mobilities.
[17] See Casas-Cortes et al. (2015).
[18] Taking inspiration from Antonin Artaud surrealist play "To Have Done with the Judgment of God" (1995), Deleuze and Guattari conceptualize "the body without organs" as the culmination of thinking in anti-essentialist terms in which concepts are portrayed as bodies. These bodies, argue the authors, can be understood as territories and cartographical manifestations. A body, then, is territorialized through

De-migranticizing migrancy brings the patriarchal heteronormative domestication of alternative forms and systems of being, into the dominated relation it occurs in. By addressing the "minor histories" of the "figure of the migrant", it becomes possible to tackle this issue with more candor, authenticity and clarity. Nonetheless, what does articulating embodied migrancy look like in analytical narratives within migration and mobility frameworks? Here deleuzian rhizomatic reasoning can shine a light on the instrumentalization of migrancy as embodied experience. By "thinking through the body" of "the figure of the migrant", coupled with narratives from the borderlands of Mexico-United States borderscapes, I attempt to illustrate the "binding" property of migrancy, and how it can breach the "voices" from above as below and move through the haze of the Nation-State gaze. One way to approach this is to engage with *rhizomatic thinking*, which decouples the hierarchical approach of knowledge production that can benefit migration and mobilities frameworks by approaching phenomena through "any point of the rhizome"[19].

Rhizomatic thinking and embodied migrancy: Thinking in multiplicity

The organization of knowledge tends to be structured, as Deleuze and Guattari (1987) point out, as a genealogical scheme of relations and connections, subordinated and folded to other instances that, in many cases, culminates in an arborescent archetype of thinking. The image of the tree -sustain these authors- "is already the image of the world", structuring relationships in power valences, denoting the subjugation and levelling of thought. Thaae arborescent structure of the genealogy of *normative* epistemic expressions stems from a center - from a point of origin- that denies the multiplicity of beginnings[20]. To re-rethink from different centers -*to re-center epistemic origins*- is one of the methodological premises of

the occupation and dependency of its organs, which inscribe certain pathways and forms of knowing. This suggests predictability and genealogy. On the other hand, a body without organs is creative in thinking, is the anti-genealogical process of creativity as the deterritorialization of the body (with organs). Without its substantive parts, the body -then- is a body without organs. In their own words, "a body without organs is not an empty body stripped of organs, but a body upon which that which serves as organs... is distributed according to crowd phenomena... in the form of molecular multiplicities" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 30).

[19] "The rhizome connects any point to any other point […] It is comprised not of units but of dimensions, or rather directions in motion. It has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (milieu) from which it grows and which it overspills. … It has multiple entranceways and exits and its own lines of flight" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 21).

[20] "Unlike the tree, the rhizome is not the object of reproduction: neither external reproduction as image-tree nor internal reproduction as tree-structure. The rhizome is an antigenealogy" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 21).

critical feminist thought, and the precursor to engage reflexively on and through positionality. It is a demand to escape the mimesis of thought and engage in a "radical" -as the return to the *root*- mode of thinking.

Seeking to reverse the arborescent epistemological model - *to turn the world upside down* - Deleuze and Guattari propose an "inverse" methodological perspective, which seeks to divert the "upwards" *naturalized* gaze – from the trunk of a tree, its foliage and canopy- "downwarads", through the soil toward the radicle-system of the *rhizome*. By seeking to engage with the potential of each bulbous rhizome present in the decentralized formation of root structure of the arborescent world-view, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari are suggesting a rupture to the order of subjugation of implicit hierarchies of thinking. This gives rise to *rhizomatic thinking*.



Caption: Illustrations (intervened) of selected rhizomes by Lloyd and Lloyd (1885): (a) Hydrastis canadensis (p. 77); (b) Cimicifuga racemosa (p. 256); (c) Actae alba (p. 241).]

Rhizomes, argue the authors, are non-subjugated ways of engaging with ideas; it is, inherently, a path toward non-linear movement in engaging with thought, whereby the product of creation is not the sum of its properties but the *state of its multiplicity*[21]. And so, Gilles and Felix (1987: 7) state that,

[21] "Multiplicities are defined by the outside: by the abstract line, the line of flight or deterritorialization according to which they change in nature and connect with other multiplicities" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 9).

A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles. A semiotic chain is like a tuber agglomerating very diverse acts, not only linguistic, but also perceptive, mimetic, gestural, and cognitive.

A *radicle-system* positions the multiple as its potential beginnings, by recognizing the multiplicity inherent in any approach related to describing the social world. By emphasizing the multiplicity of beginnings, Deleuze and Guattari are favoring the reflexive engagement of social realities, an important consideration and the basis for *rhizomatic thinking*. This, in effect, is the process of assemblage, whereby

There is no longer a tripartite division between a field of reality (the world) and a field of representation (the book) and a field of subjectivity (the author). Rather, an assemblage establishes connections between certain multiplicities drawn from each of these orders, so that a book has no sequel (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 23).

Through the arborescent beginnings, the potential of multiplicity as multiply entries and modes of access are denied to contain hermeneutic descriptors subordinated to origins of common-place, and possibly, complacency. In essence, "a multiplicity has neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 8). Thus, to think schematically "through the tree" is to deny the potential for "other-ness" in thinking, and is -as Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987: 8) provocatively state- "not a method for the people". To consider multiplicity is to acknowledge the non-static positioning and dissolve any "concrete" aspect of position if not couple with the reflexive expressions of positionalities[22]. Succinctly, rhizomatic thinking can be understood, as Carol A. Taylor (2013: 43) clearly sums up, as "a form of thinking which is centered, connective, heterogeneous, non-hierarchical and multiple".

Given such, a "point in the rhizome" is precisely the explicit recognition of a selected entry based upon the potential of one-in-many, putting recognition of selectivity and reflexivity at the forefront of argumentation, delimitation and narration. And this is precisely how rhizomatic thinking ties to the plea to de-

[22] Here, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987: 8) state that A method of the rhizome type, on the contrary, can analyze language only by decentering it onto other dimensions and other registers. A language is never closed upon itself, except as a function of impotence.

migranticize migration studies. By shedding the constrains of naturalized condition of "thinking migration" by rhizomatic thinking, it becomes possible to "enter" the objects of analysis through reflexive recognition of situatedness paths that, also, think "through the body". As John Wylie (2007: 148) points out, "human being is being embodied".

Rhizomatic thinking is the essence of innovation and renovation of the forms of approaching an object of analysis, of importance to the state of migration and mobilities research as pointed out though the discussion on "thinking through the body", the importance of embodied migrancy and articulating "the figure of the migrant". Rosi Braidotti has called rhizomatic thinking as *nomadic style* to reference the itinerant movement between the positionality of the enunciation and interpretation, as forms of interpreting and observing. In her own words, Rosi Braidotti (1997: 60) states that a nomadic style, as in the case with rhizomatic thinking, "implies the simultaneous dislocation not only of my place of enunciation as a feminist intellectual but also accordingly of the position of my readers".

Taking, as an example, the *borderscapes*[23] of Tijuana as a crux for migration politics of the Mexico-United States migration field, I demonstrate how applying rhizomatic thinking to "the figure of the migrant", through embodied migrancy, can create counter-narratives that seek to de-migranticize discourse and position itself as an important technique and tool for narration of migration and (in)mobility phenomena.

Narrating Mexico-United States borderlands: A place called Tijuana

Tijuana has figured prominently, and constantly, a pivotal place and space in the history of the development of the migration field between Mexico and the United States[24]. Its geopolitical borderscapes places itself at the forefront of biopolitical politics between the interests and power tensions of world-system positionality; as the popular saying in Mexico goes: "*Pobre México, tan lejos de Dios y tan cerca de Estados Unidos"* [25]. To approach the rich history and intricacies of the borderscapes that intersect embodied migrancy of Tijuana merits its own space, suffice to say I shall attempt to highlight certain salient properties of Tijuana -as a

[23] I use the term *borderscapes* in a similar vein as do Prem Kumar Rajaram and Carl Grundy-Warr (2008: x), to reference the "complexity and vitality of, and at, the border".

[24] See Minian (2018) for a rich analysis of the historical presence of migration and migrants in and through Tijuana.

[25] *Trans*.- "Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the United States". Expression commonly attributed to Mexican statesman and military general Porfirio Díaz, who assumed the presidency of Mexico under authoritarian rule during 1876-1911.

borderscape- that create particular social realities of embodied migrancy for Mexican deported men. Douglas Massey and colleagues (1987), retrace how places like Tijuana become representative of seminal aspects of the Mexico-United States border, notably through the degree in which Tijuana figures as a point of entry and point of return. On this latter matter, the authors demonstrate how some migrants began consolidating a livelihood in these borderscapes, seeking to overturn their itinerancy and temporality by "sticking" to the border. In addition, Jason de Léon (2015) brings to the forefront the many realities that face migrants, either in transit, returned, deported or separated, in and through the border, in places such as Tijuana. By addressing hardships faced by migrants, Jason de Léon manages to articulate the emotional toil of traumatic experiences as part of socio-biographic narratives, enmeshed in an affective embodiment of hybrid relationality (with human and non-human agents), which are dynamically processed in the *in-becoming* of the migrant. His riveting account of first-person narratives of decisions, intentions, objectives and strategies to negotiate the vast array of options and decision to migrate, highlights the complexity and intensity of being a migrant. To hover over the migrant body, as narrative, is to seek refuge from emotive connection; it is, in many ways, *to be less human*.

Thinking with rhizomes, and taking cue from de Casas-Cortes and colleagues (2015), I propose to enter the field through border research, as means to engage with the circumventing administration of the body politic of the figure of the migrant in migration and (in)mobility studies. Introducing the arterial border to address the "vast and complex migration infrastructure that spans frontiers, transportation routes and local communities" (Casas-Cortes et al. 2015: 54), Wendy Vogt (2018) presents a masterful discussion that "moves through the body" of the figure of the migrant, addressing affective and somatic examples of the ways ontological constitution is confronted through embodied migrancy; through the *experience of the experience* of migration. First-person accounts and re-telling of events, couples with critical analysis of macro and meso levels, portray an embodied and consolidated narrative that defines a positionality and "*performs*" migrancy (Butler 1993). Its performance is done though the emotional engagement it expresses and stirs because it "speaks through the body"[26]. The writer and the narrator begin to share an experience that seeks to near understanding, comprehension, maybe even attribute a sense of *compassion* (Thrift and Dewsbury, 2000). Here, a dialectical

[26] See Judith Butler's discussion on performativity.

process of creation is forged through the *intent* of writing on the *perception* of the reader. Here, the affective turn of social sciences becomes *performed* through engaged and embodied writing. This is the case, for example, of many Chicano feminist writers that address the complexities of the *borderland,* such as Gloria Anzaldúa.

The critical feminist Chicana, Gloria Anzaldúa (1987: 3) suggests thinking the borderland as "a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary". In this foray of *in-between-ness* live "the prohibited and forbidden… the squint-eyed, the perverse, the queer, the troublesome, the mongrel, the *mulato*, the half-breed, the half dead". Gloria Anzaldúa's brilliant account of the phenomenological experience of engaging in and through borderscapes, is a key example of how narratives can produce embodied notions of migrancy. Within her accounts of the construction of migration and (in)mobility phenomena, she intertwines the "feelings" associated with "living through" scales of migration-related analysis. By effectively bringing to the foreground what Nail (2015) called "minor theories" of engaging with and through migration and mobility expressions. Her narrative simultaneously moves "through the body" of borderlands, as well as above it. By simultaneously providing a "view from the bottom" attached to a view "from the top", Anzaldúa addresses the experience of embodied migrancy by the stories of a people whose affective ontopological expressions are key modes of engagement, including herself. Speaking as a Chicano feminist, she clearly positions herself as a political agent, indivisibly incrusted in the politics of her writing and, thus, speaks embodied in reflexivity. By taking "rhizomatic thinking" seriously, her accounts are rich examples of how narratives of migration and (in)mobility phenomena can benefit when committing to "bring in" embodied migrancy. *Writing, again, is a political act.*

Another example if Ana Raquel Minian's recompilation of the experiences of undocumented migrants, a key source of narratives that shines a bright light on the impacts of migration policies that are blinded by State and, therefore, sees "no bodies". One such narrative is about a young man how, having sought repeatedly to cross into the United States, only to be apprehended and "thrown back" into the streets of Tijuana. In her retelling of the story of the man named Gardoño, she details how he finds himself in a strange place where "didn't know anyone". He begins, as do all migrants in Tijuana, to walk the streets of Tijuana until he finds *coyotes* -smugglers- who were leading a "group of migrants across the border the same day".

He quickly decides to join the group and begins his endless attempt to cross the border. Her narrative *embodies* the notion of undocumented migration and gives a human dimension to the affective practices experienced in and through the body of migrants. By addressing the state of migration through the stories of migration, this narrative *humanizes* migrant and mobility research by placing the *issue* in and through the *body*.

By de-centralizing the border within the mimesis for movement, mobility and migration (Soguk 2008), Tijuana is a social construction made with and through the border. As Thomas Nail (2019: 194-195) states, "borders are not static. They are open kinetic systems. They are always made and remade according to a host of shifting material variables". Such deterritorialization of the border is precisely the nature of existing through and with border; its malleability in hybridity.

Final remarks (and the absence of the digital)

As a borderscape, a border town, a frontier, a limit, an in-between space, a transnational social space, Tijuana becomes a "place" where migrants not only arrive in search of entering the United States, but also return to. One of the historical compositions of embodied migrancy that finds itself in Tijuana comes through the lives of deported migrant men who are lodged in temporary migrant shelters. As Ana Raquel Minian (2018: 3) recalls, there is still "the assumption that "illegal migrants" have full inclusion in Mexico…that assumption is not always correct". Consequently, deportation figures prominently in the lives that cross the Tijuana landscape of *emotional* ties, tries and cries, as Karen Till (2005: 11) reminds us that "central to the ways that people create meaning about themselves and their pasts is how they expect places to work emotionally, socially, culturally, and politically".

Writing through the body is a sensory expression; it involves emotions; it involved bodies full of emotions (Bond 2018). To recognize the affective constitution of migration research and (in)mobility studies is to render narrative more "human" (Graafland and Sohn 2012). Underlying to this discussion are the latent questions of objectivity, but also of intentionality: *Who are we writing for? What are we writing for?* To remind oneself of the purpose may seem pretentious on my behalf, but is a fundamental aspect of engaging, reflexivity, with the construction of social reality. Writing, then, is part of political and identity politics, and when engaged reflexively, critically and "through the body", can provide sharp approximations to issues surrounding migration and (in)mobility studies that may escape when discourse

"hovers" over the State.

Much has been said about the committed perspective in migration and (in)mobility studies, and a lot of work has been done to remediate the naturalization of migration research. Nonetheless, Dahinden (2016) is sharp to recall that while her plea to de-migranticize migration research, she also recognizes that social sciences, as a whole, would benefit from a push toward "migranticization", and include migration -and mobility- as cornerstones of human condition (in clear opposition of the naturalized discourses that promote stasis as the *de facto* state of social configuration). This "decoupling" of normative forms of descriptive engagement presents novel forms of "seeing" migration phenomena that can, adequately, convey issues and descriptions, and maybe better than most. Stories, as narratives, are powerful engagers with our sensibilities, for they "humanize" an object that can -as has historically been the case with "the figure of migration"- be treated abstractly and detached "from the body". Re-telling phenomena from the body invites us to consider how our bodies engage with the body politic and attach a "sense and sensibility" to the politics of place and mobility. To recover the forms of presenting issues of migration and (in)mobility is to heed to the plea to de-migranticize migration research, and "humanize" discourse. Of course, missing from this discussion is the contemporary network of engagement with digital and off-site spaces and locations that add several layers of increased complexity that goes beyond the scope of this article. Addressing the new configuration of denizens, and the multiplication of "lived experiences" in diametrically infused temporalities is important, addresses important issues to "bring migration" into the contemporary composition, but must -also- recognize the colossal size of digital access inequality and the perseverance of migration within the "dialectics of the concrete" (Kosik 1976).

My recent insertion in Tijuana to carry out fieldwork on research of the phenomenology of migrancy, spanning close to 200 days from 2021 to 2022 was significant to corroborate the penetration of migrancy in the landscape of the city itself. Migration, as a prominent figure of this borderland, was expressed through the replete and perpetual presence of migrants -many of them men -who found themselves either in shelters -many of which are male-centric- or on the streets. My engagement, as part of a sociosemiotic ethnographic approach[27], with deported

[27] See Phillip Vannini (2007).

migrant men in Tijuana highlighted how embodied migrancy shaped the forms of engaging with the social processes of the borderland. Not only is the vehicle-centric mobility driven structure of Tijuana a baseline for the ways to engage with the semiotic landscape of being, but also the constant negotiations faced to simple "be" in Tijuana, as a member of a social tribe of embodied migrancy. Deported migrants face a constant discrimination, not only from the institutional actors that make up Tijuana, but from their own selves. Meaning, and consequently the forms and expressions of embodied migrancy, are affectively constituted, as emotions are structuring fundamental drivers for phenomenological engagement and interpretation (Veltri, 2016). The feeling of being isolated, deflated, detached, removed, refused, abandoned, and non-recognize makes this particular "figure of the migrant" a dominated figure of embodied migrancy. The deported Mexican migrant -as a shared characteristic of embodied migrancy- is inescapably expressed through his/her conceptualization of the past, positioning of the present, and idealization of the future. The ways I present this "figure of the migrant" encourages me to seek "the body" in analysis and seek to attribute the necessary consideration of positionality, affectivity, and intersectionality. To de-migranticize migration is also to "feel" migration, to bring the *heart* into migrancy.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Ben Ansell, Why Politics Fails, New York: Public Affairs, 2023, ISBN-13: 978-1-5417-0207-3 , 345 pages

Review by Cristina MATIUTA

There is a rich literature on the challenges and dilemmas facing modern democracies. The book briefly analyzed here- *Why Politics Fails*- is part of this literature, illustrating, in a captivating way, how our collective goals, like democracy, equality, solidarity, security and prosperity are undermined by political traps. Its author, Ben Ansell, professor of comparative democratic institutions at the University of Oxford, explores throughout the five chapters of the book, the pitfalls that undermine our common goals and the ways to avoid them or to escape them. Using the arguments and evidence from political economy, a school of thought that examines how individual and society interact starting from the premise that everyone is selfish or at least self-interested, the author shows how the gap between self-interest and collective good occurs. „Democracy, equality, solidarity, security and prosperity are admirable things. But in each case we will face a political trap, triggered by our self-interest, that stop us from reaching our collective goals. These traps are not our tragic destiny. But they are insidious, pervasive and soethimes even enticing" (p. 20).

The book is a meticulous study with a unitary structure, each chapter starting by defining the concept, followed by identifying the trap and then the way to escape it. The first chapter, about democracy, emphasizes that the idea of democracy, having 'rule by the people' at its core, in other words self-government, is a powerful and universal one, a goal most people agree on. But even if democracy is popular and desirable, its outcomes often polarize and divide us (Brexit is just an example). We want democracy in principle, but it's often impossible to deliver in practice. And this is the heart of the democracy trap: "there's no such thing as *the will of the people*" (p. 26). The author looks at the long history of the 'will of the people' concept and the debates on it. The way we define it matters a lot: hyper-inclusive (claiming

that the will of the people only exists when everyone agrees) or hyper-exclusive (when a thin majority constitutes the 'will of the people'). Both approaches are limited and perniciously, history proving this many times. Ben Ansell underlines that democracy work best with shifting majorities, where losers can become winners, and that we can improve democracy through more democracy. So we can escape the democracy trap by encouraging norms of listening and deliberating, learning to express our opinions and to tolerate those of other people as a way to reach consensus rather than antagonism.

The second chapter, on equality, approaches the different meanings that the concept has in the works of diverse thinkers (socialists, libertarians, utilitarians) and compares inequality across countries to show that most wealthy countries have quite high inequality. As an example, in 2018 the top of 0.1 per cent of Americans held almost 20 per cent of total wealth. Politics in prosperous democratic countries seems to have failed. It has underpinned, raher than undercut, inequality. We want equality but one that does not cut from our own wealth. In the author's words, "we have a collective goal of equality- to close the chasm between rich and poor. But we have individual desires to use our equal rights to live our own best life as freely as possible, which push against this common ambition of equal outcomes… Our politics gets caught in the equality trap: equal rights and equal outcomes undermine each other… For politics not to fail we need to balance carefully between equal economic rights and outcomes" (p. 91). Escaping the inequality trap requires, among others, a robust and transparent tax system, focusing on wealth taxes, international cooperation to prevent billionaires simply shifting jurisdictions, as well as an education system that don't simply send half of school-leavers to university and abandon the rest.

In the third chapter the different meanings of the concept of solidarity are analyzed. The solidaristic state had emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century, when public pensions, workers' compensation and sickness insurance were established. If at the beginning of the twentieth century government spending on social services was typically 1 or 2 per cent of national income, by the end of 1960s it was reached around fifth of national income in most rich countries. Today, the Universal Basic Income (UBI) is often seen as a solution to many of twenty-first-century problems, from bouncing back after COVID-19 to the replacement of workers with robots. Political parties claim the value of solidarity but have very

different philosophies about how it should be provided. Even when we agree we want a certain type of solidarity we might differ on who we think should receive it, or whether we really want to pay for it. Our politics fails, says the author, because when we try and look after each other, we quickly run into the solidarity trap: "we only care about solidarity when we need it ourselves" (p. 148). The UBI may help to escape the solidarity trap, but how it combines with existing welfare state schemes need to be addressed carefully and credibly.

The next chapter looks at the issue of security. Without security we are in a state of anarchy in which authority is absent. If we want to maintain order, we risk of losing control of our guardians, but if we remove our guardians we can easily fall into disorder. And here is the security trap: "we can't avoid anarchy without risking tyranny" (p. 202). A well-known quote, often attributed to Thomas Jefferson, says that "the price of liberty is eternal vigilance". The author examines the different levels of security. Most of us live in a world where we are secure in our own homes (personal security) and in our own countries (national security). Things are worse when we look at the third level of security, international security. Nation states still live in a condition of anarchy, as the war in Ukraine and other conflicts demonstrate.

A substantial chapter of the book, the last one, refers to prosperity. Gross domestic product (GDP) is the most common measure of prosperity, but our long-term prosperity depends more on long-term health and education of the population than on short-term national income. We are not the first generation to face the challenges of ballancing short-term temptations and long-term sustainability, the history of economic development is the history of our ancestors wrestling with the prosperity trap: „what makes us richer in the short run makes us poorer over the long haul" (p. 248). Perhaps the best example in this regard is our innability to tackle the climate change crisis. Reducing global carbon emission levels is a collective action problem, but short-term gain outweigh our concern for future generations. „Escaping the prosperity trap requires us to commit to the long term – to tie our hands and prevent ourselves from sucombing to short-term temptations" (p. 281).

In the closing chapter, suggestively entitled *How Politics Can Succeed,* professor Ansell make a plea for the centrality of politics to achieving our collective goals. The traps we face are inevitable and often reinforce each other: polarized democracies can worsen inequality; a rotten social safety system can worsen crime; runaway climate change could treaten global peace. So we live in an uncertain world, where self-interest undermines our ability to deliver collective goals and politics will

not always succeed to offer solutions to our dilemmas. But we need politics, one that protects democratic institutions like the Parliemant, the courts, the independent media from the contamination of authoritarianism and „from the arrows of populist iconoclasts". We need cooperation, at domestic and international levels, to to find solutions to our collective problems. Politics won't end, but it doesn't have to fail

Yoji Koyama, Massive Outflow of Population from Peripheral Countries of the European Union and Their Depopulation: Its Implications for the European Integration, Belgrad: European Center for Peace and Development (ECPD), 2023, ISBN 978-86-7236-122-3 388 pages

Review by Gabriela GOUDENHOOFT

This book encapsulates the scholarly endeavors of Professor Yoji Koyama from 2017 to 2023, who has meticulously examined the integration strategies of former communist nations in Central and Eastern Europe into the European Union. Upon reading this book, it naturally prompts one to raise a compelling question: why would a Japanese academic be profoundly interested in the economic frameworks and international relations of these European regions, particularly their democratic transitions and EU integrations? Professor Koyama attributes his keen interest to personal experiences, drawing parallels between his upbringing in a less developed region of Japan during its economically disadvantaged periods and the transformative struggles faced by these European countries. His unique perspective is rooted in the themes of transformation, survival, and integration - a viewpoint that offers fresh insights into the significant challenges these nations encounter, including depopulation and labor migration to wealthier Western countries. This narrative not only broadens our understanding of geopolitical dynamics but also enriches the discourse on global socio-economic transformations.

The ten chapters of Yoji Koyama's book meticulously delineate the European Union integration processes of former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland, Slovenia - the successor states of Yugoslavia as ”the Best Performer of Former Yugoslavia”, the Baltic States, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, among others. The text compellingly addresses, on one hand, the economic context and interrelations that significantly affect labor migration to Western Europe. On the

other hand, it explores the intricate dynamics between peripheral countries and the regional policies of the European Union. This examination not only highlights the economic dependencies and political interactions but also sheds light on how these elements collectively influence the broader trajectory of EU integration. The book's analysis provides a comprehensive insight into the multifaceted economic, social and political landscape that shapes the integration experience of these nations within the European Union framework.

Immigration is not a novel phenomenon for the countries of Western Europe and it didn't appear by the establishment of the European Union and the subsequent freedom of labor movement. Historically, Western European nations have experienced the influx of workers seeking higher wages. Traditionally, these workers would migrate alone, sending remittances back to their families in their home countries. However, a significant shift occurred during the years 1973-1974, marked by the emergence of what is described in literature as the "liberal paradox" or the "intention-result paradox" (p.2). This paradox unfolded when the European Community (EC) signaled an end to the acceptance of workers from outside its borders. This policy change prompted community workers to bring their families to Europe, leading them to settle permanently, have children, and gradually integrate into the societal fabric, eventually acquiring European citizenship. This was a stark departure from their initial intention of temporary economic migration, underscoring a profound transformation in migration patterns and policies within the European Union.

The author meticulously examines the disparities among the former communist countries, highlighting that the economic, social, and institutional landscapes are far from uniform across these nations. Positioned between two poles, he identifies Estonia as the epitome of market orientation, whereas Slovenia represents the most definitive example of strategic coordination (p. 13). To contextualize these differences, the author employs five theoretical models from dthe litterature: Anglo-Saxon model, Social-Democratic model, Continental European model, Southern European model (Meditteranean), and Asian model. Each model offers a distinct framework for understanding the varying degrees of market liberalization, state involvement, social welfare policies, and institutional structures prevalent in these transitioning economies. This analytical approach not only elucidates the unique paths taken by each country in navigating post-communist transitions but also enhances our comprehension of how diverse governance and

economic strategies impact their integration into the global economic system.

Another theoretical tool employed by the author is Immanuel Wallerstein's classification, which stratifies global capitalism into core, semi-periphery, and periphery categories. Building on this framework, Norkus introduces an additional category, the "semi-core" to more precisely position the Central and Eastern European states within the global economic context. This nuanced adaptation allows for a more detailed analysis of these countries' roles and statuses in the international economic order. By incorporating the semi-core category, Norkus acknowledges the unique transitional status of these nations, which do not fit neatly into Wallerstein's original tripartite division. This adjustment enables a more sophisticated understanding of the economic dynamics and challenges faced by Central and Eastern European countries as they navigate their post-communist economic transformations and integration into the global market system.

The issue of migration encompasses myriad facets, ranging from the quest for higher-paying employment opportunities to the aspiration of securing a more prosperous life for one's family. Additionally, it includes the emotional distress associated with family separation and the poignant realization among the elderly that their grandchildren have grown distant, culturally and linguistically, transforming into foreigners in their ancestral lands "our grandchildren are already foreigners" (p.1).

Each of these aspects represents just a few of the numerous nuances and factors that demand thorough analysis within the rather heterogeneous landscape of Central and Eastern Europe. This complexity is not merely a reflection of economic or demographic trends but also encapsulates the profound personal and social changes impacting individuals and communities. Understanding these varied dimensions requires a multidisciplinary approach that considers economic motivations, familial bonds, social networks, and the broader socio-political context influencing migration patterns in this region.

Poland exemplifies a typical Central European country where migration patterns have become highly active, particularly following its accession to the European Union. This increased mobility has seen a significant number of Polish citizens relocating to countries such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, and Ireland. In response to this labor outflow, Polish companies have been compelled to recruit workers from neighboring nations like Belarus and Ukraine to fill the resultant labor shortages.

The author's analysis of Poland's migration situation encompasses two critical aspects (p.64). Firstly, there is an exploration of the limited capacity of host countries to absorb immigrants. This involves assessing the economic, social, and infrastructural challenges faced by these nations in integrating a large influx of foreign workers, which can strain local resources and potentially lead to social tensions.

Secondly, the discussion extends to the impact on sending countries, particularly focusing on the significant loss of capable individuals who are crucial for the social and economic development of their home countries. This ”brain drain” phenomenon can severely hamper the developmental trajectories of these nations. Moreover, there is a consideration of the cultural implications, as the emigration of substantial segments of the population can lead to a dilution of cultural traditions and a disconnection from cultural heritage. These factors together paint a comprehensive picture of the multifaceted impacts of migration on both sending and receiving countries, highlighting the need for policies that address the complexities of international labor mobility within the European context.

For this purpose, the author thoroughly investigates the structural transformations within the Polish economy, particularly focusing on Poland’s transition to capitalism. This analysis includes a detailed examination of the demographic shifts and labor market dynamics that have accompanied and influenced this transition. Additionally, the author delves into the complexities of migration patterns, specifically the entry and exit flows of migrants.

This comprehensive study addresses how these structural changes have reshaped the economic landscape of Poland, illustrating the interactions between economic reforms, labor market adjustments, and demographic trends. The discussion extends to how these factors collectively influence migration movements, both into and out of the country. The author’s exploration helps to illuminate the broader socio-economic repercussions of these changes, providing insights into the challenges and opportunities presented by Poland's integration into global capitalist systems and its effects on human mobility. This nuanced approach underscores the interconnected nature of economic policies, demographic shifts, and migration trends, and their collective impact on national and regional development.

Furthermore, an acute issue explored in the author's analysis is the challenge of sustaining pension finances due to the migration of the younger population (p.100). The departure of young, economically active individuals to foreign labor

markets significantly disrupts the balance of pension systems traditionally reliant on a broad base of working-age contributors. This demographic shift heightens the burden on the remaining, often older, population who are less able to contribute economically. As a result, there is an increased financial strain on public pension schemes, which must now support a growing elderly population with a diminishing pool of contributions from a shrinking workforce. This situation necessitates a reevaluation of pension policies and potentially innovative approaches to social security to ensure stability and adequacy of support for the aging population in Poland.

Slovenia, along with the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia Federation (p.126), presents a distinct case study: as a relatively affluent nation, akin to the Czech Republic, it has experienced a net immigration, attracting more individuals from foreign countries than the number of people emigrating from Slovenia. This phenomenon can be attributed to Slovenia's unique positioning as an innovation-oriented country that has successfully integrated into the core of the global capitalist economy.

This strategic alignment with innovation and advanced technology sectors has not only bolstered its economic status but has also made it an attractive destination for skilled migrants seeking opportunities in a robust and dynamic economy. Consequently, Slovenia's approach to integrating into the world economy, leveraging its technological capabilities and fostering an environment conducive to innovation, has distinguished it from other transitioning economies in Central and Eastern Europe. This has implications for its labor market dynamics, demographic trends, and overall economic growth, reinforcing its role as a central player in the global economic system.

Among the Baltic nations, Yoji Koyama has opted to focus his analytical lens on Lithuania, a country where migration trends have precipitated a significant population decline. This demographic shift is compounded by an aging population, which further exacerbates the challenges faced by the nation.

Koyama's analysis delves into the multifaceted impacts of these demographic trends on Lithuania's social structure, economy, and governmental policies. The dramatic reduction in population not only affects the labor market, with a shrinking workforce and increasing dependency ratios, but also places considerable stress on public services and infrastructure, particularly healthcare and pension systems. By examining Lithuania within the broader context of post-Soviet migration

patterns, Koyama provides insights into the long-term effects of emigration on national development, social cohesion, and economic sustainability. This comprehensive study highlights the critical need for strategic planning and policy interventions to mitigate the adverse effects of these demographic changes.The Lithuanian government made desprerates efforts to enter Eurozone and these reforms ”have caused straines on the society”, ”major factors driving people to emmigrate” (p.159).

Also situated within the peripheral area of the European Union, Romania exhibits its unique pattern of depopulation, particularly pronounced in rural areas. This demographic shift poses substantial challenges for national development and sustainability. Despite government efforts to counteract these trends, the measures implemented have consistently proven to be insufficient (p.217).

The author's analysis delves deeper into the underlying causes and ramifications of Romania’s rural depopulation. It scrutinizes the effectiveness of governmental policies aimed at reversing or mitigating these trends, highlighting a significant gap between the objectives of such policies and their practical outcomes. The inadequacy of these measures often results in exacerbating the rural-urban divide, leading to increased migration towards urban centers and abroad, further depleting the rural population. This exploration provides a critical examination of the policy framework, suggesting that a reevaluation of strategies is essential to address the complex socio-economic factors driving depopulation and to foster sustainable development within these vulnerable communities.

For Romania, the challenge of transitioning to a market economy within a brief timeframe, under the conditions of an open economic system, was formidable. Additionally, endemic political corruption has significantly hindered the effective utilization of EU funds, further complicating this transition. The concept of ”an able state” (p.241) is crucial in this context, referring to the capability of the government to enact and enforce policies effectively. Unfortunately, Romania has struggled with this aspect, leading to suboptimal outcomes in economic development and integration within the European Union.

This lack of governmental efficacy has had direct repercussions on job creation, particularly in the rural areas where new employment opportunities have been scarce. Neither industrial improvements nor infrastructure enhancements have been adequately addressed, which has been detrimental to both rural and urban regions. Consequently, these shortcomings have driven a significant number

of individuals from both rural and urban areas to seek better opportunities abroad through emigration.

The author's detailed examination of Romania's economic and political landscape elucidates the multifaceted challenges the country faces. By analyzing the interplay between corruption, policy inefficacy, and economic underdevelopment, the study offers insights into the structural and systemic reforms needed to stabilize and stimulate growth within Romania, particularly in its most underserved regions. This analysis underscores the necessity for robust governance and strategic policy interventions to reverse the adverse trends of depopulation and economic stagnation even remittance by Romanian migrants contributed to the ”reduction of current account deficit and improvement of living standard of their families left in Romania by enhanced consumption” (p.242).

The author asserts that for Romania to bolster its economic development, a strategic initiative is needed to encourage Romanian expatriates to return and invest their resources—such as capital, expertise, networks, and entrepreneurial skills—back into the country. While some policy measures aimed at facilitating this repatriation have been implemented, the government's efforts have thus far proved insufficient.

The analysis explores the complex dynamics of leveraging the diaspora's potential to contribute to national development. It suggests that a more comprehensive and coordinated approach is essential, one that not only incentivizes return through economic opportunities but also addresses the broader systemic issues that initially drove emigration, such as political stability, economic transparency, and quality of life improvements.

Moreover, the author recommends enhancing the effectiveness of these policies by ensuring they are well-publicized, accessible, and aligned with the needs and expectations of the Romanian diaspora. This could include offering tax incentives, support for business development, and guarantees of political and economic stability. A holistic approach would potentially transform the diaspora into a pivotal force for economic revitalization and innovation in Romania, significantly contributing to the country's long-term prosperity.

Bulgaria, too, has experienced significant emigration during its transition to a market economy. The absence of an "able state" capable of implementing efficient governmental strategies has led to what has been termed "premature de-industrialization" (p. 262) and devastated the agricultural sector. As a result, the

younger, educated population has faced a severe shortage of suitable job opportunities, prompting massive emigration.

This analysis explores the interrelation between insufficient governmental planning and the economic challenges that ensued. Without robust and effective state mechanisms, Bulgaria struggled to manage the complexities of transitioning to a market-driven economy, which exacerbated industrial decline and agricultural destabilization. This situation left many of the nation's youth unable to find employment that matched their qualifications, leading to a brain drain as they sought opportunities abroad.

Furthermore, the European Union's regional policy, designed to support economic development and reduce disparities across the EU, has not been successful in reversing these trends in Bulgaria (p.263). The failure points to a need for more tailored approaches that consider the unique economic and social contexts of member states. The author suggests that for Bulgaria to stem the tide of emigration and foster economic growth, it must rebuild its industrial base, revitalize agriculture, and create a conducive environment for high-skill employment. This would require a reevaluation of existing policies and a concerted effort to establish a more capable governmental infrastructure that can effectively utilize both national and EU resources to stimulate sustainable development.

In the Western Balkans, Serbia exemplifies the challenges associated with high rates of emigration coupled with population decline, particularly in rural areas. A noteworthy example of this trend is the significant exodus of young medical professionals from Serbia, a phenomenon commonly referred to as "brain drain." This migration is primarily driven by economic factors; for instance, wages in Germany are reported to be 5-6 times higher than those in Serbia, and working conditions are considerably better (p. 286). Consequently, certain regions in Serbia face a critical shortage of medical practitioners.

The chapter dedicated to this country shows that Serbia's only viable option for addressing these systemic issues is to pursue membership in the European Union (p. 297), although this path is acknowledged as a lengthy and complex process. The Serbian economy has struggled to keep pace not only with the more advanced EU member states but also with the newer EU members from Central and Eastern Europe. Further exacerbating Serbia's economic and social challenges are the legacies of ethnic conflict, UN sanctions following the breakup of former Yugoslavia, and the damages inflicted by NATO's air raids.

Additionally, there is a significant mismatch between the output of educational institutions and the needs of the business sector. This disparity contributes to the employment challenges within the country, as the skills and qualifications provided by local educational institutions do not align with the requirements of the labor market. For Serbia to mitigate the adverse effects of these issues and foster a more robust economic environment, it is imperative that the government undertake substantial reforms. These should include improving educational curricula to better meet market demands, enhancing working conditions to retain skilled workers, and accelerating the EU integration process to stabilize the political and economic landscape.

In the final chapter of his analysis, but also in the final Conclusions part, Yoji Koyama addresses concerns surrounding the rapid emigration from four peripheral countries: Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, and Bulgaria. He particularly emphasizes the challenges faced by regional policy within the European Union at the NUTS 3 level (p. 300). While acknowledging the advancements made through European integration, Koyama notes persistent imbalances between affluent and impoverished regions.

To address these disparities, the EU established Structural Funds aimed at supporting less developed regions and areas affected by industrial decline. Additionally, the Cohesion Fund, instituted by the Maastricht Treaty, was designed to aid relatively poorer member states in their preparations for entering the Economic and Monetary Union. These initiatives were part of broader growth strategies envisioned to mitigate economic and monetary crises.

The collapse of socialism in Central and Eastern Europe around 1989-1990, and the subsequent transition of ex-communist countries to market economies, marked a significant transformation. These states' accession to the European Community (later the European Union) was guided by the Copenhagen Criteria, which were formulated to ensure equitable membership terms.

However, the global economic crisis, coupled with the Euro currency crisis, refugee crises, and demographic declines, also impacted these new member states. Despite these challenges, financial mechanisms like the Cohesion Fund and Structural Funds have facilitated economic development in these regions. Nevertheless, Koyama underscores that while substantial progress has been made, significant challenges remain. These include ongoing economic disparities, the need for further structural adjustments, and the continuous support required to ensure

the sustainable development of new member states within the broader EU framework.

The book nevertheless offers an intriguing perspective originating from a distinct part of the world, crafted through rigorous effort in examining both theories and the practical application of economic and social principles. Furthermore, it involves an in-depth interpretation of extensive data to draw conclusions about the landscape of Eastern and Central Europe.

This comprehensive analysis not only synthesizes theoretical frameworks but also integrates empirical evidence to provide a detailed exploration of the region's complex socio-economic environment. The author's methodological approach effectively bridges the gap between abstract theoretical concepts and their real-world implications, enabling a nuanced understanding of the dynamic interactions within these transitioning economies. The insights garnered from such a thorough examination are invaluable, shedding light on the multifaceted challenges and opportunities that define Central and Eastern Europe in the contemporaneity.

Ayhan Kaya, Metin Koca and Ayşenur Benevento, Nativist and Islamist Radicalisation: Anger and Anxiety, Abingdoan, Oxon, New York, NY: Routledge, Series: Routledge research in race and ethnicity, 2023, 262 pages

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Review by Simona FER

Nativist and Islamist Radicalisation: Anger and Anxiety is a collection of studies with scrupulous attention to details where a wealth of research and consistent analyses were rigorously gathered by Ayhan Kaya, professor of Politics at Istanbul Bilgi University of Turkey, Metin Koca and Ayşenur Benevento, postdoctoral researchers in the European Research Council advanced grant project. The volume relies on experiences and testimonies of authors and appeals to students and scholars of migration, minority studies, nationalisms, European studies, sociology, political science, and psychology. As the authors state, the main strength and novelty of this edited volume is to understand and explain the malaise of both native and immigrant origin youth simultaneously through a scientific method by de-culturalising and de-religionising what is socio-economic, political, and psychological in origin.

Current political, social and economic issues concerning the European Union, faced with four dominant crises, namely the global financial crisis, the refugee crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine which all of them led to emotions of fear, trauma and anger, became a huge responsibility for experts to focus on explaining the challenges that both native and migrant-origin populations have to overcome.

Two fundamental concepts are explained by the editors in the introduction of the present volume: nativism and radicalism, resorting to the literature supportive for a better unerstanding of their political, social and economic meaning and perspective.

On one side, nativism is considered a political doctrine that prioritises the interests and the will of the native-born population. The concept of nativist doctrine is explained as a theory according to which the inhabitants of long standing should reign over those of newcomers. The logic of nativism lies on the demarcation between outsiders and insiders, between foreigners and the native- born, confirmed as bearers of a culturally superior civilisation.

On the other side, radicalism cannot be perceived as a stable and strong ideological position. Ideas that are radical in some views can be liberal or even conservative in others. Liberals and democrats of the 19th century were the radicals of their age and it is no longer possible to call them as such. The radicals of the 19th century were different from the radicals of 1968 generation in the sense that the latter ones challenged the patriarchal socio-political order. Likewise, the radicals of the present are also very different from the former ones.

Similar views are discussed and enlarged upon the delicate subject of radicalisation, providing authors'perspectives on how and why the youth might be radicalising. In this volume, an interdisciplinary understanding of approaches is deployed to analyse the rationale behind the radicalisation of nativist-populist youth as well as Muslim-origin youth in Europe. The current study argues that European youth responds differently to the challenges posed by contemporary flows of globalisation such as deindustrialisation, socio-economic, political, spatial, and psychological forms of deprivation, humiliation, and structural exclusion.

Many definitions of nativism described by the literature in the migration field include differentiation between the two groups: natives and immigrants. Migrants have been framed in many European countries as a threat since September 11, even earlier, since they have been perceived as a challenge to the societal, national, economic, and cultural security of the nation.

The research mainly analyses the ways in which radicalised groups from both native and migrant-origin populations express their discontent using different cultural repertoires.

Organized into three scrupulous and accurate sections, each of the studies arises from remarkable personal viewpoints. The first section of the volume, structured into three chapters, is titled Spatial Deprivation and Geographic Contexts and aims to invite the reader to rethink existing conceptualisations and approaches to studying radicalisation and discover the way they are rooted in local and regional factors. In her research, Roberta Ricucci, as in the suggestive title It Is Possible to Be

Both Muslim and a Good Citizen in a Catholic Country, focuses on the importance of socialisation of the youngest Muslims in Italy, from an intercultural perspective, with a relevant and robust perspective that aims at taking up the tension. And there should also be new priorities among young Muslims in the demands to be worked on and invested in. The author presents some confessions of children of immigration, which are against being associated with religious issues the way their parents used to be. For them religion ”often becomes what others see of you, a label that others see on you”. For some young Muslim people being able to cope with stereotypes means strongly stressing the Italian part of their identity. This is also an exercise they often have to do with their parents and the elderly people of their ethnic community. Ayhan Kaya has a great contribution to the research by analysing heritage populism, utilised by the German nativist party Alternative for Germany (AfD), the author relying on the testimonies of young AfD supporters. The research has been conducted with a multitude of techniques, ranging from desk research to discourse analysis of the public speeches of the party leaders of the AfD. The chapter starts with the elaboration of the ways in which right-wing populist parties use the past for the formation of a kind of heritage that is to be used for coping with the ills of the present, in order to mobilise different social groups. In one subchapter the author concludes that since the so-called refugee crisis in the summer of 2015, the boundaries that are reconstituted by right-wing populist parties and their supporters are not necessarily meant to exclude refugees in need, but rather Muslim-origin immigrants and their descendants, who have become more competitive, visible and outspoken over time with their social, political, economic and cultural demands.

Most of the interlocutors in Dresden involved in the survey conducted by the author and editor of the present volume as well, said that they feel forgotten and that their economic interests are considered as they should be. A 30-year-old male from Dresden, a former self-identified neo-Nazi who was enrolled in the de-radicalisation programme a few years ago, expressed his resentment of the unification policies of Helmut Kohl’s government in the 1990s and their after-effects, stating that in the neighbourhood there are no young people and those who live there are losers. He also regrets that most young people move away, that place having no future.

Another conclusion that can be depicted in the study is that young natives in Dresden who are feeling affiliated with the AfD are more inclined to have nostalgic feelings about the Communist past, which they have not experienced themselves.

According to the AfD's party programme, German identity is "primarily shaped by culture" and is based on a "unique core inventory" that remains intact. Accordingly, the inclusion of other cultures is considered a threat since it "degrades the German value system", leading to a loss of cultural homogeneity in Germany.

In the third study within the volume Denis van de Wetering and Tobias Hecker, accordingly to Metzger explain two concepts: disengagement, which is the process whereby individuals cease to be members of an extreme (right-wing) group or organisation or to participate in its activities and deradicalisation, which is a cognitive and emotional process where a self-image based on an extreme radical ideology is abandoned in favour of a more moderate legal identity. The authors emphasize the ideea that by being involved in social interactions through their physical bodies and experiencing this involvement as a bodily sensation, individuals acquire implicit and inarticulate knowledge beyond consciousness and discursive thinking and that this also enables individuals to interact with their social environment on an intuitive level. The authors conducted thirteen interviews with former male members of right-wing extremist groups and organisations, activity established through official and civil society deradicalisation programmes in Germany. This was part of a project titled Peer pressure on defectors from extreme right-wing scenes, funded by the Federal Ministry of the Interior. A special focus of the study was the process of identity transformation in connection with the disengagement of right-wing extremist groups.

Most of the men interviewed by Denis van de Wetering and Tobias Hecker described themselves, mentioning that their involvement in the interactions of a right-wing extremist group enhanced their (already existing) reactive aggression and propensity for violence and put it at the service of political strategies against perceived enemies. However, the aggressions should not be understood only as reactions to imagined threats from perceived enemies. In their narratives, the male interviewees described their confrontations with supposed enemies as atmospherically charged not just with anger and fear but simultaneously with excitement and euphoria, culminating in brutal uninhibited and lustful violence. In their disengagement narratives, the male interviewees described their strong feelings of disillusionment, specifically mentioning disappointed expectations of solidarity and support from their comrades.

According to both authors statement a trusting relationship with a deradicalisation advisor helps disengaging right-wing extremists overcome their

speechlessness and open up emotionally to their families and relationship partners. In addition, a trusting relationship encourages the development of new perspectives on life and ideas of identity beyond right-wing extremist contexts.

In the second section of the volume, titled Mental Processes of Radicalisation, Constantina Badea presents the effects and cosequences When Attitudes of Both Mainstream Society and Immigrant-Origin Muslims Become Extreme, explaining that immigration is often the subject of political debates in Western countries (i.e. European Union, USA). An important idea debated by professor Badea in her research is that immigrants not only want to provide for their families' material needs, but they also want to preserve their culture of origin and pass it on to the next generation.

Members of the Muslim community may react differently to perceived rejection by the majority society. In the face of discrimination, they may respond by withdrawing into their national identity, reinforcing their identification as Muslims, and developing hostile attitudes towards the majority national group. More often, however, young self-identified Muslims claim membership in the national group.

Going back to Muslims concerns, according to the litterature review the results show a lack of correlation between tolerance of religious practices and prejudice against Muslims. They indicate that rejection of a particular practice (e.g. Islamic schools) cannot simply be considered prejudice against Muslims. Accepting a particular religious practice does not necessarily indicate non-prejudicial feelings. One of the strategies that C. Badea suggests is that in order to break the process of radicalisation, educational and training programmes targeting the mutual acceptance of cultural differences and the construction of a common national identity are needed. She also claims that the common national identity should be built on democratic principles and values rather than on particular religious views. Other study results show that constructing a common national identity based on shared civic values as citizens of a supra-ordinate group rather than members of a religious subgroup could be an effective intervention to improve intergroup relations within the same society.

Catarina Kinnvall, Tereza Capelos and Poppy Laurens in their research How French Muslim Women Engage with the Challenges of Assimilation and Difference, pay attention to the position occupied by some Muslim women in the Western world, who have come to constitute both a racialised and gendered category in nationalist and religious discourse. They ask how Muslim women identities are

internalised and expressed in the context of the 'boundaries of inclusion and exclusion'. They focus particularly on the position of Muslim women minority groups in the Western world, as their status continues to be a source of animosity, anxiety, and anger. The three authors'aim is to understand how French-born female Muslims make sense of their identity in the context of republicanism and its values of liberty, equality, and fraternity, and in result whether they feel they can occupy a space in public life or resign to the traditional private sphere. The conclusion was that the majority of women confined their faith to the private sphere in order to participate in French culture and public life. Although they appreciated the opportunities and privileges they were granted as French citizens, they internalised restrictions on their religious practice, liberty, and equality, which impacted their self-identification. French-Muslim women experience conflict between their French and Muslim identities on a daily basis, struggle to feel integrated into French society, and confine their faith to the private sphere to participate in French public life.

Is It Radical for a Woman to Become a Stay-at-Home Mother or Wear a Headscarf? is another very interesting and constructive study written by Ayşenur Benevento, one of the volume's editors, who during the analysis of the larger data set, noticed that young Belgian women place a particular emphasis on the importance of their self-choices and voluntary adoption of certain gendered practices while expressing their discontent through practices and emotions linked to their ethnicity, culture, religion, heritage, homogeneity, authenticity, past, and patriarchy.

A veil might provide an opportunity for a religious woman to make sense of, accept and declare her devotion to Islam. The price of this dedication, however, is usually positively correlated with the discrimination that they face in Belgium. While Islam is officially recognised as a religion and anti-discrimination principles are in place at different levels of jurisdiction, intolerance toward Islamic dressing practices is normalised and in some cases entrenched in the Belgian law.

A. Benevento presents the shared and diverse value expressions that emerged in the interviews with the 39 women first. Then, she focuses on the complexity and depth of orientations of the Belgian women categorised in two subsamples, as they present the most intense experience and knowledge as self-identified Muslim and right-wing native women. The similarities between guiding principles that emerge across women's positions led to thought-provoking findings, but some different meanings also emerged from the analysis. Women organised

many of their gender-focused value expressions around the importance of self-choice, which helped them justify their acceptance of religious clothing or homemaker status.

Muslim women reported that they often experience discrimination at work, school, or in public due to their gender, appearance, and religious practices. Despite the fact that religious beliefs may be challenging to describe, these women clearly described their decisions about veiling practices in appreciative terms linked to catalysts in family. The author says that the veiled women who they interviewed rarely seemed like victims of discrimination despite their undoubtedly raw experiences of exclusion. What emerges from this study is the need to provide opportunities for women who feel silenced due to their political or religious alignments to share the same space and guide them to develop compassionate curiosity about each other's narratives. This research has demonstrated the importance of exploring the role of homemaker when studying radicalisation, which is an area that has thus far been dominated by concerns about non-normative (non-western) cultural practices such as veiling.

The authors of the present volume titled the third section Critical Analyses of Islamist Radicalisation, which aims to reassess the received wisdom over Islamist radicalisation from critical point of view, given the widespread focus on Islamis in the academic literature and not only. Martijn de Koning, in the introduction to his study Counter-Radicalisation Policies and Responses of Dutch Muslims to the Racialisation of Danger shows how an unstable constellation of perceptions of threat, hostility, and injustice, searching for belonging and identity, social networks (online and offline), intra- and intergroup relations play a role in incentivising pathways of (de)radicalisation. The focus in this chapter is mostly on an assessment of how policies work and how Muslims engage with them or not. Martijn de Koning's study joins the conversation of religious and race studies scholars who critically interrogate ideas about religion and race as two separate and fundamentally different categories and look at their entanglements. Through policy analysis and ethnographic research conducted over the last 15 years and building on his earlier work with Maria Vliek, Martijn de Koning will explore the Dutch Countering Extremism/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) and counter- radicalisation approaches as a form of governance problematising Islam through a racial-security lens. According to author's views and to literature review as well, the process of making visible who and what the problem is, is based upon a racialising ascription which clarifies how Muslims emerged as a

category of intervention. The predominant focus on Muslims and radical Islam then turns Islam into a necessary condition to label someone a radical and to be scrutinised for potential risks. It is, however, never a sufficient condition. On the contrary, being Muslim can also turn a person into a possible ally against radicalisation.

The conclusion is that The Dutch P/CVE policies are partly the result of this struggle, and co-emerged with the entanglement of different problem-spaces in which people who were increasingly ascribed a Muslim identity were problematised as out of place, out of time and out of bounds. This has resulted in a huge expansion of state powers and all kinds of laws, measures, policy documents and practices to identify, imagine, know, and eliminate potential risks.

Mehdi Lahlou, in his research The Radicalisation of Morrocan-Origin Youth in Europe. The Case of France tries to find some explanation to some questions within the idea that the concept of radicalisation should provide answers to questions such as the following ones: why do individuals join terrorist groups or commit terrorist acts? What goes on in his and her mind? What is it that makes an individual cross the threshold actually to use violence? In short: what makes a terrorist? As the author explains, in Morocco, religious radicalisation among young people began to appear by the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. Firstly, it started to be visible in public universities and among student unions, where the Islamisation discourse gradually gained a place at the expense of the socialist and modernist discourses.

It is possible to argue that the path taken by radicalising young people in Morocco during the last few decades has been constituted by a combination of both internal and external factors. On the one hand, internal factors have made young people from poor and middle social classes easy targets for recruitment by jihadists as these youngsters were marginalised, impoverished, unemployed, and without much hope for the future. On the other hand, external factors brought Salafists and Wahabis to the fore, invading Moroccan society since the end of the 1970s under the banner of the protection of Islam. Among the sources of violence and terrorist attacks, as the author claims are: first, many young people with migration backgrounds suffer from low educational levels accompanied by the absence of reading, mainly newspapers and books. Second, easy access to information and propaganda documents/messages in the recent reign of social networks. Third, there is a social environment that makes the families increasingly conservative and

communitarian. Further on, Mehdi Lahlou gives reasons for which terrorist acts occur. First, they have experienced early and restrictive interventions of social services and juvenile justice. Family environments are deemed inappropriate or failing; transitions to homes and foster families mark the childhood and adolescence of most of them.

Then their schooling seems to correspond to that of the least qualified fractions of working-class backgrounds, as evidenced by the orienta-tion towards technical courses, which they will not necessarily complete. The research concludes that radicalisation of religious inspiration, even when it takes a violent shape, corresponds more to Islamisation of radicalism, delinquency, or violence than to radicalisation of Islam.

The next chapter in the third section was explored by Metin Koca author of this volume, as well, in his study called Religiosities in a Globalised Market: Migrant-Origin Muslim Europeans' Self-Positioning Beyond the Sending and Receiving States' Politics of Religion. This article focuses on the space that Zainab, a Muslim origin woman, interviewed for this study, and others urge to open by engaging with globally circulating cultural forms – i.e. "the field of possibilities" in Zainab's words. The research analyses individuals who shape their identities around a specific faith system and, as such, become a security concern for the governments occupying themselves with religiosities. His research rests on 152 structured interviews conducted with individuals who self-identify as Muslims in Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The interlocutors' Muslimness was their common denominator, as the author mentions. However, different other identifications appeared in their narratives depending on their perceived context (e.g. some identified themselves as "European", others refused to do so; some identified themselves with the nationality of their country of residence, others did not). During the interviews, which lasted about 90 minutes on average, the individuals were asked to discuss their personal histories, neighbourly relations, family and friendship ties, and mobility history, and to enlarge upon their thoughts on diversity, religiosity, the current state of politics and economics, and finally, their future expectations.

Metin Koca concluded that their interlocutors interact with a globally circulating religious repertoire reterritorialised and recontextualised in Europe and in line with the locally produced emotional needs, interlocution processes, and ideological priorities, the author promising the a future research shall focus on the polarisation in the many-voiced migrant-origin communities and the political

economy of relations through which the state authorities appropriate the religious sphere.

Olivier Roy, also a contributor to the volume we have the pleasure to review, in his research Commentary: Why Extremism? Among other interesting and useful views, the author turns to another side of his research, mainly the deradicalisation policies that are implemented in different places. These policies shed light not so much on the real radicalisation processes, but on the assessment and prejudices underlying these policies, as he explains. He considers that policies are always centred on combatting bad Islam by promoting good Islam and that radicalisation is no longer in the act (violence) but in the motives. Oliver Roy defines jihadism as a religious ideology, although this term of ideology is a bit out of place and contributes to erasing the difference with secular ideologies, as he claims. He also prefers to talk about jihadism as a big narrative construct centred on self-heroisation and the quest for salvation through martyrdom. He adds that, however, this is not the category most commonly used by deradicalisation actors and that the radicalised would remain dangerous as long as they had not reset the religious software. His conclusion with a great impact is that religious freedom is a collateral victim of the fight against radicalisation, because this fight locks the space for theological reflection and puts the religious field under the direct or indirect control of the state.

Succinctly considering each study in the present volume, I would gratefully state that their high quality and vibrant reflection over very interesting cases and life situations can be easily observed in their original value and efforts, conducted and provided by the contributors. This volume offers a captivating expertise of authors through masteful works of professors, researchers and PhD graduates, and serves as an invaluable addition to the field of Migration and Identity, thoroughly analyzing and exploring literature and theories, as well.

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