

On the Human Rights of Refugees and Immigrants, Homification and Immigration Policy¹

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Abstract. Mixing the motives of immigration based on humanitarian and economic or social grounds may be relatively common. In theory immigration policies may often be claimed to be based on the protection of universal human rights, yet in practice the personal qualities of individuals who are in need of protection on humanitarian grounds may rarely be entirely irrelevant when making concrete decisions on international mobility or the provision of asylum or protection on humanitarian grounds. This article argues that it would be more appropriate to clearly select either the unconditional respect for human rights or at least a partial abandonment of the concept of immigration based on humanitarian grounds. In the former case the human rights of refugees or immigrants who are in need of protection on humanitarian grounds would be guaranteed in all circumstances regardless of the costs and the potential homification² difficulties or crimes committed by the refugees or immigrants. In the latter case all potential forms of immigration would be acknowledged to rely, in practice, at least to some extent on the refugees' or immigrants' personal qualities. In both cases optimal immigration and homification policies may be attained through reciprocity in training and hearing experts from both refugee or immigrant and the native or original population backgrounds within the policymaking framework of providing maximum protection for the most important inalienable human rights.

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1. The Distinction between Immigration Based on Humanitarian versus Economic or Social Grounds

One might expect the principles of immigration policy to be relatively simple. Asylums or residence permits granted on humanitarian grounds might be expected to be based exclusively on the humanness of applicants who are in need

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² Please see the *Notes* section at the end of this article for a detailed discussion on the meaning of this term.

of protection. The refugees or immigrants are protected from persecution, death penalty, torture or other types of treatment that violate human rights or human dignity. The educational background, economic productivity or other personal qualities of the refugees or immigrants are not relevant when assessing the need for protection on humanitarian grounds.

Immigration on economic or social grounds, on the other hand, is based on the fulfilment of specific personal criteria. Such criteria may include, for instance, the applicant's age, educational background, work experience, language skills, wealth, marital status, family ties or other personal qualities. In some jurisdictions the place of residence and nationality of the applicant's spouse and children, for instance, may not necessarily be regarded as sufficient grounds for granting the foreign spouse a residence permit. Such jurisdictions may require the fulfilment of specific discretionary conditions that they themselves might regard as appropriate in addition to the family ties.

While any potential mutually exclusive classification of "the mobility of people into two categories - refugees and economic migrants" (Ceriani Cernadas, 2016: 98) or "the 'economic migrant' concept" (ibid.: 101) may in some cases be "legally non-existent, reductionist and erroneous" (ibid.), they might as well be straw men or claims which might relatively rarely be actually or credibly made in the alleged forms. Every migrant either does or does not have some humanitarian grounds for actual or potential international mobility. Whenever such humanitarian grounds do exist, they may often – if not always – include economic factors. Economic factors might be expected to constitute appropriate humanitarian grounds for actual or potential international mobility only to the extent absolute or relative economic deprivation violates inalienable human rights. In such cases the personal attributes of the migrants are irrelevant when assessing the need for protection, aid or international mobility on humanitarian grounds. In contrast, any potential economic factors over and above what is deemed to be necessary for the protection of inalienable human rights might not be expected to constitute a sufficient basis for international mobility on humanitarian grounds. In such cases the fulfilment of specific personal criteria may or may not be relevant for successful international mobility depending on the powers that be in the potential receiving

or destination areas³, although not necessarily for any potential theoretical justification for such mobility. While any specific receiving areas might refuse to grant entry to any specific potential migrants who have a valid humanitarian need for protection, aid or international mobility, they cannot dispute the validity of the humanitarian grounds per se without essentially condoning violations of inalienable human rights.⁴

³ Due to the potential absence of legitimate sovereign entities (see Auvinen, 2017), the word area – rather than, for instance, country – is used throughout this article to refer to the actual or potential host entities of refugees or immigrants.

⁴ It is also far from clear that socially beneficial economic migration is possible. For instance, in zero-sum monetary systems that are close to insolvency at any given point in time (see Auvinen, 2010), any potential migration to the monetary core – wherever it might be physically located – of individuals or groups who are exploiting everyone else would have to be accompanied with corresponding migration of someone else from the monetary core towards the periphery of the monetarily exploited individuals, groups or areas. In the case of the free movement of capital, the nature of capital may often have been violently normalized – prohibiting, regulating, restricting or eliminating, for instance, currencies that would not be issued into circulation against interest-bearing debt, allow funding of, for instance, terrorism by the issuing authorities or private entities or that might offer potential users levels of secrecy or privacy comparable to some other forms of capital holdings – before international capital mobility takes place, thus reducing or eliminating some of the potential benefits of capital diversity or multiculturalism through the homogenization of the nature, characteristics or perhaps “race” or “religion” of would-be capital migrants at the source before largely unrestrained international mobility takes place.

Even if the theoretical possibility for socially beneficial economic migration existed, there may be few if any non-sclerotic economies that would be willing and able to implement the required remedies that might permit non-nihilistically motivated effort to be directed to socially beneficial economic activity. Auvinen (2016a), for instance, has pointed out the potential need for global regime-wide executions and destruction of all non-consensually extracted surveillance information and its derivative works in the case of non-consensually implemented singularity or “trans-/posthuman” technologies. The appropriate remedy in such a case does not involve equality of opportunity or outcome with the perpetrators, but their elimination in order to destroy all non-consensually extracted elements of other people’s humanness or personal information from the universe. Without such executions and destruction, even the allegedly most dynamic or innovative economies in the world could offer to potential migrants perhaps little more than upward mobility within structurally rigged or sclerotic extractive hierarchies in the ongoing presence of some of the worst human rights violations or crimes against humanity in history.

Under non-consensually implemented singularity or “trans-/posthuman” technologies or partly or entirely “artificial” (Konsa, 2008: 1) cultures, there may well be no accurate data available on, for instance, any potential inherent characteristics of refugees, immigrants or members of the native or original population from certain ethnic, religious, economic or other types of backgrounds, the social, economic or other types of effects of immigration in general or any other social realities until all “trans-/posthuman” technologies have been removed to facilitate the discovery of such potential inherent characteristics or effects – if any. Any alleged proponent of immigration restrictions – or any other social

Essentially forced migration may also be used to reduce the migrants' long-term economic viability, to hinder their career prospects or to eliminate them altogether. According to some forms of external evaluation some of the most highly skilled or competent individuals in their fields might, for instance, be systematically denied employment or relatively modest amounts of funding in areas with perhaps relatively small numbers of members of secret societies, cults or other forms of non-transparent social groups⁵ among the general population where such highly skilled or competent individuals might have a realistic chance to settle down permanently with their families. In order to displace or eliminate

policy – who does not first and foremost demand immediate and compulsory removal of all “trans-/posthuman” technologies might be, at best, nihilist – demanding specific policy choices based on actual or alleged data which may well be externally produced or forged by, for instance, an artificial intelligence system and/or its human overseer(s) – or perhaps more likely, for instance, authoritarian or fascist – aiming, for instance, at the external production of skill or productivity differences in favor of the wrong people after the relevant skills or thinking processes have first been stolen from their legitimate owners through non-consensual mind or bodily modeling – and thus potentially also after the community's or humanity' right to exist may have been eliminated by the policies in question through the forcible incorporation of other people's humanness or personal information into their own bodies.

Until such a compulsory removal of all “trans-/posthuman” technologies it might, however, well be correct to view everyone – refugees and immigrants as well as members of the native or original population – as actual or potential soldiers under non-transparent command – individuals who may in some cases willingly, but perhaps in most cases non-consensually and/or unknowingly participate in violent harassment or extermination campaigns or be externally controlled to promote such objectives at any given point in time or at relatively short notice that might be required to expose the body of any specific individual to the relevant types of technologies. This does not, of course, change the fact that any specific courses of action on the part of the victims – whether refugees or immigrants or members of the native or original population – may in fact be autonomous, rational, normal and just responses to the ongoing harassment or extermination campaigns and any potential suggestions otherwise might reflect attempts to externally influence or control the victims or the general population.

⁵ Calling “the ability to gain access to resources by virtue of membership [in a social group]...” (quoted in Cornelius et al., 2003: 6, references omitted) – or, conversely, the ability to exclude potentially more capable and incorruptible individuals from access to resources by virtue of membership in a social group – “social capital” may be inappropriate. In many cases secret societies, cults, criminal or terrorist organizations or networks of co-perpetrators or accomplices, for instance, may provide more appropriate reference points to describe the nature of the underlying activities or social phenomena. It is these secret societies, cults, criminal or terrorist organizations or networks of co-perpetrators or accomplices which refugees or migrants must often confront when searching for any potential non-co-opted institutional, professional, occupational or social spaces in their host areas – if any – often after being victimized by similar groups or networks in their areas of citizenship.

potentially more capable and incorruptible competition before it has the chance to permanently settle down within any specific territory, the only available position or type of funding for such individuals might consist of, for instance, fixed-term funding – potentially significantly larger, if not multiple times the total amount compared to their other job or funding applications – to physically move to foreign hotspots of cultism or secret societies recommended by, for instance, some of the external evaluators or personnel otherwise connected to the applicants' previous institutional affiliations. Such a phenomenon might be described perhaps as, for instance, brain exiling and/or elimination rather than brain drain: the intent or effect may not be the simple temporary displacement of potentially more capable and incorruptible competition after which it might continue to challenge the incompetent, co-opted and/or criminal incumbents, but, at the minimum, to terminate the competing individuals' careers in any specific field, if not also to physically disable or exterminate them. One of the main challenges in the case of independent and competent individuals in some fields may well be keeping them and their family members alive, healthy, together and professionally and socially functional as long as possible. In such fields, frequent professional visits or stays overseas may indicate incompetence, co-optation and/or criminality rather than constituting competence-building forms of professional experience. Essentially forced temporary or permanent migration may thus well be a form of protectionist policy designed to preserve the power of incompetent, co-opted and/or criminal incumbents worldwide rather than an efficiency-increasing or an equality-promoting endeavor.⁶

⁶ Ironically, in a supposedly highly complex and interdependent world, similar mobility requirements as alleged expressions of professional competence do not – according to some, if not all, of the incumbents – appear to apply to, for instance, research topics or “scientific” disciplines. It may be relatively common – if not the norm – for scholars in permanent positions of employment or with long-term funding to focus on producing irrelevancies, trivialities or inaccuracies in relation to highly limited – “specialized” might be an overstatement – topics or disciplinary approaches without having to demonstrate any form of understanding on any other social phenomena. In the case of highly complex and interrelated social phenomena, breadth of knowledge may well be a necessary rather than an optional part of genuinely specializing in any specific research topic with a relatively realistic and comprehensive understanding of all other highly complex and interrelated social phenomena which have an impact on one's field of specialization – if specialization is even in theory possible or in practice desirable in a supposedly highly complex and interdependent world. Most scholars simply don't have the required competence, independence, courage or integrity to examine sufficiently large ranges of topics or interrelationships to be able to produce relevant, accurate, comprehensive and non-trivial “scientific” knowledge. This

Under non-consensually implemented singularity or “trans-/post human” technologies, any specific individuals – with or without accompanying family members – might be trafficked from one jurisdiction to another or within any given jurisdiction through external control of their bodies, be subjected to non-consensual extraction of thoughts and other potentially economically valuable elements of personhood or personal information in forced servitude, tortured, “killed softly” (see Rizal, 2010) through various forms of violence or environmental

potentially science-demolishing deficiency is largely ignored through the cross-evaluation of the alleged quality of “scientific” output by other equally incompetent, co-opted and/or criminal academic position holders or receivers of funding. Under non-consensually implemented singularity or “trans-/posthuman” technologies, for instance, any potential failure to consider the social or societal implications of, for instance, mind-reading, -modeling, -influencing or -control might be expected to result in failing one’s primary school exams – not to mention, for instance, immediate dismissal and, at the minimum, prosecution, if not outright execution, of every academic position holder for, for instance, complicity in some of the worst human rights violations or crimes against humanity in history (see Auvinen, 2016a). Consequently, non-negligible parts of the “scientific community” may be openly psychotic for non-negligible periods of time – for instance, the proponents of the neutral money theory, according to which, for instance, the necessity for the holders of real capital to incur interest-bearing debt to third parties merely to be able to engage in monetized market exchange in their existing real assets does not influence the nature or incentive structures of such exchange.

Geographic mobility of researchers may thus be allegedly deemed to be desirable or necessary primarily in order to provide opportunities for some of the incumbents, secret societies, cults or other forms of non-transparent social groups to eliminate potentially more capable and incorruptible competition regardless of what such competition may or may not do. If the competing individuals do go abroad at some point in time, they might be targeted with crimes and human rights violations when they are relatively more vulnerable without any social safety nets or knowledge of the local environment with the aim of, at the minimum, terminating their careers in the fields in question, if not also physically exterminating them. If the competing individuals do not go abroad and nonetheless manage to do independent research, their job and funding applications might be rejected based on, for instance, a lack of international experience or global professional networks, as if such factors were merits rather than potential or likely indications of incompetence, co-optation and/or criminality.

Thematic or disciplinary mobility, on the other hand, might be allegedly deemed to be professionally undesirable primarily in order to prevent any specific individuals from obtaining an accurate and comprehensive understanding of both the underlying social realities which are being studied as well as the extent of incompetence, co-optation and/or criminality in “science” – let alone from publishing manuscripts which might in some cases demonstrate widespread or systematic incompetence, co-optation and/or criminality through each topic or discipline separately as well as through any potential patterns, interrelationships or interconnections in a highly complex and interrelated world that might be identified through the examination of a sufficiently wide range of research topics or disciplinary approaches.

exposure and be externally controlled to claim that such torture, non-consensual mind-reading, -modelling, -influencing or -control, “soft killing” or other types of crime or human rights violations⁷ constitute social integration to the (“)country(“) they allegedly do and everyone else should – in case they still might not – love without specifying what precisely it is that one is supposed to love when loving the torturous and murderous destination area of human trafficking. Under such circumstances immigration, among other things, might not be primarily, for instance, a political matter. Implementation of criminal justice or self-defense through the elimination of potentially entire state, corporate, military or “law enforcement” structures and every power-wielder within them as well as any potential jurisdictions which might continue to harbor or protect perpetrators might well constitute a more accurate or “legally” pertinent description of the appropriate objectives (Auvinen, 2016a).

2. Implications of the Conflation of Humanitarian and Economic or Social Grounds

Mixing the motives of immigration based on humanitarian or economic or

⁷ One might expect every entity that reports statistics on crime or human rights violations to rely partly on anonymous, victim-managed informational platforms or portals for recording allegations of crime or human rights violations. If, for instance, the charge is that, say, states are essentially criminal or terrorist organizations which deliberately withhold information on the nature, extent and the technologies used in criminal or terrorist activities and that no-one who is receiving a salary may in fact have a duty to do his/her job – only the unpaid victims having the effective responsibility to work in order to terminate the ongoing crimes or human rights violations and to implement justice for the perpetrators while paid officials and professionals are, at the minimum, passively waiting until the surviving victims might have reached a sufficient level of organization to force them to act, if not in all cases also themselves actively participating in the ongoing criminal offences, human rights violations and persecution of the victims through their alleged public or professional authority and spying on, stalking or plagiarizing their victims’ work and private lives – there might be no reliable way for non-perpetrators to keep track of the charges or notify other potential unknowing victims of ongoing criminal or terrorist activities without anonymous platforms or portals managed by the victims themselves. Without an aggregating platform or portal the victims might not be able to locate the relevant information and without anonymity the information – which the criminal or terrorist states would already have but might be reluctant to admit having by openly using it as a basis for further escalating the persecution of the victims – might be used against the victims. Given the likely infeasibility of, for instance, successfully setting up and operating such a platform or portal by the victims for extended periods of time and the non-transparent nature of technological development under “national security” and trade secrecy (see Auvinen, 2017), one might expect the widely available

social grounds may be relatively common. Public commentators including, for instance, the President of the Republic of Finland have demanded adherence to “Finland’s” or “our” central values as a precondition for refugees or immigrants to stay in Finland (see e.g. Toivonen, 2015). For juridical reasons asylum or protection may be denied based on, for instance, war crimes or other types of serious crimes committed by the applicant. Even in such cases the threat of a death penalty, torture, persecution or other kinds of treatment that violate human dignity may prevent deportation of the applicant.⁸ The possibility of law – if any (Auvinen, 2016a) – does not rely on a democratic popularity contest or “the Aristotelian sense of legislative intervention when required by democratic principles and values” (Solanes Corella, 2013: 91). Under law – if any – it might in theory be expected to be possible for, for instance, a single refugee, immigrant or member of the native or original population to successfully bring entire jurisdictions and all their members to justice for crimes or human rights violations irrespective of any potential subsequent unanimous democratic preference by the perpetrators to absolve themselves from liability.

A cynic might point out that any potential discrepancies between humanitarian rhetoric and realities based mainly on some alternative considerations may be unlikely to be limited to migration or migrants. The “clear” and “concerning” trend whereby “migrant populations are seen as a security issue with increasingly little regard for their fundamental rights or any attempt to understand the complexities behind the decision to migrate” (Hudson and Ventura, 2016: 6) might well apply to a non-negligible extent also to the native or original populations of any specific areas irrespective of their migration policies. Populations – including native or original populations – everywhere might well be seen by the powers that be mainly as, for instance, a security issue with increasingly little regard for human or fundamental rights or without any attempt to acknowledge and enforce some of the preconditions for privately, independently and autonomously developed humanness and life choices. Similarly, in the case of both refugees or immigrants and members of the native or original population, positions of public or professional authority may be largely allocated based on non-transparent social affinities or domestic or transnational secret society or cult

estimates of the extent, nature and incidence of crime to be inaccurate, if not completely fictional or “artificial” (Konsa, 2008: 1).

⁸ See the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).

memberships⁹ rather than a non-biased selection of the most competent and

⁹ Credentialization may be used by secret societies, cults or other types of non-transparent social groups for the purposes of both promoting members and violently attacking non-members. Some of the primarily Anglophone educational institutions with the most aggressive and ferocious military backing to violently impose whatever it is that might or might not be going on within their premises or among their stakeholders as state-of-the-art science – and thus allegedly the highest world rankings among academic institutions – might, for instance, select disproportionate numbers of staff and students among less qualified actual or potential members of secret societies, cults or other forms of non-transparent social groups in order to promote their career development while selecting relatively small numbers of more independent, qualified and incorruptible candidates to keep up the illusion of high academic standards.

From the perspective of non-member students or any potential non-member staff their courses of study or academic appointments might perhaps be compared to a secret society or cult meeting which they are non-consensually attending during the course of their studies or appointments, whereby the current members, at the minimum, spy on them and examine their co-optability, corruptibility and other potentially desirable or necessary personal characteristics for potential membership or, at the minimum, for purposes of unacknowledged plagiarism or harassment, stalking or mimicking campaigns. In some cases performances where non-consensually extracted surveillance information or information relevant to the victims' personal circumstances is recycled back to them under different labels might unfold even among their colleagues or staff members in situations or informational exchanges which are accessible to the victims, although in cultist hotspots it may not be easy for the victims to find any physical spaces where such recycling or harassment could not take place through some individuals or technologies. After their studies or appointments the students' or staff members' professional futures might be determined more by the nature of their relationships to the secret societies or cults in question – persistent and knowledgeable opposition bringing perhaps the bleakest future prospects – rather than competence, independence or any non-cult-related activities which they might have undertaken during the course of their studies or appointments.

A similar logic might apply, for instance, to much of the corporate world, where entry-level positions might be viewed as, for instance, trial periods for secret society or cult membership. Irrespective of their productivity, non-co-optable or excessively incorruptible individuals might often be fired before becoming aware of the real nature of the corporation – if not the entire corporate world – as, for instance, a competition-stifling cultist conspiracy against some potentially relevant polity, humanity or humanness in general, while co-optable or corruptible individuals might have lucrative long-term careers in the protection of non-productivity-related class interests against the more non-co-optable or incorruptible individuals or classes. In politics genuine competition might often be eliminated by militaries or security services controlled by the incumbents well before presenting credible threats to the prevailing segregational policies: “national security”, for instance, might be interpreted as security of the ruling class, secret society or cult against exposure – let alone overthrow or elimination – by less co-optable or corruptible and often more competent and productive individuals or groups on the less privileged side of structurally segregated societies.

Conversely, members of secret societies, cults or other forms of non-transparent social groups might deliberately attempt to accumulate negative credentials or qualifications – for instance, false medical diagnoses, criminal records or anything else that might be portrayable in a negative light for complicit or naïve observers – for potentially threatening or competing

incorruptible independent candidates irrespective of ethnic, religious or class background.

Yet the human rights of anyone who permanently resides in Finland – or presumably in several other developed areas – cannot at least in theory be violated based on his/her opinions or actions concerning, for instance, democracy, equality, human rights or the (“law”) of the host area. Even in areas where “new immigrants should immediately sign a declaration in which they pledge... to respect the common values of the province” (Mancilla, 2012: 259) or refugees or immigrants are required to “identify themselves” with the local “language and culture” or “sign a loyalty statement to the constitution” (Costoiu, 2008: 11) in order to acquire citizenship, a person who commits serious crimes is often condemned to a penalty defined by the (“law”) rather than, for instance, forfeiture of his/her human rights or changing his/her attitudes. Why might the human rights of refugees or immigrants who are in need of protection on humanitarian grounds thus often not be regarded as equal to the human rights of members of the native or original population?

A person who is in need of protection on humanitarian grounds cannot be forced to adopt the values of his/her host area and even the commission of serious crimes might not be regarded as a sufficient basis for depriving the perpetrator of his/her human rights in the host area or for returning him/her to his/her home area that is deemed to violate human dignity. Refugees or immigrants who come to, for instance, Finland permanently on humanitarian grounds can only be supported and encouraged to homify into their new home area as effectively as possible. Immigration policy might aim to steer the refugees’ or immigrants’ homification efforts toward multiculturalism, assimilation, locally determined objectives as a part of the “autonomic diversity” of different communities within a “patchwork model” (Martínez de Lizarrondo Artola, 2009: 116) of integration or some other

independent candidates in order to, at the minimum, hinder their career development, if not to eliminate them. As long as academic or other types of societal institutions are subservient to concentrated power or located in jurisdictions where science or some other potentially relevant type of activity may not be feasible, staff and student selection and any other potential positive or negative credentializing activities in the case of both refugees or immigrants and members of the native or original population may always to some extent be based on the particularities of concentrated power – for instance, domestic and/or foreign policy, private kingdom or network building or warfare among competing factions, groups or networks – rather than non-affiliated competence in those activities which each type of institution is supposed to be undertaking.

perhaps “equally rigid” (Costoiu, 2008: 15)¹⁰ directions that are regarded as desirable based on extensive public discussion and democratic decisions. The final decision on the types of homification policies that the refugees or immigrants may or may not want is ultimately, however, made exclusively by the refugees or immigrants themselves.

¹⁰ Multicultural societies may not necessarily be any “less rigid” (Costoiu, 2008: 15) in terms of their integration policies than “states where the national identity was historically fused with the ethnic or racial identity” (ibid.: 14) or “nation-states that have historically created a strictly civic national identity, one in which ethnicity and other types of group identities do not have a place” (ibid.). In one of its theoretically purest hypothetical forms, multiculturalism involves either no culture – no sub-culture being in a position to impose its views on others in any form of public interaction – or a distinct type of monoculture – for instance, syncretism or globalism – which is inimical to some other distinct cultures. For instance, according to one globalist attempt to not only declare other conceptualizations of culture allegedly inferior, but to appropriate the concept of culture for the exclusive use of a distinct ideology, religion or worldview based on the notion of unity, transformability and openness of all “ethnic, geographical or religious features”, “The most important problem we have currently faced in the educational system is that cultures, far from being clearly defined as global, dynamic and open, are being constrained to ethnic, geographical or religious features” (Peñalva Vélez, 2009: 86). Christians, for instance, might view the statement as an attempt to deny, among others things, the existence of unchanging truths originating from the Christian God, the independence of such unchanging truths from humans or the separation of Christians from the world – on a conceptual level as long as possible and perhaps on a practical level thereafter, attempting, for instance, to present clear changes, transformations or distortions of the underlying unchanging truths as mere adaptations of those unchanging truths to changing circumstances when the potential existence of unchanging truths might no longer be denied.

Multiculturalism may never have been tried in practice, as some distinct cultures or worldviews may always have been more equal than others. In the words of Mancilla (2012: 259), for instance, “Although official integration policies promote the acceptance and integration of differences, one wonders how far this... paves the way for selective exclusion.” The multicultural utopia is not a mosaic of relativistic or mutually incompatible worldviews. The relativistic or mutually incompatible worldviews would be permanently limiting each other’s capacity for full and authentic self-expression in at least some spheres of life. Were multiculturalism ever to be tried, it might well be expected to degenerate into toleritarianism – a distinct ideology, religion or worldview whereby one’s identity might be expected to be defined by unlimited tolerance towards others, whose identities would be equally vacuous as they would also be defined by tolerance of others up to a point where no-one might know what precisely they are supposed to be tolerating and be reluctant to ask in order to avoid sounding intolerant or being punished for intolerance. The possibility of identity or culture requires the maximum capacity for autonomous self-actualization and self-expression on one’s own terms in the widest possible range of public and private environments. Whenever such freedoms exist for a relatively large number of individuals, shared identities or cultures – rather than, for instance, mere power relations – may be discovered, formed or reformed. Genuine diversity requires tolerance towards all conceivable worldviews – including intolerance. Consequently, diversity can only be a reality, not an end, as it must always involve the possibility of being transformed into a more uniform identity or culture in order to be authentic.

3. Need for Reciprocal Homification Policies

One of the relevant factors in designing homification policies and assessing the extent to which they might realistically be implemented is reciprocity between the refugees or immigrants and the native or original population. The prevailing homification policies often focus mainly on measures that are targeted at the refugees or immigrants themselves. Refugees and immigrants are also often in a near monopoly position in interpreting their own cultures and experiences to the native or original population. Under such circumstances any potential communication or “intercultural mediation” (see e.g. Jabbaz and Moncusí Ferré, 2009), for instance, may never be able to identify some of the potentially relevant issues, let alone approach such issues with a sufficiently detailed and realistic understanding of the underlying cultures or worldviews.

Entrusting the surviving members of any specific group, polity, society or culture – often after a non-negligible period of harmonizing or disciplinary violence that might have eliminated some of the best and the brightest individuals from each group – with the task of explaining the relevant characteristics, practices and needs of their group, polity, society or culture to others and negotiating with other individuals in similar positions may simply be too dangerous for every group, polity, society or culture in the world regardless of the amount of international mobility which might or might not take place. One might expect the attainment of “[t]he external defensibility of a political community” based on practices which “appear to be tolerable for other communities and their members” (Koller, 2009: 315) and the possibility of peaceful coexistence, for instance, to involve, among other things, mutual exchange of researchers or something akin to weapons inspectors in the widest possible sense of the term between different groups, polities, societies or cultures in the world whom sovereign entities would have to allow to enter and freely move within their territories in order to maintain the legitimacy of their claims to sovereignty. Such researchers or inspectors might be entrusted with the task of identifying issues which might present potential or likely threats to, for instance, the protection of inalienable human rights, peaceful coexistence or any other potential preconditions for the continued external defensibility of any specific political community. Some victims of long-standing domestic oppression or worse might be happy to welcome competent and independent foreign

researchers or inspectors into their areas of citizenship who might be able to bring, for instance, blatant and long-standing human rights violations to wider attention and, if necessary, initiate any potential de-sovereignization processes which might allow the establishment of legitimate, human rights-protecting sovereign entities or governance structures within any specific sovereign entities from the scratch without the ongoing perpetrator influence, control or violence during the period of transition. The alternative to such compulsory mutual exchange of researchers or inspectors might well in some cases be permanent global violent conflict with no other theoretical solution than extermination of at least one of the parties to the conflict. In regard of the homification policies of refugees or immigrants, one might ask whether language, cultural and homification training in relation to the refugees' or immigrants' native languages and cultures should be offered to some of those members of the native or original population who might wish to acquire such knowledge or skills in order allow both the refugees or the immigrants and the volunteer members of the native or original population to acquire in-depth knowledge of each other's cultures.

From a purely economic perspective homification training that is offered exclusively to the refugees or immigrants distorts competition. Refugees or immigrants may, after receiving linguistic and cultural homification training funded by the state, set up, for instance, companies offering translation or interpretation services or in other ways utilize their language skills and cultural knowledge, while members of the native or original population have to acquire the corresponding knowledge of the refugees' or immigrants' native languages and cultures at their own expense.

From the perspective of successful homification it might be appropriate to train with state funding also members of the native or original population from diverse backgrounds to become experts on the refugees' or immigrants' native languages and cultures. Individuals from different backgrounds may often pay attention to different things. It may be unrealistic to expect refugees or immigrants who have just arrived in their host areas to be able to recognize and communicate the biggest challenges to their homification in ways required by the native or original populations. How many Finns, for instance, travelling to, say, Iraq could comprehensively explain their culture in ways that would be best understood in Iraq? Would it not help if native Iraqis with knowledge of the Finnish language and culture would be ready to pose to the Finns questions or viewpoints, which they

might not have thought of, and to communicate some of the peculiarities of the Finnish culture in ways that are best understood by the Iraqi native population? Even in the case of refugees or immigrants who have already resided in Finland or some other host area for relatively long periods of time some of the best homification tips or concrete homification measures might well come from members of the native or original population who are familiar with the refugees' or immigrants' native languages and cultures.

Training in the refugees' or immigrants' linguistic and cultural background would also provide opponents of at least some types or amounts of immigration an opportunity to participate in the public discussion with substantive argumentation. In case certain cultures are indeed seen to include certain characteristics which make homification to Finland or some other host area difficult, any expert from the native or original population trained at the state's expense would have an opportunity to contribute well-substantiated views to the public discussion on homification or immigration policies. The trained experts from the native or original population might thus, in addition to promoting the homification of refugees and immigrants to Finland or some other host area, have a significant role in promoting discussion between the proponents and opponents of at least some types or amounts of immigration.

4. The Way Forward: The Maximum Protection of the Most Important Inalienable Human Rights as the Relevant Policymaking Framework

Public discussion on immigration policy both in Finland and in many other areas may often be contradictory. The terminology associated with immigration based on humanitarian grounds strives to create an impression of responsible societies that selflessly aim to contribute to a better world. In practice, however, the expected benefits or disadvantages to the host area may often dominate public discussion. Public statements might often attempt to present the need for protection on humanitarian grounds as one criterion among others, on the basis of which suitable refugees or immigrants might be selected at least to some extent based on the presumed interests of the host area.

Would it not be more consistent to clearly select either the unconditional respect for human rights or at least a partial abandonment of the concept of immigration based on humanitarian grounds? In the former case the human rights

of refugees or immigrants who are in need of protection on humanitarian grounds would be guaranteed in all circumstances regardless of the costs and the potential homification difficulties or crimes committed by the refugees or immigrants.¹¹ In the latter case all potential forms of immigration would be acknowledged to rely, in practice, at least to some extent on the refugees' or immigrants' personal qualities. In both cases optimal immigration and homification policies may be attained through reciprocity in training and hearing experts from both refugee or immigrant and the native or original population backgrounds.

One might expect the principles stated in the immigration policy of any specific host area to apply also to the unborn children of members of the native or original population – “migrants” who are not only being prevented from entering any specific territories, but also from being born in the first place by potentially genocidal policies targeted against some actual or potential members of the native or original populations. Any specific member of the native or original population might, for instance, be deprived of employment, professional position or compensation commensurate with his/her actual or potential ability or the relative lack of ability of the incumbents or be targeted with more active exterminatory violence with the intent or effect of, for instance, implementing policies of reverse

¹¹ In the case of crimes or human rights violations committed or facilitated by the host area against refugees or migrants, one might expect such crimes or human rights violations to prevent explicit or effective deportation or, at the minimum, to give rise to perpetual claims to justice by the victims against the host area in question irrespective of the refugees' or migrants' subsequent activities, physical locations or places of residence. In other words, while any specific area may be able to prevent any specific refugees or migrants from entering its territory at any given point in time, once refugees or migrants have entered the territory in question and been subjected to crimes or human rights violations, one might expect the refugees or migrants in question to have perpetual claims against the current or past host area that would persist until adequate remedies have been provided – potentially involving, among other things, de-sovereignization of the host area in question – irrespective of what the host area might or might not decide to do in respect of the refugees or migrants in question until adequate remedies have been provided. One may thus wonder what the logic in, for instance, “Japan’s aversion to creating a more pluralistic society based on arguments associated with social stability, history and the fear of rising crime rates” (Nagy, 2008: 47) might be: a fear of letting in excessively persistent and long-living migrants who are able to expose some of the heretofore largely ignored crime and human rights violations targeted against both non-citizens and citizens in Japan, thus causing an increase in the recorded – internationally, if not necessarily in Japan’s own official statistics relying on input from authorities who may be notoriously averse to receiving, accepting or recording crime reports or information about crimes or human rights violations – crime rates, upsetting some of the established patterns of crime and demolishing some historical myths about the magnitude, incidence and the perpetrators of crime in Japan?

eugenics – the elimination of non-co-opted or excessively incorruptible individuals – through genocidal violence and/or “deliberately inflicting... conditions of life calculated to bring about... physical destruction” (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, Article 6c).

As Garcia (2009), for instance, has pointed out, in case of doubt, the burden of proof for showing the absence of discrimination is on the part of the state.¹² Whenever the total amount of resources that is unconditionally made available to each migrant exceeds the total amount of resources that is unconditionally made available to each member of the native or original population, such policies of genocide and/or reverse eugenics may be explicitly targeted against the native or original populations as a whole or significant parts of them. One of the potentially more relevant news items or pictures of the year or era might thus not be, for instance, a picture of a dead immigrant child on the beach of some potential host area (see e.g. Szczepanik, 2016: 25), but a picture of an empty beach devoid of the unborn children of members of the native or original populations whose potential parents – unlike the actual migrating parents and/or children who were able to successfully give birth or be born in allegedly more

¹² This may be a formidable – if not clearly infeasible – task for states which, for instance, might attempt to confine all legitimate economic, academic etc. activity to a narrowly and arbitrarily, if not outright incorrectly defined set of legal institutions – corporations, universities etc. – and then subsidize or protect from external competition whoever it might be that is receiving income from such institutions as the alleged captains of industry, the “scientific community” or gatekeepers to any form of economic, “scientific” etc. activity whose privileges must allegedly be guaranteed in case anyone in the society wants to engage in or enjoy the benefits of economic, “scientific” etc. activity. In some cases discrimination may well be an understatement. A legal obligation to engage in zero-sum competition for money under a monetary system that as a whole is close to insolvency at any given point in time (see Auvinen, 2010), for instance, might more appropriately be described as a deliberate attempt to exterminate non-nihilistic humans – whether based on ethical, moral, religious, efficiency-maximizing, rights-based or some other considerations – by depriving them of the possibility to engage in monetized market exchange on acceptable terms rather than being regarded as mere discrimination against them. Such potential conclusions may have nothing to do with competitiveness, efficiency or productivity: the individuals to be exterminated or discriminated against may well be among the most competitive, efficient and productive even under the prevailing economic, “scientific” etc. institutional structures – let alone under less narrowly and arbitrarily or more correctly specified institutions – yet their non-nihilistic personal qualities may prevent them from either engaging in those activities in which they might be among the most competitive, efficient or productive or at least receiving appropriate compensation for such activities. Perhaps most – if not all – states might thus not only be illegitimate, but also profoundly discriminatory or exterminatory towards non-nihilist forms of humanness potentially in the case of both refugees or immigrants and members of the native or original population.

dangerous parts of the world – were unable to protect their unborn children from genocidal violence up to a point where human rights or sympathies for their potential violations might have been more widely recognized as being potentially relevant.

Some of the most deeply entrenched racism, genocidal violence or hatred for humanity or humanness in general may thus well manifest themselves mainly among the powers that be in the receiving or host areas for migrants and be targeted mainly against, at the minimum, non-co-opted or excessively incorruptible members of the native or original populations – if not the entire native or original populations, as the populations' chances and/or justification for continued survival might be drastically reduced by the racism, genocidal violence or hatred for humanity or humanness in general of the powers that be. In such cases one might well expect the relevant policy objective – whether meritocracy, equality of outcome or something else or some combination of them¹³ – to be implemented immediately by penalizing or eliminating every perpetrator of genocide and/or reverse eugenics. Alternatively, the fact that human rights – even in their current potentially highly deficient and/or mutually contradictory form – may be dead, access to all forms of income, wealth, power and other potential conditions for survival may be largely based on sufficiently co-opted, corrupted, criminal, terrorist or cultist personal qualities rather than more positive personal attributes and rights or dignity that humans might possess simply by virtue of being humans may not in reality exist might be at least implicitly acknowledged. Similarly, in such cases one might also expect the nature of the ongoing conflict to be recognized by non-co-opted observers as, for instance, an all-out war – potentially both a civil war and a war involving transnational or global elements – conducted through perhaps most, if not all, available means rather than, for instance, social interaction to which some rules – no matter how illegitimate, invalid, biased, non-existent or even theoretically infeasible (see Auvinen, 2016a on the possibility of law) – might be applicable for purposes other than projecting the very genocidal violence that the ongoing conflict might largely consist of.

The suggestion that an explicit selection might be made between the unconditional respect for human rights and at least a partial abandonment of the concept of immigration based on humanitarian grounds might merely aim to make

¹³ See Auvinen (2010) for a suggestion that at least some degree of equality of outcome may be necessary for the possibility of science.

the selected immigration policies more consistent and transparent. It does not tell what those policies should be. It may, however, be difficult to disagree with “the general recognition of *ius migrandi* as a basic right of persons” (Velasco, 2016a: 41), according to which “Freedom of movement around the planet is a basic right of all human beings. The burden of proof falls on those who defend suspending or restricting it” (ibid.: 42).

One potential approach to address such a burden of proof might involve making sovereignty conditional on the universal and unconditional protection of the most important inalienable human rights of both members and non-members of any legitimate sovereign entity.¹⁴ In the words of Auvinen (2017):

“The most important inalienable human rights are self-ownership of one’s body, personhood and personal information and, consequently, the actually enforced

¹⁴ Given the fact that not all potential legitimate sovereign entities might necessarily choose to define “members” exclusively as citizens, the terms members and non-members – rather than, for instance, citizens and non-citizens – are used here. A legitimate sovereign entity might, for instance, regard all of its residents or human beings who are physically located within its territory irrespective of their citizenship or residence status as members. On the other hand, citizenship cannot necessarily “be considered in terms of the nature and quality of relationships among the recognized members of an established society, or of the boundaries of that society, that divides members and non-members” (Ambrosini, 2012: 14). Citizenship alone may not render, for instance, naturalized citizens of a different ethnic origin or “people who are ‘Japanese’ and have citizenship, not to mention acculturation and phenotype by which they can normally ‘pass’ as ‘Japanese,’ yet suffer from discrimination by descent and social origin (e.g., the Burakumin historical underclass, the indigenous peoples of Hokkaido and Okinawa, or Japanese children of international relationships (Arudou 2006)” (Arudou, 2013: 158) “recognized members” who would always and everywhere be regarded as being located within “the boundaries of that society”, while non-citizens who are perceived to be of the same ethnic origin might in some cases or circumstances be regarded as members of the society (see Arudou, 2013). In case an area or polity attempts to exclude some citizens from membership based on, for instance, ethnic factors, the area or polity in question might be expected to lose the legitimacy of any potential claim to sovereignty.

Discrimination, violence or social conflicts may not, however, always be based on the distinction between members and non-members – however defined – of the polity, society or area as a whole even in areas where discrimination, violence or social conflicts based on precisely such type of a distinction might be rampant. It is, for instance, quite possible that some conflicts take place between the members and non-members of secret societies, cults, criminal or terrorist organizations or networks of co-perpetrators or accomplices rather than members of different ethnic groups or polities. In such cases victimized refugees or immigrants might well be fighting on the same side with the majority of the members of their host areas or polities against secret societies, cults, criminal or terrorist organizations or networks of co-perpetrators or accomplices that might ravage both the host areas or polities and the refugees’ or migrants’ areas or polities of citizenship through a minority of the members in both polities.

opportunity for free, private and autonomous exercise of human agency. In the absence of free, private and autonomous exercise of human agency, individuals will never have an opportunity to form and express their informed consent for the prevailing definitions of community, social contract, sovereignty or any other potentially relevant forms of community or governance – let alone to shatter any potential illusions about the alleged existence of such legitimate forms of community, sovereignty or governance through the identification of even one potential ‘community’ member, citizen, subject or a self-declared victim of misuses of ‘communal’ or sovereign forms of power disagreeing with or refusing to adhere to some aspects of the prevailing definitions of community or sovereignty.

Without universal and unconditional respect for and enforcement of the most important inalienable human rights which override all other alleged rights in case of conflict, there is no legitimate sovereign entity or nation that could actually or allegedly be defended, secured or governed.”

Such an approach might still not determine the appropriate choice between the unconditional respect for human rights and at least a partial abandonment of the concept of immigration based on humanitarian grounds. It would, however, define one potential precondition that any sovereign entity would have to fulfil before being able to legitimately form independent immigration policy or engage in any other types of activities which might commonly be associated with sovereign entities. It would also define the conceptual and ethical frameworks within which any legitimate sovereign immigration policies would have to be formed: any legitimate sovereign entity would have to show that its immigration policies – whatever they might be – aim at and actually achieve the maximum protection of the most important inalienable human rights of both members and non-members of the sovereign entity in question. In other words, a sovereign entity that at least partly abandons the concept of immigration based on humanitarian grounds would have to show, for instance, that other ways of protecting the most important inalienable human rights of both members and non-members are more effective than physically moving some victims of human rights violations into its territory or that immigration restrictions are necessary to protect, for instance, domestic cohesion, which allows more effective or extensive protection of the most important inalienable human rights of both members and non-members in order to maintain a legitimate claim to sovereignty. It does thus not necessarily follow that someone who might recognize freedom of movement as “a basic right of all human beings” (Velasco, 2016a: 42) would necessarily “defend a

world in which the opening of borders is the rule and not the exception” (ibid.: 43). The most important inalienable human rights – if not even the optimal or maximum feasible combination of, for the sake of the argument, equally important but mutually contradictory human rights – may well be protected most effectively through policies other than open borders.¹⁵

NOTES

1. This document may be accessed exclusively by natural persons who have not had willing and knowing access to any part of its contents in any form through any technological means or to any technologies which may facilitate unauthorized access to unpublished material without specifying the author of such material before it was made available by the author for personal, non-commercial use only. No derivative works are permitted.

2. Finding an appropriate English translation for the Finnish term “kotouttaminen” may not be easy. It is sometimes translated as “social integration” of refugees or immigrants to Finland. There is, however, nothing about social or about integration in the Finnish term. The term is based on the Finnish word for home – “koti” – and might thus be translated as the process of making Finland the refugees’ or immigrants’ home. It may not be overly pedantic to point out that technically the Finnish term in itself does not specify the precise type of home that should be provided to the refugees or immigrants in Finland. Is it based exclusively on the native or original population’s or the refugees’ or immigrants’ views on what an appropriate home in Finland might look like, or on some combination of those views? To the extent the relevant qualities of a “home” are defined by the refugees or immigrants themselves and they are in significant conflict with at least some views of the native or original population, the term “kotouttaminen” might thus as well be translated as,

¹⁵ Nevertheless, policies other than open borders do not, of course, guarantee any specific types of outcomes. For instance, statements according to which “There are many people who, because they were born on the wrong side of the border, have no chance of ever becoming as wealthy as the poorest people in the United States, Japan, or Western Europe [Velasco, 2016b]” (Velasco, 2016a: 56) may be simply incorrect. To the extent some truth might be involved in such statements, it might well reflect, for instance, relatively high efficiency in the elimination of dissidents or marginalized individuals in some of the more “developed” areas before they might become sufficiently poor to render the statement incorrect. The objective might in every case, however, be the unconditional respect for and enforcement of the most important human rights of each individual human being rather than, for instance, the violent promotion of some of the worst characteristics or qualities of humanness through a sleight of hand that attempts to make individual human rights, autonomy and privacy subservient to some local, national, regional, global or universal collectivities rather than the other way round.

for instance, antisocial disintegration, if this is what makes some of the refugees or immigrants feel like home in Finland.

Studying, for instance, assimilation without any normative assimilationist preferences or assumptions might thus not be entirely straightforward – let alone “almost indispensable” (Delgado Montaldo, 2007: 45, translation by the author) – as there might be no unambiguous standard on what precisely refugees, immigrants or members of the native or original population might or might not spontaneously assimilate to without any deliberate assimilatory policies or pursuits. If, for instance, it is the effective lack of some civil rights, labor market or educational participation commensurate with one’s capabilities starting from potential discrimination against children with at least one native parent in the allocation of places in international kindergartens or ability to select place of residence freely in a geographic class society which might have made living in some areas infeasible to individuals who were not born into residential property ownership in those locations (see *ibid.*: 46) that some refugees or immigrants, marginalized non-co-opted members of the native or original population or both associate with genuine independent and autonomous Finnishness or “home”, then these might well be at least equally defensible measures of assimilation as, for instance, full civil rights, labor market participation above one’s merits or capabilities, high educational attainment or genuine ability to choose place of residence might be. In the case of any potential authentic native characteristics which might have been exterminated by more violent or ruthless groups or imported conceptualizations of humanness, assimilation into the existing, violently normalized forms of imported humanness might betray the original authentic expressions of the local culture to the extent any potential refugees or immigrants might exhibit such characteristics prior to any potential social integration or assimilation. Were, for instance, honesty an original and authentic but nowadays largely extinct characteristic of Finnishness, any potential adaptation of refugees or immigrants to some of the prevailing lies, hypocrisies, cultism or Newspeak might well be regarded as a failure to assimilate into the original and authentic Finnish culture rather than successful integration into it. There would appear to be room in the Finnish language for going through some of the potential approaches to “making Finland the refugees’ or immigrants’ home” and creating more appropriate terminology to describe such positions.

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